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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS 
by Raúl Prebisch 
I . INTRODUCTION 
In Latin America, reality is undermining the out-dated 
' schema of the international division of labour, which 
achieved great importance in the nineteenth century and, 
as a theoretical concept, continued to exert considerable 
- influence until very recently. 
Under that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin 
America, as part of the periphery of the world economic 
system, was that of producing food and raw materials for 
the great industrial centres. 
There was no place within it for the industrialization 
of the new countries. It is nevertheless being forced upon 
them by events. Two world wars in a single generation 
and a great economic crisis between them have shown 
the Latin-American countries their opportunities, clearly 
pointing the way to industrial activity. 
The academic discussion, however, is far from ended. 
In economics, ideologies usually tend either to lag behind 
events or to outlive them. It is true that the reasoning 
on the economic advantages of the international division 
of labour is theoretically sound, but it is usually forgotten 
that it is based upon an assumption which has been con-
clusively proved false by facts. According to this assump-
tion, the benefits of technical progress tend to be dis-
tributed alike over the whole community, either by the 
lowering of prices or the corresponding raising of in-
comes. The countries producing raw materials obtain 
their share of these benefits through international ex-
change, and therefore have no need to industrialize. If 
they were to do so, their lesser efficiency would result in 
their losing the conventional advantages of such exchange. 
The flaw in this asumption is that of generalizing from 
the particular. If by "the community" only the great 
industrial countries are meant, it is indeed true that the 
benefits of technical progress are gradually distributed 
among all social groups and classes. If, however, the con-
cept of the community is extended to include the periph-
ery of the world economy, a serious error is implicit in 
the generalization. The enormous benefits that derive from 
increased productivity have not reached the periphery in 
Editorial note: The present study, an English translation of which 
was printed in May 1950, but which was distributed in Spanish only 
in mimeographed form, is now being reproduced in the Bulletin, 
in view of the great demand for it in university circles and among 
economists. The author has introduced no change in the original 
text. 
a measure comparable to that obtained by the peoples of 
the great industrial countries. Hence, the outstanding 
dififerences between the standards of living of the masses 
of the former and the latter and the manifest discrepancies 
between their respective abilities to accumulate capital, 
since the margin of saving depends primarily on increased 
productivity. 
Thus there exists an obvious disequilibrium, a fact 
which, whatever its explanation or justification, destroys 
the basic premise underlying the schema of the interna-
tional division of labour. 
Hence, the fundamental significance of the industrializa-
tion of the new countries. Industrialization is not an end 
in itself, but the principal means at the disposal of those 
countries of obtaining a share of the benefits of technical 
progress and of progressively raising the standard of living 
of the masses. 
The Latin-American countries are thus faced with an 
immense general problem, embracing a series of minor 
ones which must be defined before embarking on the long 
task of research and practical measures which will be 
necessary if there is a firm intention to solve the problems. 
It would be premature, in this initial report, to draw 
conclusions that would have only the doubtful value of an 
improvisation. Admittedly much remains to be done in 
the Latin-American countries, both in learning the facts 
and in their proper theoretical interpretation. Though 
many of the problems of these countries are similar, no 
common effort has ever been made even to examine and 
elucidate them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
studies published on the economy of Latin-American 
countries often reflect the points of view or the experience 
of the great centres of world economy. Those studies 
cannot be expected to solve problems of direct concern 
to Latin America.. The case of the Latin-American coun-
tries must therefore be presented clearly, so that their 
interests, 
of course, 
may be adequately integrated within the general frame-
work of international economic co-operation. 
The task ahead is thus considerable and the responsi-
bility heavy. To deal with it methodically, it would be 
necessary to begin with a preliminary examination of 
the principal problems as a whole, at the same time bring-
ing out certain general considerations suggested by direct 
contact with the economic life of Latin America. Such is 
the purpose of this report. 
, aspirations and opportunities, bearing in mind, 
, the individual differences and characteristics. 
1 
The industrialization of Latin America is not incom-
patible with the efficient development of primary produc-
tion. On the contrary, the availability of the best capital 
equipment and the prompt adoption of new techniques 
are essential if the development of industry is to fulfil the 
social objective of raising the standard of living. The 
same is true of the mechanization of agriculture. Primary 
products must be exported to allow for the importation 
of the considerable quantity of capital goods needed. 
The more active Latin America's foreign trade, the 
greater the possibility of increasing productivity by means 
of intensive capital formation. The solution does not lie 
in growth at the expense of foreign trade, but in knowing 
how to extract, from continually growing foreign trade, 
the elements that will promote economic development. 
If reasoning does hot suffice to convince us ol the close 
tie between economic development and foreign trade, a 
few facts relating to the situation today will make it 
evident. The economic activity and level of employment 
in the majority 'of the Latin-American countries are con-
siderably higher than before the war. This high level of 
employment entails increased imports of consumer goods, 
both non-durable and durable, besides those of raw ma-
terials and capital goods, and very often exports are 
insufficient to provide for them. 
This is evident in the case of imports and other items 
payable in dollars; There are already well-known cases of 
scarcity of that currency in certain countries, despite the 
fact that the amount of dollars supplied by the United 
States to the rest of the world in payment of its own im-
ports was considerable. In relation to its national income, 
however, the import coefficient of the United States has, 
after a persistent decline, arrived at a very low level (not 
over 3 per cent). It is, therefore, not surprising that, 
notwithstanding the high income level of the United States, 
the dollar resources thus made available to the Latin-
American countries seem insufficient to pay for the im-
ports needed for their intensive development. 
It is true that as European economy recovers, trade 
with that continent can profitably be increased, but Europe 
will not supply Latin America with more dollars unless 
the United States increases its import coefficient for Euro-
pean goods. 
This, then, is the core of the problem. I t is obvious 
that if the abovementioned coefficient is not raised, Latin 
America will be compelled to divert its purchases from 
the United States to those countries which provide the 
exchange to pay for them. Such a solution is certainly 
very dubious, since it often means the purchase of more 
expensive or unsuitable goods. 
It would be deplorable to fall back on measures of that 
kind when a basic solution might be found. It is sometimes 
thought that, by reason of the enormous productive ca-
pacity of the United States, that country could not increase 
its import coefficient for the purpose of providing the 
basic solution to this world problem. Such a conclusion 
cannot be substantiated without a prior analysis of the 
factors that havé caused the United States steadily to 
reduce its import coefficient. These factors are aggravated 
by unemployment, but can be overcome when it does not 
exist. One can understand that it is of vital importance, 
both to Latin America and the rest of the world, that the 
United States achieve its aim of maintaining a high level 
of employment. 
It cannot be denied that the economic development of 
certain Latin-American countries and their rapid assimila-
tion of modern technology, in so far as they can utilize 
it, depend to a very large extent upon foreign investment. 
The implications involved render the problem far from 
simple. The negative factors include the failure to meet 
foreign financial commitments during the great depression 
of the nineteen thirties, a failure which, it is generally 
agreed, must not be allowed to happen again. Fundamen-
tally the problem is the same as that referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. The servicing of these foreign in-
vestments, unless new investments are made, must be paid 
for by means of exports in the same currency and, if 
these do not show a corresponding increase, in time the 
same difficulties will arise again. They will be the greater 
if exports fall violently. The question thus arises, whether, 
pending that basic solution, it would not be wiser to direct 
investments toward such productive activities as would, 
through direct or indirect reduction of dollar imports, 
permit the regular servicing of foreign obligations. 
Here one must beware of dogmatic generalizations. To 
assume that the meeting of foreign commitments and the 
proper functioning of the monetary system depend upon 
nothing more than a decision to obey certain rules of the 
game is to fall into an error involving serious consequen-^i 
ces. Even when the gold standard was in operation in the 
great centres, the countries of the Latin-American 
periphery had great difficulty in maintaining it, and their^ 
monetary troubles frequently provoked condemnation from 
abroad. The more recent experiences of the large coun-
tries have brought a better understanding of some aspects 
of the situation. Great Britain, between the two wars, 
encountered difficulties somewhat similar to those which 
arose and continue to arise in the Latin-American coun-
tries, which have never taken kindly to the rigidity of the 
gold standard. That experience doubtless helps to bring 
about a better understanding of the phenomena of the 
periphery. 
The gold standard has ceased to function, as in the 
past, and the management of currency has become even 
more complex in the periphery. Can all these complica-
tions be overcome by a strict application of sound rules 
of monetary behaviour? Sound rules for these countries 
are still in the making. Here there arises another vital 
problem; that of utilizing individual and collective ex-
perience to find a means of harmoniously fitting monetary 
action into a policy of regular and intensive economic 
development. 
Let this not be interpreted as meaning that the classic 
teachings are of no value. If they do not provide positive 
rules, they at least show what cannot be done without 
impairing the stability of the currency. The extremes to 
which inflation has gone in Latin America show that 
monetary policy was not based upon these teachings, 
since some of the larger Latin-American countries in-
creased circulation to a greater extent than did those 
countries which had to meet enormous war expenditure. 
There is yet another aspect of the problem of dollar 
shortage. It is true that, as already stated, a high level 
of employment increases imports. But it is also a fact 
that an excessive monetary expansion has often unduly 
increased the pressure on the balance of payments, thus 
leading to the use of foreign exchange for purposes not 
always compatible with economic development. 
These facts must be taken into account in an objective 
analysis of the effects of the inflationary increase on the 
process of capitalization. It must, however, be admitted 
that, in most of the Latin-American countries, voluntary 
savings are not sufficient to cover the most urgent capital 
needs. In any case, monetary expansion does not bring 
about an increase in the foreign exchange reserves ne-
cessary for the importation of capital goods; it merely 
redistributes income. It must now be determined whether 
it has led to a more active capital formation. 
The point is a decisive one. The raising of the standard of 
living of the masses ultimately depends on the existence 
of a considerable amount of capital per man employed in 
industry, transport and primary production, and on the 
ability to use it well. 
Consequently, the Latin-American countries need to 
accumulate an enormous amount of capital. Several have 
already shown their capacity to save to the extent of 
being able to finance a large part of their industrial 
investments through their own efforts. Even in this case, 
which is exceptional, capital formation has to overcome 
a strong tendency towards certain types of consumption 
which are often incompatible with intensive capitalization.. 
Nevertheless, it does not appear essential to restrict the 
individual consumption of the bulk of the population, 
which, on the whole, is too low, in order to accumulate 
ihe capital required for industrialization and for the • 
technical improvement of agriculture. An immediate in-
crease in productivity per man could be brought about 
by well-directed foreign investments added to present 
savings. Once this initial improvement has been accom-
plished, a considerable part of the increased production 
can be devoted to capital formation rather than to inop-
portune consumption. 
How are sufficient increases in productivity to be 
achieved? The experience of recent years is instructive. 
With some exceptions, the rise in employment necessitated 
by industrial development was made possible by the use 
of men whom technical progress had displaced from 
primary production and other ocupations, especially cer-
tain comparatively poorly paid types of personal services, 
and by the employment of women. The industrial em-
ployment of the unemployed, or ill-employed, has thus 
, meant a considerable improvement in productivity and, 
consequently, where other factors have not brought about 
a general lowering of productive efficiency, a net increase 
in national income. 
The great scope for technical progress in the field of 
primary production, even in those countries where it has 
already been considerable, together with the perfecting 
of existing industries, could contribute, to national in-
come, a net increase that would provide an ever-increasing 
margin of saving. 
All this, however, especially in so far as it is desired to 
reduce the need for foreign investments, presupposes a 
far greater initial capitalization than is usually possible 
with the type of consumption of certain sectors of the 
community, or the high proportion of national income 
absorbed, in some countries, by fiscal expenditure, which 
makes no direct or indirect contribution to national pro-
ductivity. 
It is, in fact, a demonstration of the latent conflict 
existing in these countries between the desire to assimilate, 
quicldy, ways of life which the technically more advanced 
countries adopted step by step as their productivity in-
creased, and the need for capitalization without which 
this increase in productivity could not be achieved. 
For the very reason that capital is scarce, and the 
need for it great, its use should be subjected to a strict 
standard of efficacy which has not been easy to maintain, 
especially where industries have developed to meet an 
emergency. There is, however, still time to correct certain 
deviations and, above all, to avoid them in the future. 
In order to achieve this, the purpose of industrializa-
tion must be clearly defined. If industrialization is con-
sidered to be the means of attaining an autarchic ideal 
in which economic considerations are of secondary im-
portance, any industry that can produce substitutes for 
imports is justifiable. If, however, the aim is to increase ' 
the measurable well-being of the masses, the limits beyond 
which more intensive industrialization might mean a de-
crease in productivity must be home in mind. ' 
Formerly, before the great depression, development in 
the Latin-American countries was stimulated from abroad 
by the constant increase of exports. There is no reason 
to suppose, at least at present, that this will again occur 
to the same extent, except under very exceptional circum-
stances. These countries no longer have an alternative 
between vigorous growth along those lines and internal 
expansion through industrialization. Industrialization has 
become the most important means of expansion. 
This does not mean, however, that primary exports 
must be sacrificed to further industrial development. Ex-
ports not only provide the foreign exchange with which 
to buy the imports necessary for economic development, 
but their value usually includes a high proportion of land 
rent, which does not involve any collective cost. If pro-
ductivity in agriculture can be increased by technical' 
progress and if, at the same time, real wages can be 
raised by industrialization and adequate social legislation, 
the disequilibrium between incomes at the centres and 
the periphery can gradually be corrected without de-
triment to that essential eiconomic activity. 
This is one of the limits of industrialization which must 
be carefully considered in plans of development. Another 
concerns the optimum size of industrial enterprises. It is 
generally found in Latin-American countries that the 
same industries are being attempted on both sides of the 
same frontier. This tends to diminish productive efficiency 
and so militates against fulfilling the social task to be 
accomplished. The defect is a serious one, which the 
nineteenth century was able to attenuate considerably. 
When Great Britain proved, with facts, the advantages 
of industry, other countries followed suit. Industrial de-
velopment, however, spurred by active competition, tended 
towards certain characteristic types of specialization which 
encouraged profitable trade between the various countries. 
Specialization furthered technical progress and the latter 
made possible higher incomes. Here, unlike the case of 
industrial countries by comparison with those producing 
primary products, the classic advantages of the division 
of labour between countries that are equal, or nearly so, 
followed. 
The possibility of losing a considerable proportion of 
the benefits of technical progress through an excessive 
division of markets thus constitutes another factor limit-
ing the industrial expansion of these countries. Far from 
being unsurmountable, however, it is a factor which 
could be removed with mutual benefit by a wise policy 
of economic interdependence. 
Anti-cyclical policies must be included in any pro-
grammes of economic development if there is to be an at-
tempt, from a social point of view, to raise real income. 
The spread of the cyclical fluctuations of the large centres 
to the Latin-American periphery means a considerable loss 
of income to these countries. If this could be avoided, it 
3 
would simplify the problem of capital formation. Attempts 
have been made to evolve an anti-cyclical policy, but it 
must be admitted that, as yet, but litde light has been 
thrown on this subject. Furthermore, the present dwin-
dling of metallic reserves of several countries means that, 
in the event of a recession originating abroad, they would 
not only be without a plan of defense but would lack 
means of their own to carry out the measures demanded 
by the circumstances. 
The principal problems having been set forth in this 
first part of the report, the following sections will be 
devoted to some of tíieir outstanding aspects, which must 
be discussed both on account of their intrinsic importance 
and of the need for carrying out systematic research on 
them.'^ 
I I . THE ADVANTAGE OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND THE 
COTTOTRIES OF THE PERIPHERY 
It was stated in the preceding section that the advantages 
of technical progress have been mainly concentrated in the 
industrial centres and have not directly extended to 
the countries making up the periphery of the world's 
economic system. The increased productivity of the in-
dustrial countries certainly stimulated the demand for 
primary products and thus constituted a dynamic factor 
of the utmost importance in the development of Latin 
America. That, however, is distinct from the question 
discussed below. 
Speaking generally, technical progress seems to have 
been greater in industry than in the primary production 
of peripheral countries, as was pointed out in a recent 
study on price relations.^ Consequently, if prices had been 
reduced in proportion to increasing productivity, the re-
duction should have been less in the case of primary 
products than in that of manufactures, so that as the 
disparity between productivites increased, the price re-
lationship between the two should have shown a steady 
improvement in favour of the countries of the periphery. 
Had this happened, the phenomenon would have been 
of profound significance. The countries of the periphery 
would have benefited from the fall in price of finished 
industrial products to the same extent as the countries 
of the centre. The benefits of technical progress would 
The obstacles in the way of carrying out such a task in Latin 
America are -well known. The greatest difficulty is perhaps the 
small number of economists capable of an original approach to 
the specific problems of these countries. For various reasons, it has 
not been possible to supply the lack by training an adequate 
number of young men of high intellectual calibre. Considerable 
progress has been_ made by sending them to the great European 
and American universities, but this is not sufficient. One of the 
most conspicuous deficiencies of general economic theory, from 
the point of view of the periphery, is its false sense of universality. 
It could hardly be expected that the economists of the great 
countries, absorbed by serious problems of their own, should devote 
preferential attention to a study of those of Latin America. The 
study of Latin America's economic life is primarily the concern 
of its own economists. Only if this regional economy can be ex-
plained rationally and with scientific objectivity, can effective 
proposals for practical action be achieved. 
It must no be thought, however, that this desire springs from 
an exclusive individualism. On the contrary, Latin-American eco-
nomists can only accomplish it on the basis of a sound knowledge 
of the theories expounded in the great countries with their wealth 
of universal truths. An intelligent knowledge of the ideas of others 
must not be confused with that mental subjection to them from 
which we are slowly learning to free ourselves. 
" "Post War Price Relations in Trade Between Under-developed 
and Industrialized Countries", document E/CN.1/Sub.3/W.5. 
thus have been distributed alike throughout the world, in 
accordance with the implicit premise of the schema of 
the international division of labour, and Latin America 
would have had no economic advantage in industrializing. 
On the contrary, the region would have suffered a definite 
loss, until it had achieved the same productive efficiency 
as the industrial countries. 
The above supposition is not borne out by the facts. As 
can be seen in the indexes of table 1, the price rela-
tion turned steadily against primary production from the 
1870's until the Second World War. I t is regrettable 
that the price indexes do not reflect the differences in 
quality of finished products. For this reason, it was not 
possible to take them into account in these considerations. 
With the same amount of primary products, only 63 per 
cent of the finished manufactures which could be bought 
in the 1860's were to be had in the 1930's; in other 
words, an average of 58.6 per cent more primary products 
was needed to buy the same amount of finished manufac-
tures.® The price relation, therefore, moved against the 
periphery, contrary to what should have happened had 
prices fallen as costs decreased as a result of higher 
productivity. ^ 
During the expansion of the last war, as in the case 
of all cyclical expansions, the relation moved in favour 
of primary products. Now, however, although there h ^ 
not been a recession, a typical readjustment is taking 
place, with the result that prices of primary products are 
losing their former advantage. 
The pointing out of this disparity between prices does 
not imply passing judgment regarding its significance 
from other points of view. It could be argued, on grounds 
° According to the report already quoted. The figures for the 
thirties go only as far as 1938 inclusive. The data given are the 
Board of Trade's average price indexes for British imports and 
exports representative of world prices for raw materials and 
manufactured goods respectively. 
Table 1 
RATIO OF PRICES OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES TO" 
THOSE OF MANUFACTURED GOODS (AVERAGE IMPORT 
AND EXPORT PRICES, ACCORDING TO DATA OF THE 
BOARD OF TRADE) 
(1876-80 = 100) 
Periods 
Amount of finished 
products obtainable 















SOURCE: "Post War Price Relations in Trade Between Under-
developed and Industrialized Countries", document E/CN.l/ 
Sub.3/W.5, 23 February 1949. 
of equity, that the countries which strove to achieve a 
high degree of technical efficiency were in no way obliged 
to share its fruits with the rest of the world. Had they 
done so, they would not have reached their enormous 
capacity to save, without which it might well be asked 
whether technical progress would have achieved the in-
tense rhythm which characterizes capitalist development. 
In any case the productive technique exists and is at the 
disposal of those with the capacity and perseverance to 
assimilate it and increase their own productivity. All 
that, however, is outside the scope of this report. The 
purpose is to emphasize a fact which, despite its many 
implications, is not usually given the importance it de-
serves when the significance of the industrialization of the 
peripheral countries is discussed. 
Simple reasoning on the phenomenon in question brings 
us to the following considerations: 
First. Prices have not fallen concomitantly with tech-
nical progress, since, while on the one hand, costs tended 
to decrease as a result of higher productivity, on the 
other, the income of entrepreneurs and productive factors 
increased. When income increased more than productivity, 
prices rose instead of falling. 
Second. Had the rise in income, in the industrial cen-
tres and the periphery, been proportionate to the increase 
in their respective productivity, the price relation between 
primary and manufactured products would have been the 
same as if prices had fallen in strict proportion to pro-
ductivity. Given the higher productivity of industry, the 
price relation would have moved in favour of the primary 
products. 
Third. Since, as we have seen, the ratio actually moved 
against primary products in the period between the 
1870's and the 1930's, it is evident that in the centre the 
income of entrepreneurs and of productive factors in-
creased relatively more than productivity, whereas in the 
periphery the increase in income was less than that in 
productivity. 
In other words, while the centres kept the whole benefit 
of the technical development of their industries, the 
'peripheral countries transferred to them a share of the 
fruits of their own technical progress.^ 
Before explaining the reason for this phenomenon, 
.which is so important to Latin America, it would be 
well to consider how the effects of increased productivity 
are transmitted. 
* "Post War Price Relations in Trade between Under-developed 
and Industrialized Countries", document ByCN.l/Sub.3/W.5, pp. 
115-116: 
"A long-term deterioration in terms of trade, such as has been 
found to obtain for primaij producers over a long period, may 
be an effect of differences in the rate of increase in productivity 
in the production of primary commodities and manufactured 
articles, respectively. If we can assume that the deteriorating terms 
of trade for under-developed countries reflect a more rapid in-
crease of productivity in primary commodities than of manu-
factured goods, the effect of worsened terms of trade would, of 
course, be less serious. It would merely mean that, to the extent 
that primary commodities are being exported, the effects of in-
creased productivity are being passed on to the buyers of primary 
articles in the more industrialized countries. Although statistical 
data on differential rates of increase in productivity of primary 
production in under-developed countries, and production of manu-
factured articles in industrialized countries, are almost entirely 
lacking, this explanation of the long-term changes in terms of 
trade which were observed in this study may be dismissed. There 
is little doubt that productivity increased faster in the indus-
trialized countries than primary production in under-developed 
countries. This is evidenced by the more rapid rise in standards 
of living in industrialized countries during the long period covered, 
Table 2 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
BENEFITS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS BETWEEN 




























Costs decrease as productivity rises and prices 
decrease with costs, without any rise in income: 
100" 100 100 100 
62.5" 71.4 116.7 87.5 
Costs decrease as in the first case, but income 












prices following the increase in income: 
100" 100 100 





° Figures relate to the finished products. See explanation on 
page 8. 
" Part of the price representing value added by the manufactur-
ing process. 
For this purpose, an illustrative example is presented 
in table 2, in which it is assumed that the indexes of 
productivity, per man, are greater in industry than in 
primary production. For the sake of simplification, both 
are supposed to make an equal contribution to the finished 
product. 
It has been assumed in the first case that, with an 
increase in productivity, from 100 to 120 in agriculture 
and from 100 to 160 in industry, incomes of entrepre-
neurs and productive factors do not rise, but costs fall. If 
prices are reduced pari passu with costs, the decline in 
the price of primary products is less than that in the case 
of manufactured goods, as is shown by the corresponding 
indexes. Consequently, the ratio between the two moves, 
in favour of the primary products, from 100 to 116.7. 
This is precisely the ratio that would have allowed the 
increase in final production to be shared equally by the 
primary producers and the industrial centres. In fact, if 
there is an increase in primary productivity from 100 to 
120, and if, as has just been seen, 100 primary products 
can now be exchanged for 116.7 manufactured articles, it 
means that primary producers can now obtain 140 instead 
of 100 of those products, or, in other words, that the 
increase has been the same as in the case of final pro-
duction, an increase obviously obtained by the industrial 
producers also. 
from 1870 to the present day. Hence, the changes observed in 
terms of trade do not mean that increased productivity in primary 
production was passed on to industrialized countries; on the 
contrary, they mean that the under-developed countries maintained, 
in the prices which they paid for their imported manufactures 
relative to those which they obtained for their own primary 
products, a rising standard of living in the industrialized countries, 
without receiving, in the price of their own products, a correspond-
ing equivalent contribution towards their own standards of living." 
There is a marked difference in these results when, in 
the second case, incomes are altered. It is assumed that, 
in industry, the increase in income is greater than the 
increase in productivity and that, in primary production, 
both increases are equal. As a result, the price ratio 
moves against primary production, f rom 100 to 93.3, so 
that primary products, despite the increase in productivity 
from 100 to 120, can buy only 112.0 final products, as 
against 100 previously. On the other hand, a similar calcu-
lation shows that industrial producers can now obtain 168 
final products, as compared with the 100 they bought 
before. 
It should be noted that, whereas the primary producers 
can increase their acquisitions of final products less than 
they increase productivity, industrial producers benefit 
more than they should in relation to the increase in 
their productivity. 
It follows, logically, that if the increase in income in 
primary production had been assumed to be less than, 
instead of equal to, the increase in productivity, the price 
ratio would have dropped still further against the primary 
producers. 
The deterioration of 36.5 per cent in the price ratio 
between the eighteen seventies and the nineteen thirties 
suggests the possibility of a phenomenon of that kind. 
In short, if, in spite of greater technical progress in 
industry than in primary production, the price relation 
has moved against the latter instead of in its favour, it 
would seem that the average income, per capita, has risen 
more in industrial centres than in the producer countries 
of the periphery. 
. The existence of this phenomenon cannot be understood, 
except in relation to trade cycles and the way in which 
they occur in the centres and at the periphery, since the 
cycle is the characteristic form of growth of capitalist 
economy, and increased productivity is one of the main 
factors of that growth. 
In the cyclical process of the centres, there is a contin-
uous inequality between the aggregate damand and sup-
ply of finished consumer goods. The former is greater 
than the latter in the upswing and lower in the down-
swing. 
The magnitude of profits and their variations are 
closely bound up with this disparity. Profits rise during 
the upswing, thus tending to curtail excess demand by 
raising prices; they fall during the downswing, in that 
case, to counteract the effect of excess supply by lowering 
prices. 
As prices rise, profits are transferred from the entre-
preneurs at the centre to the primary producers of the 
periphery. The greater the competition and the longer 
the time required to increase primary production in re-
lation to the time needed for the other stages of produc-
tion, and the smaller the stocks, the greater the proportion 
of profits transferred to the periphery. Hence follows a 
typical characteristic of the cyclical upswing; prices of 
primary products tend to rise more sharply than those of 
finished goods, by reason of the high proportion of 
profits transferred to the periphery. 
If this be so, what is the explanation of the fact that, 
with the passage of time and throughout the cycles, in-
come has increased more at the centre than at the 
periphery? 
There is no contradiction whatsoever between the two 
phenomena. The prices of primary products rise more 
rapidly than industrial prices in the upswing, but also 
they fall more in the downswing, so that in the course 
of the cycles the gap between prices of the two is pro-
gressively widened. 
Let us now look at the explanations of this inequality 
in the cyclical movement of prices. It was seen that 
profits rise in the upswing and decrease in the downswing, 
thus tending to offset the disparity between demand and 
supply. If profits could fall in the same way in which 
they rose, there would be no reason whatsoever for this 
unequal movement. It occurs precisely because they can-
not fall in that way. 
The reason is very simple. During the upswing, part 
of the profits are absorbed by an increase in wages, 
occasioned by competition between entrepreneurs and by 
the pressure of trade unions. When profits have to be 
reduced during the downswing, the part that had been 
absorbed by wage increases loses its fluidity, at the cen-
tre, by reason of the well-known resistance to a lowering 
of wages. The pressure then moves toward the periphery, 
with greater force than would be the case if, by reason 
of the limitations of competition, wages and profits in the 
centre were not rigid. The less that income can contract 
at the centre, the more it must do so at the periphery. 
The characteristic lack of organization among the wor-
kers employed in primary production prevents them from 
obtaining wage increases comparable to those of the inj-. 
dustrial countries and from maintaining the increases to 
the same extent. The reduction of income — whether 
profits or wages — is therefore less difficult at the pe-
riphery. 
Even if there existed as great a rigidity at the periphery 
as at the centre, it would merely increase the pressure of 
the latter on the former, since, when profits in the pe-
riphery did not decrease sufficiently to offset the inequali-
ty between supply and demand in the cyclical centres, 
stocks would accumulate in the latter, industrial produc-
tion contract, and with it the demand for primary pro-
ducts. Demand would then fall to the extent required to 
achieve the necessary reduction in income in the primary 
producing sector. The forced readjustment of costs of _ 
primary production during the world crisis illustrates 
the intensity that this movement can attain. 
The greater ability of the masses in the cyclical centres 
to obtain rises in wages during the upswing and to 
maintain the higher level during the downswing and the 
ability of these centres, by virtue of the role they play in 
production, to divert cyclical pressure to the periphery 
(causing a greater reduction of income of the latter than 
in that of the centres) explain why income at the centres 
persistently tends to rise more than in the countries of 
the periphery, as happened in the case of Latin America. 
That is the clue to the phenomenon whereby the great 
industrial centres not only keep for themselves the benefit 
of the use of new techniques in their own economy, but 
are in a favourable position to obtain a share of that 
deriving from the technical progress of the periphery. 
I I I . LATIN AMERICA AND THE HIGH PRODUCTIVITY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
The United States is now the principal cyclical centre 
of the world, as was formerly Great Britain, Its economic 
influence over other countries is obvious, and in that in-
fluence, its enormous increase in productivity has played 
a vital part. It has profoundly affected foreign trade and, 
through its variations, the rate of economic development 
of the rest of the world and the international distribution 
of gold. 
The Latin-American countries, with their high coeffi-
cient of foreign trade, are extremely sensitive to such 
economic repercussions. An examination of the implica-
tions of the phenomenon and the problems it presents is 
therefore opportune. 
It is a well-known fact that, in the United States, prices 
have not fallen in proportion to the increase in producti-
vity as the recent research of Mr. Fabricant has clearly 
shown. During the period covered by that research — the 
forty years preceding the Second World War — manufac-
turing production costs declined regularly and persistently. 
The movement of prices did not follow this pattern at all. 
The increase in productivity was not reflected in prices 
hut in income. Wages and salaries rose as real costs fell. 
This did not account, however, for all the benefits of pro-
ductivity, as an appreciable part of it was passed on in 
the form of a shorter working day. 
The increase in income arising out of higher producti-
vity sooner or later extends to all phases of economic life 
through the well-known process, which need not be recalled 
here. By virtue of that same process income has also 
increased in activities in which technical progress has 
been insignificant or non-existent, as in certain types of 
services. In some social groups the increase was very 
slow; meanwhile the rest of the community enjoyed ad-
vantages which, as the necessary adjustment took place, 
had to be yielded to the former. This transfer, however, 
was usually ofi'set by new increases in wages resulting 
from still higher productivity. 
This fact is pointed out as a good example of the type 
of adjustment to which the gradual industrialization of 
Latin America will necessarily give rise. As productivity 
increases with industrialization, wages will rise, thus caus-
ing a comparative increase in the prices of primary pro-
ducts. In this way, as its income rises, primary production 
will gradually obtain that share of the benefits of technical 
progress which it would have enjoyed had prices declined. 
As in the case of the lagging social groups mentioned 
above, it is evident that such adjustment will mean a loss 
of real income in the industrial sectors, which will, how-
ever, be limited by the import coefficient; but in the long 
run, that loss can be well compensated by the benefit of 
subsequent technical developments. 
As mentioned before, since prices do not keep pace 
with productivity, industrialization is the only means by 
which the Latin-American countries may fully obtain the 
advantages of technical progress. 
Another solution had, nevertheless, been found by the 
classical theory. If the advantages of technique were not 
passed on through prices, they would be extended to the 
same degree by the raising of income. We have just seen 
that this is precisely what happened in the United States, 
as well as in the other great industrial centres. It did 
not, however, occur in the rest of the world. It would have 
required, throughout the world, the same mobility of 
factors of production as that which characterized the 
broad field of the internal economy of the United States. 
That mobility is one of the essential assumptions of the 
theory. In fact, however, a series of obstacles hampered 
the easy movement of productive factors. Doubtless the 
high wages paid in the United States, as compared with 
those in the rest of the world, would have attracted large 
masses to that country, with a very adverse effect upon 
wages, tending to reduce the difference between them and 
those in the rest of the world. 
Thus the observance of one of the essential rules of the 
classic game would have resulted in a considerable lower-
ing of the standard of living of the United States, as 
compared with the levels actually achieved. 
It is easily understandable that the protection of this 
standard of living, attained by great effort, should have 
prevailed over the uncertain advantages of an academic 
concept. But the classic rules of the game form an indivi-
sible whole and, if one is eliminated, the others cannot 
logically serve as absolute standards governing relations 
between the centres and the periphery. 
This point is the more worthy of consideration in that 
one of the consequences of the technical progress of the 
United States, so much greater than that of the rest of 
the world, has been another important departure from the 
rules. 
As previously stated, the import coefficient of the United 
States has become extremely low, not more than 3 per 
cent. In 1929 it was 5 per cent. The decline is not new, 
but one of long standing. During the last hundred years, 
national income increased about two and a half times 
more than imports. 
This phenomenon is largely explained by technical pro-
gress. Paradoxical as it may seem, increased productivity 
contributed to the strengthening of the United States' pro-
tective tariff policy, after that country had reached the 
stage of economic maturity. The explanation is simple. 
Over a given period of time, technical progress does not 
affect all industries equally. When higher wages resulting 
from the increased productivity of the more advanced 
industries are extended to the less advanced, the latter 
lose the advantage which had enabled them to compete 
with foreign industries paying lower wages. The signifi-
cance of this factor will be appreciated from the fact that 
wages are twice or two and a half times as high in the 
United States as in Great Britain. Thus, tariff protection 
has been necessary for industries more efficient than their 
foreign competitors, but whose level of productivity is 
lower than the average for their own country. For instance, 
despite the great improvement of agricultural techni-
que, some of the important branches of agriculture needed 
protection as a result of their relatively high incomes as 
compared with those of foreign competitors. 
England, when it was the economic dynamic centre, 
followed a diametrically opposed policy. If, however, the 
clock could be put back, it is by no means certain that it 
would abide by the same policy and disrupt its economy. 
The United States is a powerful and well-integrated eco-
nomic entity and has become so largely through its own 
deliberate effort, the great significance of which is re-
cognized. One cannot overlook, however, the fact that this 
brought about, for the rest of the world, conditions in-
compatible with the functioning of international economy 
in the same way as before the First World War, when 
the British centre strictly observed the rules of the game 
in the fields of monetary policy and foreign trade. 
It is under these new conditions of international eco-
nomy, that the process of industrialization has begun to 
develop in Latin America. The fundamental problem lies 
in adaptation to these conditions — in so fa r as they can-
not be altered — while seeking new rules in keeping with 
the new circumstances. 
Until that happens, and possibly with slight intervals, 
a persistent tendency toward disequilibrium will prevail. 
It is due, fundamentally, to the following fact; while, as 
we have seen, the import coefficient of the United States 
has been declining, the dollar imports of the Latin-Amer-
ican countries are tending to increase, thus compelHng, 
them to take defensive measures to lessen the effects. 
There are several reasons for this: 
First: since technical progress has been greater in the 
United States than anywhere else, the demand for the 
capital goods necessary for industrialization is preferen-
tially made upon that country. 
Second: technical development continuously manifests 
itself in the form of new products which, by modifying 
existing ways of life, assume the character of new neces-
sities, of new ways of spending the income of Latin 
America, generally substituting them for the previous 
forms of domestic expenditure. 
Third: in addition to those products which have un-
deniable technical advantages, there are others toward 
which demand is diverted by the considerable persuasive 
power of advertising. New tastes are created which must 
be satisfied by imports, to the prejudice of those which 
could be satisfied locally. 
That it is not possible to reduce the import coefficient 
at the centre on die one hand, and to allow it to increase 
freely in the periphery on the other, under the influence 
of the above factors, was fully proved by the serious 
events of the nineteen thirties. We now have sufficient 
perspective to understand their significance and to learn 
the lesson that they teach. One other fact must first be 
mentioned. 
It has already been stated that the industrialization of 
Latin America, if wisely carried out, will open the way 
to a considerable increase in national income, by giving 
more productive employment to vast numbers of the po-
pulation at present engaged in occupations of low pro-
ductivity. 
It can now be seen that the rise in income so far 
achieved has accentuated the influence of those factors on 
the demand for dollar imports. The greater the rise in 
income in these countries, therefore, the greater their need 
to import. This brings us once again to the problem of 
dollar shortage, which demands special attention. 
I V . THE PROBLEM OF THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE AND ITS 
REPERCUSSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 
As soon as the symptoms of a dollar shortage begin to 
appear, the natural reaction is to look back at the not 
very distant past when, as shown in charts 1 and 2, in-
creasingly large quantities of gold were being concentrated 
in the vaults of the United States. Before the First World 
War, that country held 26.5 per cent of the world reserves; 
by the beginning of the Second World War, this figure 
had increased to 50.9 per cent; and though at the end 
of hostilities it had fallen to 36.5 per cent, the United 
States again increased its share, which in 1948 comprised 
about half the world reserves. 
The dollar shortage means that the United States does 
not purchase merchandise and services, or lend money, in 
an amount sufficient to cover the needs, justified or not, of 
other countries. This entails recourse to monetary reserves: 
dollars must be sold or gold sent to the United States. 
Though this dwindling of reserves is not slow to give 
rise to monetary disturbances, the attraction of gold 
toward the main cyclical centre, if persistent, is not simply 
a monetary problem; it is the manifestation of a much 
deeper dynamic phenomenon related to the rhythm of 
economic growth of the various countries and the way in 
which it occurs. 
Depending on the type of its own growth, the action of 
the principal centre may, through cyclical fluctuations, 
take the form either of a persistent tendency to expel gold 
that flows to it, and thus stimulate the economic develop-
ment of the rest of the world, or that of a tenacious re-
tention of gold, to the detriment of the dynamic forces of 
the rest of the world. The British cyclical centre was of 
the first type. So was the new principal cyclical centre 
before 1929. In the nineteen thirties, however, the second 
type prevailed, and the countries of the rest of the world 
were obliged to adjust their relationship with that centre 
Chart 1 
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NOTE: The amounts representing net short-term dollar assets 
belonging to the countries of t he rest of the world have been 
deducted from the gold holdings of the United States, since they 
represent monetary assets belonging to these countries and not 
to the United States. In view of the size of these assets at 
certain times, the effects of the adjustment are considerable. In 
1947, for instance, the United States would have held 60 per 
cent of the world's gold, had not the exclusion of the above 
mentioned dollar assets reduced the figure to 48.6 per cent. 
SOURCES: The following procedure has been adopted in making 
this adjustment: (a) Data for the years 1931-1936, both in-
clusive, have been taken from Banking and Monetary Statistics, 
Washin^on, 1943, pages 574-589, and after 1937 from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, January 1949, page 130. (6) The figures for 
the years before 1931 have been calculated by taking the net 
balances of the short-term capital movement according to the data 
for the United States balance of payments published in The 
United States in the World Economy, United States Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
Economic Series No. 23—Appendix B. In charts 1 and 2 parts 
of the curve have not been adjusted, owing to lack of data. The 
world total has been obtained from the Federal Preserve Bulletin 
for the years before 1940, and from the Annual Reports of the 
Bank for International Settlements, Basle, for the later years. 
Data for 1948 are preliminary. All calculations have been made 
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in order that they might he able to continue developing, 
in spite of the unfavourable influence of the centre and its 
great absorption of metal. 
The Latin-American countries shared, with the others, 
the hardships of the nineteen thirties. It is understandable, 
therefore, that, faced with the symptoms of another dollar 
shortage, they should examine the past, as they can now do 
in clearer perspective, to discover whether the same factors 
which were at work then are again coming into force. 
Those factors relate, on the one hand, to the repercus-
sions on the rest of the world of the contraction and ex-
pansion of the principal cyclical centre and, on the other, 
to the marked reduction of its import coefficient and other 
foreign payments. 
When income falls in the principal centre during the 
cyclical downswing, the fall tends to spread to the rest of 
the world. If the Tatter's income does not fall simultane-
ously and correspondingly, but with a certain lag a dis-
equilibrium arises in the balance of payments. Since the 
fail in income is more rapid at the centre, the decrease 
in imports and other foreign payments is sharper there 
than in the rest of the world, with the result that the 
latter is forced to send gold to the centre. If equilibrium 
were possible — in the presence of cycles it is not — bal-
ance would be achieved when the respective incomes fell 
at the same rate. 
The cyclical contraction that occurred in the United 
States after 1929 would have been sufficient to attract a 
great part of the gold it had lost during the previous 
expansion, as usually happened in the cycles of the old 
principal centre. In this case, however, there appeared a 
new factor which had not been an element of the British 
influence, namely, the decline of the import coefficient. 
This decline was chiefly the result of two events: the rais-
ing of tariffs in 1929, on the one hand, and, on the other. 
a greater decline in the prices of imported primary pro-
ducts than in those of finished products (which have the 
most influence on national income). Chart 3 illustrates 
the intensity of this phenomenon. 
The decline of the import coefficient in the principal 
cyclical centre strengthens the tendency to accumulate 
gold, resulting from the contraction of income. In fact, 
imports in the centre fall even more sharply than in the 
rest of the world and the disequilibrium turns still further 
against the latter. To restore the balance, it would not 
only be necessary, as in the previous case, for the income 
of the rest of the world to contract as sharply as that of 
the principal cyclical centre, but much more sharply. The 
greater the decline in the import coefficient and in other 
external payments of the principal cyclical centre, the 
more must the income of the rest of the world fall below 
the level of that centre. It must be remenbered that, in 
addition to imports, these other external payments were 
also considerably reduced, by the cessation of the foreign 
loans made by the United States. 
After the trough of the depression had been reached, in 
1933, another expansion took place. According to British 
cyclical experience, the principal cyclical centre should 
have lost gold, as in fact it did during the expansion of 
the nineteen twenties. In the thirties, however, the opposite 
occurred; the monetary reserves of the United States 
attained extraordinary proportions, even discounting, as 
has been done in all the charts, the large quantity of 
foreign funds which, for other reasons, were deposited in 
dollars in the United States. 
The decline of the import coefficient played a part in 
this. The income of the centre would have had to increase 
much more than that of the rest of the world for the 
former to cease attracting gold after the contraction and 
subsequently to begin losing it. The increase would have 
Chart 4 
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SOURCE: The data for income have been obtained from National 
Income and its Composition, by S. Kusnetz, New York, 1941 
for the years 1919-1928; from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1948 for the years 1929-1947, and from Economic 
Indicators, February 1949, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C., for 1948. The data on imports were obtained 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and Economic 
Indicators. 
had to be great enough, first to compensate the effects of 
the decline in the coefficient, and then to surpass them. 
For instance, if the coefficient is halved, the income of the 
principal centre must increase to twice as much as that 
of the rest of the world, barely to offset the effects of such 
reduction. 
The income of the United States, far from achieving 
this relatively high increase, took longer than that of the 
rest of the world to reach the level it had attained in 1929, 
judging from what took place in an important group of 
countries (see chart 4 ) . 
It is thus not surprising that gold should have been 
steadily accumulating in the principal cyclical centre. The 
concentration of metal in the United States was, in fact, 
enormous. Practically all the new production of monetary 
gold in the world, which was certainly considerable after 
1933, collected in that country. The reserves of the rest 
of the world fell slightly, as may be seen in table 1.® 
® An examination has been made in the text of the factors which 
caused the United States to attract gold in the nineteen thirties. 
There were also factors operating in the rest of the world which 
caused the expulsion of gold. Outstanding among them were those 
which appeared during the two world wars. The United States 
acquired large quantities of gold in return for supplies furnished 
If, in the nineteen thirties, the rest of the world had 
relied for its economic development solely upon the stim-
ulus deriving from imports and other payments made 
by the United States, the increase of its income would 
have been much less than that country's. As already 
pointed out, this is due to the depressive effect of the 
decline of the import coefficient of the United States. 
However, this did not actually happen since, in the coun-
tries shown in chart 4, income increased to a greater 
extent than in the United States. 
If these countries, like the rest of the world, had in-
creased their income without changing their import coef- i 
ficient, it can be safely assumed that they would not have i 
been able to do so for long without seriously impairing 
their monetary reserves. If this did not happen, it was 
simply because they had already reduced their coefficient 
of imports and other payments, especially of imports from 
the United States, which fell more than those from other 
sources, in order to attenuate the contraction originating 
in the United States.® This enabled the rest of the world 
not only to develop in the way already described, but in 
several instances, to use part of its dollar exports to reduce 
its debt to the United States. ^^  
Why was the coefficient of imports from the United 
States reduced more sharply in the rest of the world than 
the latter's total coefficient? Obviously because the deficit 
in the balance of payments was more acute in terms of 
dollars. Had imports in other currencies been reduced to 
the same extent as those in dollars, the damage suffered 
by international trade in the nineteen thirties would have 
been even more severe, with consequent additional loss 
of its classical advantages. 
What were the reactions of Latin America when faced 
with the phenomena occurring in those years in the prin-
cipal cyclical centres? It is needless to repeat the story 
of the well-known way in which such events were reflected 
in this part of the continent, but they should serve to 
clarify ahd define the best interests of Latin America. 
The reaction in Latin America was similar to that of 
other countries in the rest of the world, namely, a reduc-
tion of the import coefficient through depreciation of the -' 
currency, higher tariffs, import quotas and exchange 
controls. 
Such measures had never been applied as widely as in 
those days, since there had never been a shortage of 
pounds sterling under the monetary hegemony of London. 
to the Allies. It could only have lost this gold through a much 
greater inflationary expansion of income than that which actually 
took place, a possibility which need not, therefore, be considered. 
This was not the only phenomenon in the redistribution of gold 
brought about by the two wars. Part of the gold received by the 
United States was transferred to neutral countries or non-belli-
gerents, to cover their favourable balance of payments. This is a 
normal phenomenon in the expansion of a cyclical centre, which 
was reflected in Latin America by a large increase in its metallic 
reserves. But it is also natural that a large part of the gold should 
return to the cyclical centre. This is what happened during the 
recession which took place in the United States after the First 
World War, and the cyclical movements of the British centre were 
also marked by fluctuations of gold. The present return of gold 
from the Latin-American countries to the United States, however, 
is different, in that the movement has begun before a contraction 
in that country has taken place. This is due, as already stated, to 
the rise in imports, occasioned by the high level of employment 
and accentuated by inflationary phenomena. 
° See charts published for various countries in The United 
States in the if orld Economy, United States Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Economic 
Series No. 23, pages 67, 68 and 69. 
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Chart 4 
NATIONAL INCOME OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF 
ELEVEN OTHER COUNTRIES 
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom) 
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SOURCE: Data for the national income of the United States have 
been obtained from National Income and its Composition, by S. 
Kusnetz, New York, 1941, pages 310-311, for the years 1924-1928, 
both inclusive; and from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 1948, for the years 1929-1938. Those for the income of 
the eleven countries were obtained from World Economic De-
velopment, Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries, by Eugene 
Staley, Montreal, 1945, page 144, chart 13. 
The rapid extension of exchange controls is explainea 
by the pressing need to reduce imports immediately and 
to stem the flight of capital. However, exchange controls 
were a means not only of reducing the volume of imports, 
but also of diverting to other countries, mainly those of 
Europe, demand for imports which, because of their low 
cost and suitability to Latin America's needs, it had 
formerly been preferable to bring from the United States. 
Notwithstanding its implications, it would be difficult to 
deny the obvious fact that exchange control has, in many 
instances, been used as an instrument of discrimination 
in international trade, contrary to the sound practices 
established with great efiFort through the general applica-
tion of the most-favoured-nation clause. It must, neverthe-
less, be recognized that, when a country lacked the dollars 
necessary to pay for its essential imports, the only way out 
of so critical a situation seemed to be to import goods 
payable in currencies received in payment of exports. 
Had these other currencies been convertible into dollars, 
the situation would have been very different. However, 
the dollar shortage affected all the rest of the world, and 
multilateral compensation could not be achieved when the 
total balance due in dollars exceeded available supplies. 
Exchange control was not the result of a theory but was 
imposed by circumstances. None who had first-hand knowl-
edge of the complications of every kind that it involved 
would have adopted such a measure, had there been other 
alternatives available or had it been within the power of 
the Latin-American countries to eliminate the fundamental 
causes of the evil. 
Unfortunately these causes persisted too long. The aban-
donment of exchange control might have been considered 
when the worst of the world crisis was past and economic 
recovery in full swing, but the way in which the principal 
cyclical centre functioned made such a possibility remote. 
Chart 5, showing the monetary reserves of Latin 
America, reveals the nature of the difficulties. Imports 
and other payments usually absorbed all the dollars newly 
added to the reserves and even a part of the reserves 
themselves. Exchange control, as already stated, served 
the purpose of diverting the demand for imports that 
could not be so financed. Even so, in the nineteen thirties 
it could not prevent total monetary reserves from remain-
ing at a level considerably lower than that maintained in 
the nineteen twenties. 
Such was the significance of exchange control in those 
days. Whether handled well or badly, it was the means of 
mitigating the serious repercussions of events abroad on 
the internal activity of the Latin-American countries. 
Later, however, its functions changed considerably. Ex-
change control has been, and still is, used to check the 
effects of internal inflationary expansion on imports and 
other liability items in the balance of payments. It is 
evident that in this instance exchange control, instead of 
Chart 5 
GOLD RESERVES OF LATIN AMERICA 
Millions of dollars 
Includes seven countries. 
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NOTE: AS data for the earlier years of this period, 1913-1939, 
were available for only seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) the appropriate 
cur\'e including them is shown until 1939. Five additional 
countries (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mex-
ico) are included in the second curve covering the years 1929-
1939. These figures refer only to gold reserves and were calculated 
at the rate of S35 per fine ounce. 
SOURCES: Monetary and Banking Statistics, Washington, 1943, for 
the years 1913-1936; and International Financial Statistics, 
Washington, 1949, for the years 1937-1939. 
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counteracting the effects of inflation, diverts the infla-
tionary pressure toward internal activity, thus accentua-
ting the rise in prices. 
The same considerations thus do not apply in both cases. 
Latin-American countries had no influence over the ex-
ternal factors that imposed exchange control in the nine-
teen thirties. On the other hand, the factors operating 
today are dependent upon their own decisions, as Latin-
American governments, concerned as they are at the grav-
ity of this problem, have more than once admitted. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine to what 
extent the scarcity of dollars, which once more faces sev-
eral Latin-American countries, is the result of the low 
import coefficient of the United States and to what extent 
it is the result of the inflationary pressure referred to 
above. 
It has already been explained that the high level of 
employment attained in Latin America entails a consider-
able volume of dollar imports. Meanwhile, as its national 
income had reached an extremely high level, the United 
States also increased its imports from Latin America and 
other countries of the world. In 1948, its total imports 
amounted to 6,900 million dollars, with a coefficient of 
only 3 per cent. Had the coefficient been 5 per cent, as 
in 1929, imports would have totalled 11,500 million. 
These figures show the magnitude of the effects produced 
by the decline of the import coefficient. 
It is still too early to say whether or not the Latin-
American countries' share of these imports will provide 
them with sufficient means of covering their import needs 
in addition to the other payments they have to make to 
the United States. A considered opinion cannot yet be 
given. Information is still very inadequate and does not 
permit an examination of the composition of imports for 
the purpose of determining with sufficient accuracy how 
much of the increase has been due to the redistribution 
of income typical of inflation. There are instances of con-
siderable dollar payments for imports wholly unrelated 
to industrialization or the mechanization of agriculture, 
but it is difficult to say to what extent such cases can be 
considered general. 
In any case, very special attention should be paid to the 
events now taking place. For instance, the recommenda-
tions recently made by the Joint Brazil-United States 
Technical Commission in its interesting report on Brazil 
are decidedly symptomatic. 
There is great similarity between the measures envi-
saged by the Commission in connexion with imports and 
those which, as recalled above, several Latin-American 
countries were compelled to take in the nineteen thirties. 
Despite the great increase in Brazil's dollar exports, 
the Commission has shown that they are not sufficient to 
cover its imports in that currency. It therefore approves 
the restriction of non-essential imports through a more 
effective application of the system of exchange control 
and recognized that "it would be necessary for Brazil to 
obtain its essential imports, as far as possible, from soft-
currency countries with which it has had a 'favourable' 
balance of trade in recent years", and adds that "one 
measure which might assist in reducing the total of hard 
currency imports, would be to require a review by the 
control authorities of all purchases in the dollar area 
proposed to be made by Brazilian government departments 
and 'autarquías' 
' Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1949, pages 32-33. 
It is remarkable that a report of this nature should 
envisage not only the restriction of imports through ex-
change control, but also the application of discriminatory 
measures. 
The case would be of no great significance if it were 
merely a recognition of the temporary need for relieving 
pressure on the balance of payments. If, however, it is 
the expression of something more fundamental and per-
sistent, the Latin-American countries would have serious 
cause for concern. 
Experience has shown that multilateral trade is the 
best suited to the economic development of Latin Ameri-
ca. The ideal would be to be able to buy and sell in the 
best, though perhaps different, markets, without dividing 
foreign trade into water-tight compartments. The situation 
in which sales to Europe must be stricdy counterbalanced 
by purchases from that continent, or even from each 
European country, with no possibility of using the ba-
lances for purchasing from the United States the goods 
which best satisfy the needs of Latin-American economic 
development, is not a solution that offers the undeniable 
advantages of multilateral trade. 
It is essential, if multilateral compensation is to be 
practicable, that Europe have a dollar surplus with which 
to pay for its excess purchases from Latin America, after 
having satisfied its own import requirements from the 
United States. 
This is, without doubt, the difficulty encountered by 
the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission. In 
the face of it, the Commission had only two alternative 
courses of action: either to propose the measures it 
actually recommended to Brazil or to suggest application 
of restrictions to all the countries equally, to the det-
riment not only of the exports of those countries with 
which Brazil has a favourable balance, but also to the 
rate of its economic growth. 
The events of the nineteen thirties seem to have left 
the conviction that no fundamental solution can be ex-
pected from trade with the United States. Indeed, if the 
present extremely low import coefficient is maintained, 
its imports might be insufficient to solve the latent pro-
blem of a dollar shortage, even on the favourable as-
sumption that maximum employment in that country 
wou d last. If, with maximum employment, income were 
to rise in the future at a rate unlikely to prove much 
more than 3 per cent a year, a corresponding increase in 
imports from the rest of the world would not do much 
to relieve the dollar pressure. 
Is there, however, no possibility of an increase in the 
import coefficient of that country, whereby its imports 
would increase more rapidly than national income? 
The possibility does exist. The persistent attraction of 
gold toward a principal cyclical centre is only conceivable 
theoretically when there is a considerable margin of unem-
ployed factors of production. 
There could be no repetition of the phenomena of the 
nineten thirties if the United States were able to main-
tain maximum employment and if the rest of the world, 
thus stimulated by the principal centre, were able to carry 
out a similar policy of full utilization of its growing pro-
ductive factors. 
As explained in connexion with the adverse experience 
of those years, since there was unemployment in the 
United States, the rest of the world could not maintain its 
import coefficient with respect to that country without 
adjusting it to that of the United States with respect to 
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the rest of the world, as no country can carry a perma-
nent deficit in its balance of payments. Maximum em-
ployment, however, can alter the situation very much, as 
a brief reasoning will show. 
Let us assume that a relatively high coefficient of the 
rest of the world, or better still a coefficient increased by 
the industrialization of Latin America, causes a sharp rise 
in the demand for exports from the United States. Let us 
further assume that, through the growth of productive 
factors, income increases annually by, say, 6,000, of 
which 4,000 represents factors employed in the export 
industry to satisfy the great demand and the remaining 
2,000, industries supplying domestic needs, with an equi-
valent volume of production. 
It is obvious that this volume of 2,000 will be insuf-
ficient to satisfy the internal demand created by the ex-
penditure of the 6,000 income. Demand will then exceed 
supply, and since internal factors are fully employed, the 
deficit of production for internal requirements will have 
to be covered by imports. 
If the productive factors were not fully employed, the 
excess of demand over supply would tend rather to stim-
ulate internal production, and imports, fa r from rising 
in proportion to excess demand, would show only a slight 
increase, representing that part of the excess which is 
barely reflected in a demand for foreign goods, owing to 
the low import coefficient. 
The nature of this report precludes more detailed de-
velopment of the argument. It should be pointed out, 
however, that for such machinery to function, it is es-
sential that the rest of the world be able to satisfy the 
United States' increased demand for imports, since the 
process would otherwise be inflationary. At the same 
time, the countries increasing their coefficient or their 
real income should be assured of sufficient resources to 
face a temporary disequilibrium in their balance of pay-
ments, pending the reaction of the principal cyclical 
centre. 
In short, with full employment at the cyclical centre, 
any increase in its exports to the rest of the world, brought 
about by the action of the latter, would tend to be ac-
companied by a corresponding increase in imports (or 
other payments abroad) and gold would not tend to con-
centrate at the centre, to the detriment of the other 
countries. 
It is clear that if this is to be achieved, the centre 
must not lower its import coefficient. In any case, what 
purpose would be served by such a measure if all pro-
ductive factors are already fully employed? It is under-
standable that internal production should be substituted 
for imports in order to increase employment when there 
are unemployed factors. It is also understandable that, 
even when there is full employment, a country should 
avoid the sacrifice, through foreign competition, of in-
dustries supplying domestic consumption to favour those 
producing for export, as happened in the case of the 
British cyclical centre during the nineteenth century. 
Where full employment exists, however, it would show 
a lack of economic sense to lower the import coefficient 
generally while at the same time encouraging the de-
velopment of certain industries producing for domestic 
consumption, at the expense of international trade. 
Consequently, if nothing should hamper the natural 
play of economic forces, where there is full and growing 
employment at the principal cyclical centre, the way 
should be clear for the solution of that fundamental 
problem which is of such concern to the countries of 
Latin-America and the rest of the world. The import coef-
ficient of the United States would certainly increase, even 
if existing tariffs were left unaltered, and its interdepend-
ence with the rest of the world would be strengthened. 
Thus it could be demonstrated that, in addition to full 
employment, the United States could achieve two other 
fundamental objetives of its economic policy: the active 
promotion of foreign trade and the furthering of Latin-
American industrialization. 
Another theoretical consideration closely related to the 
foregoing questions should be noted before closing this 
section. As yet nothing positive has been achieved in the 
attempt to explain, with the help of the classical theory, 
the fluctuations of the balances of payments and the 
international movements of gold in the nineteen thirties. 
Such an attempt could hardly have been successful, since, 
as is well known, the classical theory is based on the 
assumption of full employment. If this assumption were 
to take place in reality, the essential soundness of the 
classical reasoning regarding gold movements could be 
proved, allowing, of course, for the partial modifications 
which the theory demands. As Lord Keynes pointed out 
in his General Theory, with full employment we are 
safely ensconced in a Ricardian world. The opinion ex-
pressed on this, in his posthumous article published in 
the Economic Journal, is, therefore, not surprising: "I 
find myself moved, not for the first time, to remind con-
temporary economists that the classical teaching embodied 
some permanent truths of great significance, which we 
are liable today to overlook because we associate them 
with other doctrines which we cannot now accept without 
much qualification. There are in these matters deep un-
dercurrents at work, natural forces, one can call them, or 
even the invisible hand, which are operating towards 
equilibrium.. . " ® Admittedly, if the classical medicine is 
to work, it is essential that import tariffs and export 
subsidies should not progressively offset its influence. It 
is for this reason that one is entitled to draw some pro-
visional comfort from the present mood of the American 
Administration and, as I judge it, of the American people 
also, as embodied, in the Proposals for Consideration by an 
International Conference on Trade and Employment. We 
have here sincere and thoroughgoing proposals, advanced 
on behalf of the United States, expressly directed towards 
creating a system which allows the classical medicine to 
do its work. 
V . CAPITAL FORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
INFLATIONARY PROCESS 
The margin of savings depends ultimately upon the pro-
gressive increase of labour productivity. Though the level 
of productivity achieved by some Latin-American coun-
tries is such that, by means of a judicious policy, they 
would be able to reduce the amount of foreign capital 
needed to supplement national savings to moderate pro-
portions, in the majority of them this capita] is admit-
tedly indispensable. 
In actual fact, productivity in these countries is very 
low owing to lack of capital; and the lack of capital is 
due to the narrow margin of savings resulting from this 
low productivity. The temporary help of foreign capital 
® Lord Kepes, "The Balance of Payments of the United States", 
The Economic Journal, June 1946, pages 185 and 186. 
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is necessary if this vicious circle is to be broken without 
unduly restricting the present consumption of the masses, 
which, generally speaking, is very low. If this capital is 
effectively used, the increase in productivity will, in time, 
allow savings to accumulate which could be substituted 
for foreign capital in the new investments necessitated by 
new technical processes and the growth of the population. 
Throughout most of Latin America, the characteristic 
lack of savings is the result, not only of this narrow 
margin, but, in many cases, of its improper use. Saving 
means refraining from consumption and is thus incom- • 
patible with certain types of consumption peculiar to re-
latively high income groups. 
Great disparities in the distribution of income may be, 
as they have been in the past, a factor favourable to the 
accumulation of capital and technical progress. Although 
the influences of that factor in the Latin-American coun-
tries should not be overlooked, there are many well-known 
examples of how such distributive inequalities have fos-
tered types of consumption peculiar to countries of high 
productivity. Considerable opportunities for saving and 
effectively employing monetary reserves for productive 
imports are thus frequently lost. 
It is the increase in productivity that has enabled the 
United States, and to a lesser degree other industrial 
countries, to shorten the working day, raise the real 
income and standard of living of the masses, and con-
siderably increase public expenditure, without impeding 
a huge accumulation of capital. 
It is a well-known fact that fiscal expenditure, which, 
in the middle of the last century, formed a relatively 
small part of national income in the great industrial 
countries, today represents a large portion of it. This has 
become possible only as a result of increased productivity. 
The Latin-American countries have also followed this 
general tendency. If, where productivity is high and the 
accumulation of capital considerable, the increase in the 
proportions of public expenditure is cause for concern, it 
must be even more so in countries where a considerable 
part of the national income must be devoted to saving, 
since saving is necessary to attain that increase in pro-
ductivity without which the aim of raising the standard 
of living of the masses would be a mere illusion. 
The problem is essentially one of estimating needs. The 
resources available to satisfy the enormous individual and 
collective needs of the Latin-American countries are rel-
atively small, and the possible contribution of foreign 
capital is also limited. Those needs must therefore be 
evaluated from the standpoint of the aim in view, in 
order that the limited resources may be most advanta-
geously distributed. If the aim is to increase the measur-
able well-being of the community, the increase of capital 
per man must take very high priority. There are various 
types of public and private investment which are indispu-
tably useful for this purpose, but since they do not in-
crease productivity, they cannot bring about the increase 
in saving necessary for new investments. On the other 
hand, those same investments, if put into efficient capital 
goods, will immediately increase productivity and so dev-
elop a margin of saving which, transformed into new 
investments, will give rise to yet further increases in 
productivity. 
For these and many other reasons, the problem of cap-
ital formation is of the utmost importance. 
The considerable pressure of those individual and col-
lective needs on comparatively scanty resources usually 
provokes inflationary processes such as those with which 
the governments are now so rightly preoccupied. At the 
same time there has grown up a belief, not only among 
the privileged, but also among those whose only concern 
is the general welfare, that inflation is an unavoidable 
means of forced capitalization where voluntary saving is 
evidently insufficient. 
It is a thesis worthy of careful examination. Since the 
process is widespread, there is a wealth of data available 
for fruitful investigation which will later permit an ap-
preciation of its value and range. Meanwhile, some com-
ments may contribute to define this problem. 
One indisputable fact stands out: the stimulus of mon-
etary expansion has led to a high level of employment 
and thereby to a real increase in income. It appears, 
however, that a large part of that effect had already been 
achieved during a phase of moderate credit expansion 
which preceded the acute inflationary process. As that 
process developed, the increase in employment • and real 
income became less and less marked, and that of prices 
more so, with consequent disturbances in the distribution 
of total income. 
This experience provides both positive and negative " 
lessons.® The positive lesson is pertinent to the subject 
since the growth of employment brought about an increase 
in the potential margin of savings. The negative lesson is „ 
also concerned with it. The exaggeration of the stimulus 
necessary for the achievement of maximum employment 
led internally to excessive inflationary pressure, which, 
with the rise in imports consequent upon the resumption 
.of foreign trade after war-time restrictions, absorbed a 
large part of the gold and dollars which had been ac-
cumulated. 
The fragmentary information available raises more than 
one doubt as to whether those reserves have been used in 
strict accordance with the needs of the economic develop-
ment of Latin America. In order to throw light upon , 
those doubts, it would be interesting to discover to what 
extent the aforesaid reserves have been used to import the 
most essential capital equipment, how far they have been 
spent on non-essential articles or those related only to the 
mode of living of high-income groups, and to what extent 
they have served to cover the capital outflow caused by 
the process of inflation.^" 
These different uses of foreign exchange are closely 
linked with the internal effects of inflation. The rise in 
prices, by creating exceptional profits, places in the hands 
of a comparatively small group great opportunities for 
saving, as always happens when income distribution is 
altered in such a way. It would be extremely interesting 
to ascertain to what extent these opportunities have been 
translated into collective savings and whether those savings 
" The possibility of a rational policy of employment of idle or 
ill-employed resources lias been shown by experience. At one time 
exports had constituted the chief dynamic factor. After the world 
crisis, however, they proved insufficient to fulfil adequately their 
role of stimulating development. In the nineteen thirties, the 
weakness of the external dynamic factor had already been counter-
acted in some of the Latin-American countries by a policy of 
internal stimulation. In order to do so, as was explained elsewhere, 
it was necessary to reduce the import coefficient. The events of the 
Second World War showed how much further this policy could 
be carried. The war brought about a drastic reduction of the 
coefficient, while at the same time increasing the force of the ex-
ternal stimulus. 
It is interesting to note that Latin-American private deposits 
in the United States amounted to $729 million on 30 June 1947. 
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have been put to the most productive use from the stand-
point of the community. 
If a large part of Áe profits arising out of inflation 
had actually been saved and efficiently inv i t ed , those 
who expound the foregoing thesis would have a strong 
point in their favour. Unfortunately isolated figures do not 
provide sufficient reliable evidence to justify any gener-
alization. None the less, the information on Brazil pre-
sented by the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Com-
mision is illuminating. In 1946 the large corporations 
reinvested 30 to 40 per cent of their profits and distributed 
the rest among the shareholders. The amount distributed 
by all the corporations is believed to have amounted to 
12,000 million cruzeiros, of which one fourth, or barely 
3,000 million, represented various forms of saving.^^ 
Taking the figures as a whole, only about 50 per cent of 
total profits would represent direct or indirect investments. 
That being 60, the proportion consumed would have 
been considerable. Since, moreover, the high-income groups 
have a high import coefficient, it is not surprising that a 
large part of the foreign exchange accumulated should have 
been spent on products not essential to economic develop-
ment, as may be inferred from other information from 
the same source. 
There is yet another aspect of the question to be clari-
• fied. Assuming that under given circumstances a certain 
amount of inflationary expansion is considered the most 
practical expedient, in view of the scarcity of savings, 
there would be ways of best achieving that purpose, at 
the same time mitigating the serious consequences of the 
inflation. The State has means of stimulating the invest-
ment of a large portion of profits and inflationary incomes 
through progressive taxation of the part spent and con-
sumed, while lowering the tax or granting exemption on 
the part invested; furthermore, through exchange control 
or taxation, it can divert the part which tends to be used 
for imports incompatible with strong economic growth. 
Such means may, of course, also serve to increase un-
productive public expenditure instead of savings, to the 
detriment of an increase in national productivity. 
Logically, if some groups have benefited considerably 
from inflation, others must have sufl'ered. Conclusive studies 
have not yet been made, but it would seem that there 
is no essential diff'erence between inflation today and in 
the past. The middle class and the fixed-income groups 
have generally been those to bear the brunt of the trans-
ference of real income to entrepreneurs and other bene-
ficiaries. The better organized labour unions have through 
wage increases managed to overtake, and at times surpass, 
the price rise, although usually with a lag. There are not 
enough reliable data, however, to ascertain to what extent 
the whole group has benefited and not merely certain 
sectors. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the 
increase in employment during the first stage of the ex-
pansionary process has usually meant an increase in the 
real income of the working-class family, even when wages 
have not been adjusted to rising prices. 
All this redistribution of income brought about by 
inflation creates in the sectors that benefit the iUusion 
that the total wealth of the community is increasing, even 
though real income ceased to rise to any extent, once the 
initial stage of moderate expansion was passed. It is an 
illusion peculiar to the stage of euphoria and prodigality; 
during that time capital equipment is not renewed, as in 
^^  Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Com-
mission. Part III. 
the case of transport and other public and private invest-
ments, and a large part of the previous increase in mone-
tary reserves is spent in a short while. This means the 
consumption of accumulated capital and so must not be 
mistaken for a real increase in income. The illusion begins 
to fade during the second phase—that of increasing ten-
sion—and finally disappears during the third—that of 
painful readjustment. 
The first stage seems to be over in Latin America, and 
as the second develops, acute social antagonisms are ap-
pearing, which threaten the efficacy of the existing econ-
omic system. An atmosphere unfavourable to the smooth 
development of that system is being created, and with it 
certain kinds of governmental intervention and fiscal 
measures prejudicial to private initiative and undermin-
ing the sense of individual responsibility. Thus the infla-
tion that has greatly increased the remuneration of the 
entrepreneur ends by impairing his efficiency—a factor of 
vital importance for the growth of the Latin-American 
countries. 
The State soon takes a substantial share of the entre-
preneur's inflationary gains in the form of taxes. The 
increase in public expenditure resulting from that par-
ticipation will present a problem no less serious than the 
others, when inflationary profits disappear and it becomes 
necessary to bring State wages and salaries into line with 
the cost of living, with the obvious risk that the proportion 
of national income represented by public expenditure will 
again rise, to the detriment of capital formation. 
Sound conclusions regarding the value of inflation as an 
instrument for collective saving can be drawn only after 
an objective analysis of the above facts and of others 
arising out of it. Whatever the final figures, it will have 
to be admitted that inflation has tended to discourage 
typical forms of voluntary saving which had acquired 
growing importance in some Latin-American countries. 
Here may be found the source of future savings for in-
dustrialization, when monetary stability can be restored 
in accordance with the new rules of the game imposed by 
new conditions. In short, if the forced savings which 
accumulate through inflation are furnished by many sec-
tions of the community whereas the benefits thereof are 
passed on to favoured groups only, the question arises 
whether it is not possible to devise other forms of saving 
(either voluntary or collective) by which resources could 
be better devoted to productive ends, without the serious 
social disadvantages of forced saving. 
Meanwhile an appeal to foreign savings appears inevi-j 
table. Unfortunately, in this connexion the problem in-
herited from the disastrous experience of the nineteen 
thirties is still far from solution. While the default of the 
debtor is still fresh in the memory of the creditor coun-
tries, there is a tendency both to forget the circumstances 
in which default occurred and to spread the mistaken 
belief that a recurrence of p a s t events could be a v o i d e d 
by the observance of certain rules of procedure. At the 
root of this we find the same fundamental problem as was 
mentioned in connexion with foreign trade trends. This 
was pointed out by the United States Department of Com-
merce in a study published some years ago.^^ 
In 1929 the United States supplied the rest of the world 
with $7,400 million in payment of imports, investments 
and other items; hence the rest of the world could easily 
^^ The United States in the Woñd Economy, Economic Series 
No. 23. Washineton. D. C.. 1943. caae 6. 
in 
pay the $900 million due in fixed financial services on 
capital invested by the United States, apart from remit-
tances of profits. In 1932, however, the supply of dollars 
was reduced to $2,400 million, while the services, had they 
been paid, would still have amounted to $900 million. The 
rest of the world would thus have had barely $1,500 
million to cover its imports and other payments to the 
United States, as against $6,500 million in 1929. 
In the light of ¿hese figures, it is not surprising that 
default was more or less general throughout Latin Amer-
ica. The few countries that continued to meet their obliga-
tions did so at great sacrifice, at the cost of a severe 
contraction of their internal economy and to the detriment 
of their monetary reserves. It is only natural that, after 
such an experience, they should be reluctant to find them-
selves once more in a position in which they must either 
fail to meet their obligations or sacrifice their economy. 
Until a solution to the fundamental problem of foreign 
trade is found, care must be taken that dollar investments, 
where they cannot be used to further dollar exports, shall 
contribute, directly or indirectly, to the reduction of im-
ports in that currency, in order to facilitate future pay-
ment of services. 
From this and other points of view, it would seem 
imprudent to renew the active flow of investments of the 
nineteen twenties without adopting a plan to deal with 
the series of concrete problems which arise in this con-
nexion. The existence of international credit institutions 
could be a very effective factor in the drafting of such a 
plan, in which the types of investment best suited to the 
development of Latin-American economy through their 
contribution to productivity and to the development of the 
necessary capacity for repayment may be considered in 
co-operation with the individual countries concerned. 
There seems no reason why this plan should not include 
the field of private investment. Much is heard about the 
need for establishing a system of guarantees or regulations 
in order to promote it. All this is worthy of further con-
sideration. New measures must, however, be developed in 
the light of past experience. There were many other difii-
culties besides the fundamental ones of the nineteen thir-
ties, and the abuses on both sides should be fully admitted 
in order to prevent a repetition of the evil. In this way, 
and with effective technical assistance, it should be possi-
ble to develop an investment policy that would be welcomed 
by all concerned because of its reciprocal advantages. 
VI . THE LIMITS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
It is obvious that the economic growth of Latin America 
depends on the increase of the average income per in-
habitant (which in most countries is extremely low) and 
on an increase in population. 
An increase in the average income per inhabitant could 
be achieved in only two ways: first, through an increase 
in productivity; and second, assuming a certain level of 
productivity, through an increase in income per man en-
gaged in primary production, in relation to the income 
of the industrial countries which import part of that pro-
duction. This readjustment, as already explained, tends 
to correct the disparity in income brought about by the 
way in which the benefits of technical progress are distri-
buted between the centres and the periphery. 
We shall now consider the increase in productivity in 
relation to the existing population. There are two aspects 
of the question. On the one hand, the adoption of modern 
technique will allow production per man to increase, 
making labour available to increase production in the 
same activities in which it was already employed, or direct-
ing it to others. On the other, the index of productivity 
will also be raised by the diversion of persons ill-employed 
in activities where the very low productivity cannot be 
increased to any notable extent, to others where technical 
progress makes such improvement possible. 
Agriculture offers a typical example of the influence 
of technical progress. In some of its important branches, 
technical development has made possible a steady increase 
in production with a proportionally lower increase in 
employment. In other words, agriculture absorbs a de-
creasing proportion of the increase in the population of 
working age, with the result that industry and other acti-
vities have been able to increase their employment more. 
This is not a case of diverting, to other work, people 
already employed, but of offering a different form of 
employment to people reaching working age. There have, 
however, been instances in which the rapid growth of 
industry during recent years has brought about an actual 
transference of workers, with unfavourable consequences 
for agriculture. ^ 
Furthermore, the increase in foreign demand for agri-
cultural products after the great depression was, in general, 
relatively slow, by comparison with the rate in previous v. 
years. Taking this fact in conjunction with the conse-
quences mentioned above, it would be difficult to say what 
productive activities, other than industry, could have ab-
sorbed the increase in population of the Latin-American 
countries which export such products. 
It is quite possible that technical progress in other 
activities will bring consequences similar to those just 
pointed out. That, too, will mean an important source of 
man-power for industrial development. 
This is not the only possible source. The low level of 
productivity in industry itself represents a wastage of 
man-power which, given the proper use of modem tech-
nique, can be employed to great general advantage in 
expanding existing industries or in developing new ones. 
Finally, there is another possibility which the recent 
experience of some countries has shown to be worthy of 
consideration. The low income level prevailing among the 
masses has made it possible for the higher income-groups 
to enjoy hand-made goods and certain types of personal 
services at comparatively low prices. This is due to what 
we have termed ill-employed man-power. As productivity 
in industry increases and real income, per capita, rises, 
there is a natural tendency for the ill-employed to move 
towards industry. However disturbing this trend may be 
to some sectors of society, it is the usual way in which the 
benefits of technical progress are passed on to all social 
groups within a country, as the experience of the great 
industrial countries has shown. The solution does not lie 
wholly in an increase in productivity, however. The social 
aim of industrialization might well be jeopardized if too 
large a part of the increase were to be devoted to increas-
ing consumption or to a premature slackening of pro-
ductive effort. 
It has been emphasized that, to achieve this increase in 
productivity, capital, per capita, must be considerably 
increased and the technique for its effective use acquired. 
The need is progressive. In fact, a general increase in 
wages resulting from greater productivity in industry 
gradually spreads to other activities, which are thereby 
obliged to use more capital, per capita, in order to achieve 
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the increase in productivity without which they would be 
unable to pay higher wages. Thus many activities in which 
human labour is now more profitable, because it is cheaper, 
will tend to become mechanized; the same will happen to 
a certain degree in household economy. 
It is not possible to estimate, even approximately, the 
extent of these potential capital requirements and thus of 
the resources that will be needed to satisfy them, since 
even present capital, per capita, employed in the principal 
Latin-American countries cannot be determined with any 
satisfactory degree of accuracy. However, to judge from 
the needs which have already arisen during the initial 
stage of the industrialization process, the resources made 
available by exports—at least by dollar exports—do not 
appear adequate to meet those requirements after other 
imports and foreign payments have been met. 
As already explained, the possibility must be faced that 
a reduction in the import coefficient may be necessary. 
This may apply to either the general coefficient or the 
dollar coefficient and may be brought about by decreasing 
or eliminating non-essential goods, in order to allow in-
creased imports of capital goods. A change in the compo-
sition of imports would in any case appear essential to the 
development of industrialization. 
It should be clearly understood what this means. It is 
'merely the adaptation of imports to the resources made 
available by exports. If the latter were to rise sufficiently, 
it would not be necessary to restrict imports, except as a 
further means of intensifying industrialization. Exports 
from Latin America, however, are largely dependent on 
fluctuations in income in the United States and Europe 
and on their respective import coefficients for Latin-Amer-
ican products. Consequently they cannot be controlled 
directly by Latin America, and the situation can be 
changed only by the decision of the other countries. 
It would be a different matter if Latin America in-
tended to carry industrialization to the point of directing 
certain factors away from primary production to industry 
in order to increase the output of the latter to the detri-
ment of the former: in other words, if Latin America, 
being in a position to maintain exports and imports at a 
specified level, were deliberately to lower it, sacrificing 
part of its exports in order to increase industrial produc-
tion as a substitute for imports. 
Would there in that case be an increase in productivity? 
At this point the question would be defined in classical 
terms. It would be a matter of discovering whether the 
increase in industrial production brought about by the 
factors diverted from primary production was or was not 
greater than the amount of goods formerly obtained in 
exchange for the exports. Only if it were greater, could 
it be said that there was an increase in productivity, from 
the standpoint of the community; if it were not, there 
would be a loss of real income. 
This then is one of the most important limits of indus-
trialization, one of a dynamic nature which might become 
less restrictive as the economy developed but which should 
be constantly borne in mind, however, if the primary 
objective is to increase the real welfare of the masses. 
There is no sign that Latin America is approaching 
this limit. It is in the initial stage of the industrialization 
process and in most cases the man-power available as a 
result of increased productivity is still amply sufficient for 
industrial growth. Moreover, it does not seem that the 
countries in which this process of industrialization has 
reached a more advanced stage have yet been driven to 
choose between an actual increase in exports and industrial 
development. 
Nevertheless, exports can be sacrificed to an illusory 
increase in real income long before the possibilities of 
intensifying productivity or of utilizing all the man-power 
available have been exhausted. 
An increase in productivity requires a considerable 
increase in capital, and before this can be achieved, a long 
time will elapse and new techniques will appear which 
may call for further increases in capital, in addition to 
that necessitated by the growth of population. At the 
same time, savings are scarce. It is necessary, therefore, 
to use them in such a way as to obtain the maximum 
increase in output. However, a mistaken policy could 
cause deficient use of these savings, as can be easily 
demonstrated. 
It has been said that technical progress in agriculture 
and the comparatively slow foreign demand for its pro-
ducts have, in many cases, allowed industry to absorb a 
larger part of the increase in population of working age 
than agriculture. Let us assume that year after year this 
increase in hands is required in agriculture in order to 
meet rising foreign demands in addition to the increase 
in domestic consumption, but that, as a result of various 
measures, industrial development is expanded to such an 
extent that agriculture is deprived of the hands it needs 
in order to continue increasing exports. 
The reasons why the substitution of industrial produc-
tion for exports may represent a loss of real income have 
already been explained. There would, however, be also 
another loss. Land is a very valuable factor of production, 
which costs nothing. By comparison with industry, the 
amount of capital that must be added to it is relatively 
small. Consequently, the men who could have worked 
efficiently in agriculture occasion a demand for more 
capital when employed in industry. That increased capital 
could, however, have been put to more productive use 
if, instead of being diluted in the total annual increase in 
population, it had been confined to a part of that increase: 
the higher capital per man would have resulted in greater 
productivity. Hence, the dilution of capital would not 
have allowed the increase in productivity that otherwise 
might have been obtained. Thus to the direct loss would 
be added another, which, although less tangible, would be 
nonetheless real. 
Furthermore, if productivity did not increase, there 
would be less incentive for ill-employed persons to go into 
industry, with the result that, instead of man-power being 
used to the best advantage, it would be disadvantageously 
diverted away from highly productive occupations. 
This is not a remote possibility, but a danger to which 
Latin America is continually exposed and into which it 
may sometimes have fallen for lack of economic develop-
ment programmes with specific aims and clearly defined 
means to achieve them. Capital is scarce and it would 
indeed be deplorable to invest it where it would lessen 
total productivity rather than where it could increase it. 
It should therefore not be forgotten that the greater the 
exports from Latin America the greater may be the rate 
of its economic development. We should not, however, lose 
sight of the possibility that a recrudescence of protectionist 
policy in countries that import from Latin America might 
lead to the replacement of those imports with goods 
produced locally. 
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Such a turn of events would be highly regrettable, but 
should it occur, the only solution would appear to lie in 
limiting the growth of imports or even reducing them in 
absolute terms, in order to adjust them to exports. In 
such a contingency, the increase in real per capita income 
would be less than it might have been, and it is con-
ceivable that it might decline if the phenomenon became 
acute. 
In this connexion it is necessary to take into consider-
ation one elementary fact. Europe has lost a large part of 
its investments in other parts of the world and, from the 
point of view of the availability of dollars, cannot be ex-
pected, even when the process of reconstruction is complete, 
to be in a position to supply dollars to Latin America. On 
the contrary, it will need to take great care to balance 
its own trade. Consequently, even if one individual 
country were able for a time to reduce its imports to 
Europe without perceptible loss in its exports to that area, 
it is obvious that Latin America as a whole could not 
do so. 
In discussing the increase in capital, per capita, we 
have implicitly assumed that industrial establishments 
would be able to attain a satisfactory size, for which a 
minimum of production is required. What is this size in 
the Latin-American countries? The variety of conditions 
obtaining in the dififerent countries makes it difficult to 
generalize in this case, as in others. Moreover, no system-
atic study of productivity and its relation to the optimum 
size of the establishment and the industry has yet been 
made in these countries. Depressive examples are quoted, 
however, of the sub-division of industry into an excessive 
number of inefficient undertakings within one country or 
of the multiplication of comparatively small enterprises 
in countries which, by combining their markets for a 
number of products, could reach a higher degree of pro-
ductivity. The present division of markets, with its con-
sequent inefficiency, constitutes another limitation of in-
dustrial growth, in this case one which could be overcome 
by the combined efforts of countries which, by reason of 
their geographical position and economic features, would 
be able to undertake it to their general advantage. 
It was pointed out at the beginning of this section that 
there are two ways of increasing real income. One is 
through an increase in productivity and the other through 
a readjustment of income from primary production so as 
to lessen the disparity between it and income of the great 
industrial countries. 
The second result can be achieved only in so far as the 
first is accomplished. As productivity and the average real 
income from industry increase in the Latin-American 
countries, wages in agriculture and primary production 
in general will have to rise, as they have in other countries. 
The effect will be gradual and if there is not some 
relationship between all the respective increases in average 
income of the principal countries exporting primary pro-
ducts, unavoidable difficulties may arise in readjustments 
of the kind just mentioned, whedier they be internal or 
international. 
The possibility of gaining ground in this sphere depends 
also on the ability of Latin America to maintain the prices 
of primary products in the cyclical downswing, the point 
at which it has frequently lost all or a part of the share of 
the benefits of technical progress that the periphery usually 
receives in the upswing. There is room here for inter-
national economic co-operation. 
V I I . BASES FOR THE DISCUSSION OF AN ANTI-CYCLICAL 
POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 
The cycle is the typical form of economic growth under 
our present system, and, although it is a general pheno-
menon which must be explained by a single theory, it 
manifests itself in a different way at the cyclical centres 
and at the.periphery. 
Notwithstanding these differences, much has been writ-
ten about the cycle at the centres, but very little regarding 
the periphery. The brief comments which follow are not 
an attempt to fill the gap, but an outline of some ideas on 
anti-cyclical policy which, if accepted in principle, could 
constitute a suitable basis for the discussion of the problem. 
If the discussion is not to take place on an abstract plane, 
the particular case of each country must be examined in 
order to determine whether its economic structure and 
existing conditions make those ideas practicable or whether 
other ways of dealing with the cycle must be found. 
The firm intention of the United States Government to 
follow an anti-cyclical policy is well known. It does not 
seem advisable, however, to rely exclusively upon measures 
taken by the principal cyclical centre, since in the case-, 
of a contraction in that country, firm action on the part 
of the peripheral countries could be very opportune. The 
Latin-American countries should, therefore, prepare to 
play their part in the common task. 
At the centres the policy resulting from this aim attempts 
to influence the volume of investments, which are con-
sidered the dynamic factor in economic fluctuations. This 
is not the case at the periphery. There exports are the 
dynamic factor, which is not surprising, since their fluctu-
ations reflect those in income at the centres, which in turn 
are closely linked with investment. 
It is not, of course, within the power of the periphery 
to regulate exports in the same way that the centres 
propose to regulate investments.^^ 
Other means must therefore be sought for averting the 
more serious consequences of cycles on the internal activity 
of the Latin-American countries. In the first place, the 
idea that industrial development will in itself make them 
less vulnerable to these phenomena should be dismissed. 
For this to happen, exports would have to become a very 
small proportion of national income. In that case, a 
country would have already left the periphery and become 
a cyclical centre, and though it might thus have lessened 
its vulnerability to external influences, it would have dev-
eloped those inherent characteristics of the system which 
give rise to the cyclical fluctuations of the centres. 
We are rather of the opinion that industrial develop-
ment will bring out the consequences of the cycle more 
clearly, by accentuating fluctuations in urban employment. 
In a country that is essentially agricultural, depressions 
manifest themselves more in the fall of rural income than 
in unemployment; indeed in many Latin-American coun-
tries during the great world depression, people who had 
previously gone to the cities to find work returned to the 
land. Unemployment was, so to speak, diluted, this cannot 
be expected when relatively large industrial masses are 
concentrated in the cities: in that case the cyclical un-
employment problem would assume serious social compli-
cations. 
This refers to the impossibility of the Latin-American coun-
tries changing the pattern of export fluctuations by their own 
actions, and not to the results that could be achieved through 
regulating export surpluses, to which reference is made at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Does this lead to the conclusion that, from the cyclical 
point of view, industrialization has this disadvantage? It 
might be so if economic activity were left free to operate 
under its own forces. If it is not, however, industrial 
development could be one of the most effective elements 
of an anti-cyclical policy. 
Let us briefly examine the various possibilities: in one 
of them, perhaps the most widespread, an attempt is 
made to lessen or counteract the effects of export fluctu-
ations on internal activity by means of a compensatory 
policy in which investments, chiefly in public works, are 
made to vary in adverse ratio to the fluctuation in exports. 
This policy demands certain conditions. During the cycli-
cal upswing, tax revenue increases and the market is 
favourable to the sale of public bonds. Nevertheless, the 
State should not only abstain from using these additional 
resources to increase public investments, but should restrict 
them in proportion to the increase in private employment. 
Thus during the upswing resources would be accumulated 
in anticipation of bad times or used to repay bank credit 
extended during the preceding contraction. At the mere 
mention of these requirements the difliculty of fulfilling 
them is apparent. For the very reason that the Latin-
American countries are in full process of development, 
their investment projects are always larger than can be 
• carried out with the limited means available. To maintain 
that, when those means increase and the opportunity of 
carrying out such projects presents itself, the authorities 
instead of seizing it should accumulate resources for the 
future, which may be enjoyed by their successors, would 
mean making the success of anti-cyclical action depend 
on attitudes not always compatible with sound political 
interest. 
There are yet other difficulties, among them the flexi-
bility of plans. Investments must be alternately increased 
and restricted according to the cycle, and that is not an 
easy thing to do. Moreover, there would have to be a rapid 
transfer of people from the activities most affected by the 
depression to those created by the new public investments. 
. All this, if it does not lead to the exclusion of the possibility 
of anti-cyclical action, at least suggests the exploration of 
other means more suited to Latin America's individual 
characteristics. 
It is important that internal activity should develop at 
a high level of employment, despite the cyclical movement 
of exports. The way in which that movement causes inter-
nal activity to rise and fall is well known. When exports 
increase, so does internal demand, and with it employ-
ment and income; the rise in income brings about in turn 
a rise in imports, which thus tend, although with some 
lag, to adjust themselves to exports. This is the way the 
cyclical upswing develops in Latin America. The opposite 
occurs in the downswing: the fall of exports brings about 
a drop in income and employment, with a consequent 
reduction of imports. 
Let us now assume that in the course of these phe-
nomena, internal activity has reached its lowest point. 
Employment has fallen with a corresponding reduction of 
income from a maximum of let us say, 10,000 to a 
minimum of 7,500. Of this 7,500, twenty per cent, or 
1,500, is spent on imports required in addition to local 
production to satisfy the current needs of the population, 
and the very low level to which exports were reduced 
barely suffices to pay for these imports. 
If, in order to increase employment and income to a 
maximum, a policy of expansion similar to that recom-
mended in the great centres were followed, there would 
be an immediate increase in imports, providing the coeffi-
cient had not changed. Thus when income reached 10,000, 
imports would be at least 2,000, and if exports were 
maintained at a level close to 1,500, there would ensue a 
disequilibrium which would reduce monetary reserves 
to a very small amount in a relatively short time. 
It should be pointed out incidentally that similar diffi-
culties are not likely to occur at the centre during the 
downswing, since that is precisely when they receive the 
inflow of gold from the peripheral countries. 
Without exceptional resources, it would not seem pos-
sible, therefore, to develop in these countries a policy of 
expansion tending to increase employment, and at the 
same time not reduce the import coefficient. 
The possibility of doing so is limited by obstacles which 
vary in importance from one country to another. Let us 
assume, for the sake of simplifying the argument, that 
they have been overcome and that the coefficient has 
gradually been reduced from 20 to 15 per cent through 
tariff changes. This has enabled employment and income 
to expand without an increase in imports above the min-
imum of 1,500, the level at which exports are also main-
tained: in other words maximum employment has been 
achieved without disturbing the equilibrium of the balance 
of payments. 
Thus, owing to the reduction of the coefficient, the 
current needs of the population at this maximum level of 
employment can now be satisfied with 500 less in imports. 
The problem has therefore been that of producing the 
difference internally, whether they were finished consumer 
goods or the raw materials essential to their manufacture. 
Not all consumption, however, can be satisfied by arti-
cles of immediate consumption or of comparatively short 
duration. As pointed out elsewhere, technical progress in 
the great industrial countries has steadily created new 
needs for durable consumer goods which must be imported. 
These goods become indispensable as the standard of liv-
ing rises. This does not mean, however, that the importa-
tion of such articles cannot be drastically reduced when 
the fall in exports hardly allows payment for essential 
imports. For the very reason that the goods are durable, 
it would seem possible to restrict importation of them 
to the extent required by the intensity of the downswing, 
if they have been freely imported in the preceding up-
swing. 
The same applies to capital goods. If it has been pos-
sible to meet requirements during the upswing, it will be 
possible to restrict temporarily their import during the 
downswing. In this connexion, it should be taken into 
account that with the reduction of the coefficient for 
articles and materials intended directly or indirectly to 
satisfy current needs, there will be a greater margin than 
before for the importation of both durable capital goods 
and durable consumer goods. 
Finally, there are non-essential goods satisfying current 
needs, which are imported in comparatively large quan-
tities in times of prosperity; it is obvious that when 
foreign exchange is scarce importation of these can be 
reduced without serious consequences. 
In short, for the purposes of this policy, imports are 
divided into two categories. One covers those that cannot 
be deferred, and includes the articles and materials in-
dispensable for achieving maximum employment with a 
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minimum of exports and at the same time ensuring the 
satisfaction of current needs. The other includes imports 
of durable consumer or capital goods which are by nature 
deferable, as well as unessential goods for current consump-
tion. 
Let us now continue with our example. The policy-
adopted had succeeded in bringing about maximum em-
ployment, but meanwhile exports had again increased 
under the influence of a new upswing. At the same time, 
the demand of primary products which had also fallen to 
its cyclical minimum, rose again in proportion to the rise 
in income caused by the increase in the value of exports. 
It is evident that where there is maximum employment, 
this increase in demand will inevitably cause a corre-
sponding increase in imports. Prices will also rise, with a 
consequent increase in the profits of entrepreneurs, which 
in turn increases their demand and, through it, imports. 
Consequently the increase in income that ordinarily 
results from a rise in exports above the cyclical minimum 
will soon be transformed, in one way or another, into an 
increase in imports, without affecting the level of internal 
employment. 
It must be remembered that the readjustment of the 
coefficient does not mean a reduction in imports. They 
will be of the same magnitude whether or not this anti-
cyclical policy is followed, since they depend ultimately 
on exports and foreign investments. To reach the goal 
desired, it is only necessary to alter their composition. 
In other words, this change is as follows. When exports 
are at the cyclical minimum, a peripheral country can pay 
for only a comparatively small quantity of imports. That 
quantity is not sufficient to cover the imports required 
to maintain maximum employment. Hence it is necessary 
to change the composition of imports and, with it, the 
structure and volume of internal production, in order to 
satisfy the current needs of the population while main-
taining maximum employment. 
While exports remain at their minimum level, only 
goods essential for maintaining employment and current 
consumption can be imported. When, however, exports 
again increase with the upswing, the time will have come 
for the importation of the additional goods necessitated 
by the increase in demand. 
Thus while the imports essential to the satisfaction of 
the current rieeds of the population will follow the rela-
tively slow rate of the organic growth of the country, 
deferable imports wiU remain subject to the fluctuation 
in exports. 
When it was explained above that a reduction in the 
coefficient of imports for current consumption was indis-
pensable for the carrying out of an anti-cyclical policy, 
reference was made to the obstacles which would have 
to be overcome. These obstacles are of various types. 
In the first place, the substitution of internal production 
for imports usually requires the raising of tariffs, owing 
to the higher cost of internal production. From this point 
of view, there would be a loss in real income, but on Üie 
other hand, the loss in income resulting from cyclical 
fluctuations in employment is usually very great. It is 
very probable that in most cases the collective gain from 
employment stability is much greater than the loss result-
ing from the higher cost of internal production. It is 
conceivable, however, that the precariousness of natural 
resources and the inefficiency of workers or management 
might be such that the loss through increased costs would 
absorb an excessively large part of the increase in real 
income gained through greater employment. The serious-
ness of this difficulty cannot be denied. 
At the same time, the substitution of internal produc-
tion for imports requires the importation of capital goods, 
and consequently the necessity of saving during the process 
of reducing the coefficient. Even if saving could be achieved 
internally, to import the capital goods it would be necessary 
to reduce still further the coefficient of imports for current 
consumption, thus bringing about a further rise in the 
cost of iving. Therein lies the second obstacle, one which 
could doubtless be partly removed with the co-operation 
of international financial institutions, which would thus 
be able to show that their anti-cyclical measures while 
aiding the peripheral countries, also help to maintain the 
demand for capital goods at the centres. 
Finally, an anti-cyclical policy of this kind might re-
quire transfers of productive factors that are not always 
easily carried out. However, as explained in another chap-
ter, these difficulties could be lessened to a large extent 
by the increase of the population of working age and by 
the better utilization of the ill-employed. 
In Latin America, the lowest point on the curve of 
exports and foreign investments has been rising in succeed-^ 
ing cycles. This does not mean, however, that they may 
not fall to a level lower than in the preceding cycle; the 
phenomenon is unusual, but has been known to occur, as^, 
for instance, during the great world depression. If it should 
happen again, a high level of employment could be main-
tained only to the extent to which monetary reserves were 
sufficient to cover the excess of essential imports over 
minimum exports or in so far as the international lending 
agencies were able to achieve their anti-cyclical purpose." 
The need for reducing imports of durable goods during 
the cyclical downswing has already been pointed out. Is 
exchange control indispensable to achieve this? As has 
been seen, the increase in demand for such goods is 
chiefly the result of new income from increased exports; 
hence if there is no undue increase in that demand as a 
result of credit expansion, there will be no need for 
restrictions, unless there should be a sharp drop in export 
prices in the cyclical downswing. Restrictive measures 
would be necessary only if the expansion were very great, 
or if minimum exports fell below the level of essential 
imports and there were no extraordinary resources to 
pay for them. 
In such a case, the alternatives are clear: either to 
reduce even more the coefficient for essential imports (the 
increase in protective tariffs implied placing an additional 
burden on the consumers), or deliberately to restrict im-
ports of deferable articles by means of exchange control. 
It is easy to picture a country where a marked pro-
pensity to import non-essential articles might be incom-
patible with the high level of imports of capital goods 
needed for intensive economic development. Exchange 
control could then be an effective instrument of selection, 
without precluding other measures. 
For such special cases, one can envisage simple measures 
of control by which the distribution of import permits 
would be left to the free play of supply and demand, 
within the limits of the amount of exchange to be made 
available for such imports. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that if a country were 
to embark on a very easy credit policy, it would be 
In this connexion see the remarks of Dr. Hermann Max in 
Significado de un Plan Marshall para América Latina. 
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compelled to choose between devaluation or a system of 
exchange control which, while masking that devaluation, 
diverts it with an inflationary influence towards internal 
activity. An efí'ective instrument of anti-cyclical policy 
would then become an instrument of inflationary policy. 
Actually, all measures of monetary policy may equally 
well be put to good or bad use. There would not even be 
the excuse of unemployment since, as maximum employ-
ment would have been already achieved, there would 
be no valid reason to continue Áe credit expansion. 
Mention has already been made of the extreme case in 
which the cyclical minimum of exports is insufficient to 
cover essential imports. This is where monetary reserves 
can fulfil their specific function. It is therefore an appro-
priate point at which to examine the matter. 
Reserves increase in the upswing and, in the downswing, 
lose a large part of that increase; the greater the previous 
credit expansion, the greater the loss incurred. This is 
easily comprehensible if it is remembered that in the 
peripheral countries imports generally lag behind exports. 
This, and the similar movement of other items in the 
balance of payments, causes receipts to exceed payments 
during the upswing, with a consequent inflow of gold and 
foreign exchange, while, in the downswing, the opposite 
occurs. 
" The theoretical explanation of this interesting process 
can be briefly recalled. The gold and foreign exchange 
that flowed in during the upswing tend to flow out again 
through the circulatory movement of the corresponding 
income. The foreign eocchange that flows in as a result 
of an increase in exports, for instance, is closely related to 
an equivalent increase in income; this increase in income 
circulates internally and is transformed into other in-
creases in income; but in each stage of this circulatory 
process part of the increase becomes an additional demand 
for imports, so that the original amount is progressively 
reduced. Thus the inflowing foreign exchange tends to 
flow out again. The time lag before it flows out depends, 
among other things, on the magnitude of the import 
. coefficient and other liability items. 
Other things being equal, the higher this coefficient, the 
sooner will exchange flow out. 
It should not be surprising that the outflow of foreign 
exchange from the Latin-American countries is imper-
ceptible during the cyclical upswings, since the new ex-
change then flowing in exceeds, in the international ac-
counts of a country, the exchange that flows out, and 
there is a net gold balance in favour of the country. In 
the downswing, when exports and other asset items de-
crease, the outflowing foreign exchange exceeds the in-
flowing, and monetary reserves thus lose part of the gold 
gained before. 
At the end of each cycle there is thus a net increase 
in gold which represents the share of the country in the 
world distribution of new monetary metal production. The 
net increase is comparatively small and depends in the 
long run on the rate of economic growth of the country 
and on its coeflicient of imports and other liability items 
in relation to the rest of the world. 
If the coeflicients do not change, the country which has 
a higher rate of increase than most will tend to lose a part 
of the net increase in gold which it would otherwise have 
had; the more marked the difference in the rates of 
growth throughout cyclical fluctuations, the greater will 
be the loss in the net increase of gold. 
It could well happen that the gold added, in course of 
time, to the monetary reserves of a country would not be 
sufficient to offset the consequences of a reduction in ex-
ports during an unusually deep depression. Clearly a 
reduction in the total import coefficient would help to 
retain a greater amount of gold in periods of prosperity, 
and the country would be better able to face such an 
eventuality. 
Additional monetary reserves could also be built up by 
means of savings; in so far as savings are not invested, a 
part of income in circulation is not transformed into 
imports and consequently does not give rise to an outflow 
of gold. The quantity of gold retained is equal to that of 
savings. This could be achieved, for instance, if the cen-
tral bank were to issue bonds during the upswing and 
cancel the corresponding amount of money, which would 
again be put into circulation in the downswing; there 
would be an additional reserve equivalent to the money 
cancelled which, together with the existing reserves and 
the share in the world distribution of gold, could relieve 
monetary pressure if minimum exports should not be 
sufficient to cover essential imports. 
We realize that the building up of additional reserves 
by means of savings is not a very attractive solution to 
countries that need to import large quantities of capital 
goods. It is clear, however, that if a country were able 
to obtain international credit during a period of acute 
depression, it could use more gold during the upswing to 
import capital goods instead of retaining it as envisaged 
above. Such a possibility is, in fact, conceivable if a 
general anti-cyclical programme could be drawn up for 
the periphery whereby a country which had followed a 
sound policy could rely upon sufficient co-operation on the 
part of international institutions during the downswing. 
It is very understandable that while an inflationary 
process was developing at the principal centre, it was not 
considered advisable to aggravate it by granting inter-
national credit in excess of that required for the urgent 
needs of Europe. If, however, there were to be a contrac-
tion, the case would be different, and it would be the 
right moment to adopt a general anti-cyclical policy with-
out the contradictions that would result from unilateral 
action by each one of the Latin-American countries. 
International action need not be limited to the field of 
credit. There are other effective ways of combating de-
pression in the peripheral countries. There has been much 
discussion of the possibility of purchasing the surpluses 
of primary production. It is well known that in the down-
swing agricultural production falls far less than that of 
industry. It is in the interest of both the centres and the 
periphery that it should not decline very much, since 
that would delay the recovery of the centres. I t follows 
that a judicious policy of purchasing surpluses could be 
highly beneficial; the reduction in imports of primary 
producer countries would be less, in so far as the cyclical 
fall in exports could be checked and, consequently, the 
reduction of demand in the industrial countries would also 
be smaller. 
This regulatory measure would have another advantage. 
The prevention of an unduly large drop in the prices of 
primary products through such purchases would help to 
keep the relation between those of primary and finished 
products from continually turning against the peripheral 
countries in the way described earlier. 
The aforementioned tendency of agricultural production 
to decline far less than that of industry, or to decline 
hardly at all, was taken into consideration earlier, when 
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the bases for a discussion of an anti-cyclical policy were 
outlined. It was then assumed that the reduction of exports 
would cause a decline in income in primary production, 
but no reference was made to the possibility of rural 
unemployment. The downswing is reflected in a drop in 
prices rather than in a contraction of production, but as 
rural profits fall with the prices, so likewise do invest-
ments in agriculture, thus causing a certain amount of 
unemployment. 
Though, for the reasons given at the beginning of this 
chapter, a general compensatory policy is not deemed 
practicable, this does not mean that there is no need for 
partial compensatory measures. Even with the effective 
application of an anti-cyclical policy fluctuation in some 
types of investments is inevitable. In fact, we have seen 
that an increase in the profits of entrepreneurs causes an 
increase in their imports of capital goods. The new equip-
ment, however, calls for the construction of buildings and 
other improvements that absorb man-power during the 
upswing and release it in the downswing, just as happens 
in the case of rural investments. 
This is not an unsurmountable obstacle. One of the 
specific advantages of not being obliged to follow a com-
pensatory policy of public works and general investment 
is that of being able to plan steady development in ac-
cordance with the growing needs of the country and the 
amount of savings that can be used to satisfy Áem. The 
total amount of construction can thus increase from year 
to year without the acute fluctuations entailed by a com-
pensatory policy. Partial readjustments would fit into this 
progressive development very well. For instance, mortgage 
loans for private construction could be reduced during 
the upswing, in order to make available man-power for 
industrial construction, and during the downswing addi-
tional loans could be granted for construction and rural 
investments in general. 
The ideas expressed in this chapter are far from con-
stituting a programme of anti-cyclical policy. They are 
intended only to present the main aspects of the problem 
and to arouse discussion, while at the same time pointing 
out certain difl'erences between cyclical behaviour at the 
centres and at the periphery which oblige the Latin-
American countries to work out their own programme. 
Moreover, the exposition of the principal problems 
relating to the economic development of Latin America 
would not have been complete without a consideration of 
anti-cyclical policy. It is an indispensable complement 
of a long-term economic development policy. As mentioned 
before, industry will bring out the viJnerability of the 
periphery to the fluctuations of the centre. It is not enough 
to increase productivity and thus absorb unemployed or 
ill-employed factors. Once productive employment has 
been achieved, steps must be taken to prevent a return 
of unemployment as a result of cyclical fluctuations. 
The two policies are compatible, however, not only as 
regards their ultimate aim, but also the means of achiev-
ing them. Both require a readjustment of the import 
coefficient. The anti-cyclical policy calls for it so that a 
country may continue to satisfy its current needs and to 
maintain maximum employment in spite of fluctuating 
exports. The industries and activities which satisfy those 
needs are precisely those which the Latin-American coun-
tries can establish with least difficulty, thanks to a market 
which expands as the rise in productivity increases con-
sumption. If a country could achieve this objective, it 
would be in a position to endure bad times without detri-
ment to current consumption and employment. It is not 
necessary for this purpose to force the creation of capital 
;oods industries. If it could be accomplished by a high 
evel of industrial development, technical skill and the 
accumulation of savings, it would certainly be an encour-
aging proof of maturity. There is no sound economic 
reason for setting up capital goods industries, however, 
since there is still ample room for increasing the pro-
ductivity of those producing for current consumption. 
From the standpoint of economic development, the 
maximum rise in the standard of living depends on pro-
ductivity and this in turn depends to a great extent on 
the most efiicient machines. At the same time, it is in 
durable consumer goods that technical progress continual-
ly offers new or improved articles. It would seem advisa-
ble, therefore, to import such articles as can be paid for 
by means of exports or, in the case of capital goods, by 
foreign investments, within a general programme of eco-
nomic development. 
Moreover, from the anti-cyclical viewpoint, the conse-
quences of export fluctuations could be diverted to fall 
entirely upon the importation of these imports. 
All these are general considerations, which, by their 
very nature, cannot be applied to particular cases. A 
country might undertake the establishment of durable 
goods industries during the initial stage of its industrial 
development for special reasons, which would have to be 
carefully analysed. 
Here as in many other cases, our knowledge of the 
economic structure of the Latin-American countries, their 
cyclical form of growth and their possibilities is limited. 
If a scientifically impartial investigation of such questions 
could be carried out and the training encouraged of eco-
nomists capable of grasping new economic phenomena, 
foreseeing the problems involved and co-operating in the 
search for solutions, a service of incalculable value would 
be rendered to the economic development of Latin America. 
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I N F L A T I O N A N D G R O W T H : A S U M M A R Y O F E X P E R I E N C E I N L A T I N A M E R I C A * 
FOREWORD 
In accordance with ECLA resolutions 81 (VI) and 1 and 8 (VII I ) , the Secretariat of the Commission is in the course 
of preparing a study of inflation in Latin America and of its relation to economic growth. 
Inflation is a highly controversial subject. For one thing, it is complex and has many facets: movements in prices 
are associated in various ways with changes in wages, in exchange rates, in the output of various sectors, in invest-
ment, in foreign trade, in the supply of money, and so on. In this profusion of cross-correlations, it is easy to interpret 
any one as a complete explanation, and such over-simplified views are widespread. Even at the professional level there 
are sharp differences of opinion. 
Secondly, the matter is far from being a merely academic one. It afl'ects the daily lives of everyone in each country 
concerned. The question of what causes inflation is inseparably linked with another question, how it should be cured, 
and the policies of stabilization which have been adopted in many countries are hotly debated, because they raise far-
reaching social and political issues. 
When a subject is simultaneously complicated and political, debates over policy tend to be strident and somewhat 
unfruitful. Partisans of different viewpoints lose sight of tiie historical background and of the experience in other countries. 
"It may therefore be useful to take stock of the whole problem, and look for the antecedents of today's difficulties by 
studying what has happened in a number of Latin American countries over the past two or three decades. The afore-
said study attempts to assess some of the main forces at work, to examine their interaction and to make a critical 
.appraisal of the policies followed by the authorities. Thus the basis is provided for indicating the principles on which 
policy should be based. 
The study deals with the relevant features of Latin America's economic structure, with external and internal trends 
since 1929 and with experience in various fields of policy; and it also includes more detailed analyses of four of the 
countries in the region. This will be published later this year. In the meantime, for the benefit of delegations attending 
the ninth session of the Commission, some of the interim results are sumarized in this paper. 
* This article will be included in the study under the above title to be published by ECLA in 1962 in which will be compiled the 
results of research carried out at the regional level and in some Latin American countries during the past several years by a group 
of economists brought together by the ECLA secretariat. Each chapter of the future publication will bear the author's signature since 
in most cases it reflects his personal views. The secretariat will draft a general introduction to the publication setting forth its position 
on the subject. The author of the present article is Mr. Dudley Seers, an economist who until a few months ago was a member oi the 
ECLA secretariat and under whose direction the studies were carried out. 
I. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS 
1. THE DEFINITION OF "INFLATION" 
The confused discussion of the subject is partly due to the 
fact that there is no widely agreed definition of the term 
"inflation". In everyday language "inflation" means a 
rapid rise in the general level of prices. It is, however, 
also used in senses rather different from this. For example, 
"inflation" is sometimes said to exist when demand tends 
to exceed supply, even though prices are not actually 
rising, for example because of controls. Again, some people 
use "inflation" to describe an increase in the amount of 
money in circulation, or even simply as the printing of 
money, and this too may not be closely associated with 
rising prices. 
Each of these last meanings implies a view about the 
direct cause of price increases, and it will therefore 
be more objective as well as simpler to keep to the com-
mon usage, namely that "inflation" means a rapid and 
general rise in prices, whatever the reason for it. But this 
usage is a little imprecise and a price rise will only be 
termed an "inflation" for the purposes of this study, 
provided it continues for some years and continues at a 
significant pace. 
But what constitutes a significant pace? The answer 
given to this reflects national experience. Those who have 
lived in countries where violent inflation has been the 
rule might consider that a price rise averaging 10 per 
cent per annum for some years would amount almost to 
stability. On the other hand, in a country which has 
experienced little price change for a long time, an increase 
of 2 or 3 per cent a year may appear inflationary. Partly 
because of this inevitably subjective approach, and partly 
because the price indices available lack both a full cover-
age and also accuracy, no attempt wiU be made here to 
say that some particular percentage rise in prices would 
constitute the borderline between relative stability and 
inflation. The essential characteristic of inflation is, in 
any case, not so much the rise in prices itself, as the 
chronic and recurrent nature of the increase. 
2 . FAILURES IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT 
The repeated waves of price rises in a number of Latin 
American countries are significative of economic and fin-
ancial maladjustments. In order to see the likely nature 
of these maladjustments, the most important economic 
problems of a Latin American economy and the nature 
of the process of development, should be briefly examined. 
The main typical weaknesses are that per capita in-
come is low; that the distribution of income is very un-
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equal, as between different areas and different social 
classes; that the level of activity depends on a few export 
commodities; and that many goods, including most forms 
of machinery and equipment, have to be imported. There 
are three -reasons why these problems have become much 
more dangerous in the past few years. Firstly, the in-
crease in the population, already fast, is accelerating in 
nearly every country. Secondly, people in Latin America 
are growing more aware of the contrast between condi-
tions in their own countries and those overseas, and also 
of the contrasts within each country in the region, and 
they are becoming increasingly unwilling to tolerate living 
in, or on the brink of, acute poverty. Thirdly, the mar-
kets for the inajor exports of the region are showing 
not merely their customary instability, but also severe 
oversupply, despite the general prosperity in the industrial 
countries; even in "boom" years, commodity markets are 
far from buoyant. 
The general line of development that the region needs 
is obvious: economies have to be diversified so that they 
can continue to grow, regardless of trends or fluctuations 
in world commodity markets. But while this is obvious, 
it is far from simple. The time factor is crucial, and rapid 
industrialization imposes great strains, not merely econ-
omic strains but also tensions in the social structure and 
administrative system. The socio-economic system and the 
bureaucracy of many countries have defects which are 
exposed under these pressures, and the process of adjust-
ment may fail to be carried through successfully. 
This failure can take various forms. One possibility is 
that no progress is made with the work of diversification, 
so that growth continues to depend very heavily on the 
performance of traditional exports. If these are sluggish, 
the consequence is economic stagnation, in the sense of 
constant or falling per capita incomes, accompanied by 
increasing unemployment and perhaps political instability. 
The results of failing to diversify the economy are not 
apparent so long as exports are rising rapidly. It is in 
fact tempting to forget the need for economic reform 
under these circumstances. But commodity booms, how-
ever vigorous they seem, do not last for ever. When they 
end, the threat of stagnation materializes, perhaps all the 
more dangerously if a high proportion of essential supplies 
is still imported. 
The progress of growth cannot be considered successful 
—even though it is both rapid and accompanied by in-
dustrialization—if it is achieved without a definite im-
provement in the conditions of the poorest sections of the 
community. The burden of economic transformation has 
at times been thrown on them by suppressing increases, 
or even inducing declines, in their real income. It may be 
possible by such means to release resources for invest-
ment and to keep prices steady, even despite the shortages 
of one type or another that inevitably appear in the 
course of growth. But relief is only obtained at the cost 
of aggravating distortions in the income structure. Sooner 
or later the political opposition mounts, so this way for-
ward cannot be followed indefinitely. Besides, the grow-
ing inequality of income distribution would inhibit the 
appearance of mass production industries, an essential step 
in the process of development. 
Moreover, as demand grows, it msLy outstrip the rise 
in output in some or all of the sectors of the economy. The 
pattern of investment may not be right, or technical pro-
gress may be uneven, or management in some industries 
may be unenlightened. (These possibilities are not of course 
mutually exclusive). Agriculture is an obvious illustration 
in a region where both the person in charge and the size 
of the productive unit are determined by inheritance more 
often tiian by the play of economic forces. One possibility 
is to ease the consequent shortages by increasing imports. 
But the normal supply of foreign exchange, i.e. income 
from exports and from long-term capital, may not be rising 
fast enough for this. Then special methods of financing 
the deficit have to be used: for instance, running down 
reserves of foreign exchange or accumulating short-term 
debts. These devices cannot of course be used indefinitely, 
and persistent recourse to them is a sign that the economy 
is failing to carry out its adjustment satisfactorily. 
Inflation is another such sign. This may, be attributable 
to monetary or fiscal policies that raise demand too 
quickly. It may be due to wage increases greater than the 
economy can bear. Or the problem may not be so much 
one of general excess demand or general rises in costs 
as one of particular bottlenecks in supply. Perhaps some 
shortages, e.g., of food, cannot be relieved by imports 
because of transport and marketing difliculties, or because 
of a lack of foreign exchange. Alternatively, or concur-
rently, the pressure of demand for imports may, if it isf-
not being met by sufficiendy rapid production of local 
substitutes, lead to devaluation, which also lifts the level 
of costs. These upward pressures on prices may arise' in 
the course of industrialization, or alternatively, they may' 
be associated with economic stagnation and the failure to 
develop key sectors of the economy. 
The process of growth could of course, at least in 
principle, take place without these deficiencies. Output 
could grow sufficiently fast in all sectors so that, despite 
the population increase, average incomes rose without a ; 
deterioration in income distribution or a chronic payments 
deficit or inflation. This would then be a process of dy-
namic equilibrium. Inflation should be viewed as one 
possible deviation from that dynamic equilibrium. 
3. MONETARY AND REAL FACTORS 
Inflation is invariably accompanied by some increase in 
the supply of money, so the former can always be imputed 
to the latter. It is therefore tempting to say that bad mone-
tary policy is "responsible" for inflation and that there 
is no need to look further than this. This simple chain 
of deduction is all the more attractive because it dispenses 
with the need for analysis of economic trends. 
But it is essential to probe deeper. The question neces-
sarily arises during the examination of any particular 
situation: why did the supply of money increase? Was 
there a budget deficit? Did the Central Bank expand its 
loans to the commercial banks? But these questions in 
turn immediately suggest others. What influences were 
causing tax receipts to lag, or public expenditures to 
climb? What forces in the private sector were raising costs 
and increasing the demand for bank credit? And a look 
at regional experience reveals that some questions are 
continually recurring: why are the pressures so great on 
Governments to increase social services and to start public 
works projects? Why has credit restriction so often threat-
ened to bring with it heavy unemployment? 
To answer these questions, account must be taken of 
the rate of population growth, trends and fluctuations 
in the supply of foreign exchange, the movement in real 
wages, and so on. It is hard to explain what has happened 
in the monetary sphere, without invoking the fundamental 
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economic factors. Changes in the supply of money are, 
generally speaking, the expression of real forces acting in 
the economy. Conversely, monetary developments are im-
portant to the extent that they influence—as they certainly 
do—real economic factors such as the level and composi-
tion of investment; and monetary analysis is a useful 
adjunct to economic analysis. But it is no substitute. The 
problem of inflation cannot be examined in isolation from 
the central economic problems. 
4. THE AIMS OF ECONOMIC POUCY 
This approach guards against framing questions of eco-
nomic policy in the wrong terms. To ask: what should a 
policy of stabilization consist of? would be to assume that 
stability is something that can be pursued in isolation from 
the main economic objectives. Such a formulation could 
lead to policies which were seriously wrong. The funda-
mental aims of economic policy, outlined above, can be 
phrased as follows: to make the national income grow as 
quickly as possible; to distribute it more equally; and to 
dampen its short-period fluctuations. At times of course 
there may be conflicts between these three aims, but in 
the long run they are not inconsistent, indeed it is difficult 
to imagine how economies could grow rapidly for a long 
period without inequality of income and vulnerability 
"being reduced. 
In the last resort, nearly all objectives can be expressed 
in these terms. Economic objectives as they appear to 
politicians—for example, the need to provide sufficient 
employment or to improve living conditions—are really 
the same, for only if these central aims are achieved is 
there hope of eliminating unemployment and poverty. 
There are other important objectives, but on careful 
scrutiny one sees they are not really ends in themselves 
but rather the means of achieving one or more of the ends 
already listed. For example, diversification of the economy, 
through industrialization, is pursued not so much for its 
own sake, but because it appears to be the only way in 
which the economy can be developed to a stage at which 
it would be able to continue to grow without a chronic 
tendency to deficit in international payments; or because 
a diversified economy is better able to withstand fluctua-
tions in commodity markets; or because industrialization 
will break down rigid social barriers that cannot be de-
stroyed in any other way. 
5. THE DRAWBACKS OF INFLATION 
Price stabilization is also in the category of means rather 
than ends. The first reason for avoiding a persistent price 
rise is that inflation hampers growth. Uncertainties about 
price movements greatly complicate rational anticipation 
and planning, for the Government and private citizen alike; 
and inflation also discourages saving and distorts the 
pattern of investment. Secondly, it inhibits policies de-
signed to compensate for fluctuations in exports. Thirdly, 
it is associated with a shift to profits in the distribution of 
income. 
Unfortunately, the word "inflation" has acquired, over 
the long years of controversy, certain non-objective con-
notations. It is no longer used simply to describe a move-
ment in economic indicators Weaknesses are often ascribed 
to inflation, although they are in fact due to more funda-
mental defects in the socio-economic structure. Thus 
although economic stagnation has been associated with 
inflation during part of the 1950's in Chile, it has also 
been observed in countries with stable price levels, such 
as Cuba and Haiti. Similarly low rates of personal savings, 
heavy investment in luxury flats or high profit margins, 
which are typical symptoms of persistent inflation, can 
also be found in economies which have never known a 
serious degree of inflation. 
In any case, price movements cannot all be condemned 
out of hand. Except in the most strictly regimented eco-
nomy, prices of various goods move from time to time 
upward or downward. The main ultimate justification put 
forward for the price system is that it is intended to 
achieve the necessary shifts in the factors of production 
by variations in prices. A process of growth, when sub-
stitutes are being developed for imports, involves produc-
tive factor movements on a massive scale. In some types of 
economy, these movements are achieved by administrative 
decree or political pressure. In countries of Latin America, 
however, an important role in transforming the economy 
is played by price changes. Yet because of rigidities in 
various prices, reflecting a widespread reluctance to ac-
cept the corresponding drop in income, and because of 
supply inelasticities, due to the lack of factor mobility 
which will be discussed below, the working of the price 
mechanism may well produce more price rises than falls, 
lifting the average level of prices. Indeed, rising prices 
have traditionally accompanied processes of rapid indus-
trialization. Thus, in Japan prices rose by more than 80 
per cent during the decade and a half of intensive growth 
from 1888/92 to 1903/07, despite near stability in world 
prices at that time.^ But inflation has, of course, not 
normally been of the speed experienced in Latin America 
in the past decade. 
It is always necessary to go back to the basic aims of 
policy; a policy that avoided inflation but did not convey 
a firm expectation of growth, or of a more equal income 
distribution, or of reduced vulnerability to export fluctua-
tions, could hardly be considered well conceived. On the 
other hand, it is a mistake to go to the other extreme 
and conclude that inflation does not matter. Fulfilment 
of the main objectives, particularly economic growth, is 
easier if chronic inflation can be avoided. 
6. THE ALLEGED CONFLICT BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND 
STABILITY 
Putting the matter in this way shows that it is misleading 
to ask questions such as: are price stability and develop-
ment incompatible objectives? And it is still more mis-
leading to ask: which is preferable? 
Posing a choice between development and stability is 
to fall into a logical fallacy. The choice is only between 
various objectives, not between an objective and some-
thing which, though it helps achieve a number of objec-
tives, is itself a means rather than an end. The damage 
done by inflation has to be judged in terms of its effects 
on growth, equality and vulnerability; this has to be 
worked out through economic analysis. The question for 
policy-makers is whether the total effects of one policy 
on the level, distribution and variability of income are 
better than those of another policy—allowing for the 
prospect, inter alia, that inflation may be involved in one 
case but not in the other, or in one more than the other. 
In the longer run, the antithesis is even more obviously 
^ K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "Role of agriculture in Japanese 
Economic Development" (Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. IX, No. 1). Part II. 
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fallacious. Only through economic development can the 
economy be made more flexible and strengthened, so that 
it becomes less prone to inflation. If growth were slowed 
down in the attempt to avoid inflation, the day would be 
postponed when the economy could be developed with less 
strain and thus less danger of inflation. A country that 
pursues stability at the expense of growth, may find it 
ends up with neither. 
11. THE PROCESS OF INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. THE CONDITIONS POR DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM 
There is no simple and self-evident causal nexus between 
development, on the one hand, and inflation, on the other, 
in either direction. Yet they are obviously not com-
pletely unconnected phenomena either. An under-developed 
country that attempts to change and to grow rapidly faces 
certain tensions which may result in inflation. Whether 
this happens or not depends on the following factors: 
(a) the pace at which economic change occurs; 
(b) whether external developments are favourable or 
otherwise; 
(c) the flexibility of the internal economy (reflecting 
not merely the productive structure but also a wide 
range of institutional, social and cultural charac-
teristics) ; 
(d) the extent to which the policies followed by Govern-
ments ease or aggravate the process of transform-
ation. 
(a) Suppose, for example, that the national product is 
growing quickly, as it may have to if the rate of increase 
of the population is high. This implies a fast expansion 
in demand, especially for some types of goods and services, 
because, inter alia, growth will be accompanied by urban-
ization. Examples of items of consumption which typically 
expand quickly in a growing economy are consumer 
durables, household electricity and passenger transport. 
(f>) For under-developed economies such as those in 
Latin America, these rises in demand may create problems. 
Of course they can be accommodated, if exports are 
rising fast enough. Foreign exchange supplies will then 
permit imports of durables—to continue with the previous 
examples—to increase, and also allow equipment for elec-
tricity generation and for transport services to be pur-
chased overseas. It will similarly be possible to ease other 
shortages that arise during the inevitably somewhat un-
even process of growth. 
It should be borne in mind that imports will have to 
grow at least as quickly as income if this room to man-
ceuvre is to be maintained. If, however, export markets 
are weak, the domestic economy will itself have to satisfy 
these types of expanding demand. Some sectors, such as 
the engineering industry, will have to grow particularly 
fast. The agricultural sector will also have to expand its 
output because of the increasing need for food to feed 
city populations. Not only industries producing "final" 
products will be aff'ected but also—and more especially— 
those producing "intermediate" goods and services, such 
as steel, energy of various kinds, and freight transport. 
(c) Those brought up in the classical tradition of 
economics might expect that declines in the sales of export 
products would induce labour and capital to shift readily 
into secondary industries of their own accord, because 
of the more attractive wages and profits to be found there. 
For this to happen, two conditions must be fulfilled. In 
the first place, prices must act as signals to show what 
changes in the channelling of resources are necessary. 
Secondly, factors of production must move readily and 
easily in response to such signals. 
The first conditions will be met if there are no monopo-
hstic elements which affect the levels of wages or of profits 
in particular industries, or trends of prices. More im-
portant, prices need to be such that profits reflect the 
social benefit to the economy as a whole of acts of invest-
ment. 
The second condition is that labour must be mobile 
enough in all senses (geographically, industrially and 
occupationally) to flow in response to wage changes, and 
that capital should also move into the most profitable 
openings irrespective of where it arises. ("Profitable" here 
refers of course to the long term.) This mobility is 
greatest if the export sector can sell its surplus output in 
the home market, or if its resources can be used where 
they are, without much adaptation, to produce other goods, t 
In addition, and perhaps more crucially, entrepreneurs 
must emerge to take advantage of the possibilities of 
profits and to combine labour and capital efficiently. 
There are certain financial corollaries of this physical" 
transformation. The flow of saving has to be high enough 
to finance the capital requirements, and has to increase 
when a rising yield signals that import substitution has 
to be accelerated. This problem is easier to solve to the 
extent that capital is available from overseas, and con-
versely more difficult to the extent that capital is absorbed 
in the purchase of foreign securities, United States dollars, 
or gold. 
Apart from the physical and financial conditions for 
dynamic equilibrium, there are also social ones. The 
purpose of economic growth is, in the final analysis, to 
solve social problems by providing better nourishment, 
housing, etc. This implies that it is more successful to the • 
extent that inequalities of income are reduced. Indeed, • 
since the manufacturing industries mostly require large 
markets, increasing equality could in any case hardly be 
avoided in the long run. 
(d) Merely to state these conditions indicates that eco-
nomic transformation may not come about automatically, 
through the normal interplay of economic forces. Yet 
dynamic equilibrium can still be achieved if Government 
policy is far-sighted and firm enough to ensure that the 
necessary substitutes for imports are produced and also 
to curb inessential consumption and investment by fiscal 
and monetary policy. This in turn implies the need for 
efficient and honest public servants. 
These last two conditions—(c) and (d)—are of course 
themselves interrelated. Structural obstacles to growth also 
affect the distribution of political power and the context 
within which it is wielded. 
The question of whether inflation is inevitable in the 
process of rapid development therefore resolves itself into 
three subsidiary questions: are markets for the country's 
exports buoyant?; is the internal economy flexible?; and 
is government policy efficient? 
If exports rise rapidly enough, as they did in Venezuela 
for many years, the economy can grow quickly without 
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serious danger of inflation, even though labour and capital 
are immobile, enterprise is deficient, and the Government 
lacks an adequate development policy. In that case, how-
ever, the economy will grow rather than develop: it will 
not achieve enough import substitution to enable it to 
weather comfortably a subsequent weakening of export 
markets. On the other hand, if exports are stagnant, or 
even more if they fall back, then the pace of price rises 
will depend on structural factors and on Government 
policy. The greater is the weakness in exports and the 
more intractable are structural obstacles to development, 
the less easy is it for a Government to avoid inflation and 
still to maintain a satisfactory economic expansion. 
2, THE MECHANISMS OF THE INFLATIONARY PROCESS 
This brief review of ideal conditions points to the ways in 
which inflation can emerge and propagate itself—the plu-
ral is used because there are, in theory at least, several 
Dossible processes of inflation. For the sake of exposition, 
et us suppose that an economy has been growing in dy-
namic equilibrium, as has been defined above, and that 
something happens to divert it from this path. 
A convenient first hypothesis is that the rise in exports 
slows down or stops. If growth is to continue undiminished, 
this must mean an acceleration of the rate of import 
substitution, i.e. of industrialization. Some local industries 
will have to expand particularly quickly. Imports of capital 
equipment, and of raw materials unavailable locally, will 
not fall. They will increase, because of the very need for 
industrialization, so imports of consumer goods will tend 
to be reduced, probably sharply. 
This need to expand certain industries rapidly will have 
a direct impact on the price level, because goods produced 
for the first time domestically will almost certainly be 
more expensive than the imports they replace. Otherwise 
they would have been produced before. The new substitutes 
will be produced under the protection of tariffs or import 
controls; they will be marketed in monopolistic conditions; 
they will usually be manufactured in rather small quanti-
fies because of the limited size of local markets, and in 
any case the techniques used may be relatively inefiicient. 
But what is of greater significance for the economy is 
-that the expansion of these industries means a big increase 
in the demand for certain inputs. To attract workers into 
the new industries, for example—especially skilled work-
ers—higher wages have to be offered. This creates short-
ages of certain types of workers elsewhere, raising costs 
in other industries, and it affects the general wage level. 
The increased demand for electricity aggravates problems 
of lack of energy that exist, and the increased need for 
transport facilities will add to the strain on that sector. 
The accelerated pace of urbanization associated with this 
economic development implies that passenger transport 
facilities, urban social services and food supplies will also 
have to grow more quickly. 
Import substitution thus changes consumption functions 
throughout the economy. It requires from the productive 
sectors a flexible response which is difficult to achieve 
in an economy where the markets for labour and capital 
are imperfect. Failure to make the needed spurt in output 
means rising prices. Moreover, to the extent that the 
economic transformation is not adequate, the pressure of 
demand for imports will not be relieved. The exchange 
rate will thus be devalued, which will also raise costs. 
Once prices rise, for whatever reason, this affects the 
levels of living of various sections of the community, and 
leads to attempts to raise wages and other forms of income 
—attempts which are more or less successful according 
to the power of the sections concerned. Then, in time, 
thrift is discouraged, and capital is diverted away from 
the types of long-term investment which are needed. So 
inflation gains momentum. Moreover, as prices rise deficits 
appear in government accounts because of the inflexibility 
of taxes. 
An alternative possibility is that the growth rate of 
population may accelerate, making it necessary for that 
of national income to accelerate too. The rate of growth 
of exports, although previously satisfactory, will then prove 
too slow, and the same problem of an import "bottleneck" 
will arise. 
So far it has been assumed that the pressure of excess, 
demand appears because imports of some types cannot 
keep climbing fast enough. It may also make itself felt 
if supply lags for different reasons. For example, agri-
cultural output may cease to expand at a satisfactory pace.. 
This will mean rising food prices, or, alternatively, in-
creasing imports of food, a state of affairs which aggra-
vates any foreign exchange shortage. And, moreover, it 
immediately stimulates pressure for wage increases. On 
the other hand, failure of the output of steel or of pe-
troleum to grow in line with demand will create the need 
for rapid import substitution in other sectors, even if 
exports are rising reasonably fast. 
The acceleration of demand for particular goods will 
pose formally similar problems. This might happen as the-
result of "autonomous" changes in the pace of urbaniz-
ation, or in the distribution of income, or in the coverage-
of consumer credit, or in taste (for example, as a result of 
the "demonstration effect"). In any of these ways a price 
inflation can develop, and, once it starts, it develops 
cumulative features. 
Apart from long-term models, such as have been out-
lined here, inflation might emerge because of fluctuations 
in exports, even if these fluctuations were to take place-
around a rising trend. Over the short run, capacity to 
produce substitutes for imports cannot be increased, so 
there is an immediate danger of devaluation if the growth, 
of income (and the demand for imports) continues while 
exports fall back. This is especially likely to occur if there-
is a chronic long-term tendency to inflation. 
Moreover, when exports recover, the process is not 
necessarily reversed. By that time rises in internal prices 
and incomes will have occurred, and it will seem un-
realistic to consider going back to the old exchange rale. 
Incomes will also be rising in the export sector, and so 
will prices of imported manufactures (particularly if the-
recovery of the country's exports is part of a world boom). 
So both in a slump and in a boom prices tend to move 
upward, and the long-term pace of inflation depends in 
part on the violence and frequency of short-term fluctua-
tions in commodity markets. 
Similarly, a budget deficit might grow because of the 
decline in revenue from exports, or indeed for any other 
reason, such as quite irresponsible increases in public 
outlays. Then again, demand may rise because an ex-
pansion of monetary policy causes private investment to 
outrun private savings. Whatever the cause, an excess 
of total demand means rising prices. This discourages 
exports, while it stimulates imports, thus inducing de-
valuation, and causing a shortage of foreign exchange for 
certain types of imports. 
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Again, wage rises may be greater than productivity 
increases. This at once results in rising prices, especially 
if the organization of industry is monopolistic. It also 
unbalances the budget, and increases the costs of basic 
activities such as electricity production and transport. 
Either their prices will be adjusted, in which case the 
upward trend in prices is strengthened, or they will be 
held constant, in which case the enterprises will lack short-
term financing for investment. Since consumption will at 
the same time be stimulated, familiar problems of short-
age of capacity will appear. 
While, therefore, there are many ways in which the 
process may begin, it will in time, however it started, 
show certain predictable symptoms, including a strained 
foreign balance, and shortages of particular types of 
goods. 
It should be noted that a different theory is required to 
explain inflation in semi-industrialized countries like Brazil 
or Chile and in fully developed countries. In the former 
case, the model has to allow for the changing patterns 
of demand, due to urbanization, for the high share of food 
in workers' expenditure, for hindrances to the mobility 
of labour and of capital, for the general impossibility of 
selling export products in the home markets, for the 
chronic shortage of productive capacity, for the lack of 
certain industries (notably those producing capital equip-
ment) , for the inflexibility of the fiscal mechanism and 
so on. These are features which do not have to be given 
the same weight (or, in some cases, any weight at all) 
in the analysis of inflation in developed economies. 
Besides, a general theoretical explanation of Latin 
American experience has to take account of dynamic 
factors such as population growth. This compels govern-
ment initiative in providing social and economic capital, 
and in creating employment opportunities if these do not 
emerge. Analysis of trends in this region also has to 
allow for adverse secular trends in markets for primary 
commodities, and an income-elasticity of demand for 
imports greater than unity. 
The process which has been described cannot be clas-
sified as one of "cost" inflation or of "demand" inflation, 
in the manner customary in professional discussion in 
Western Europe and North America. It has elements of 
both, but also structural features and trends which are 
peculiar to less developed economies. 
The importance of various aspects of this process varies 
from country to country, according to the rate at which 
each grows, its experience with foreign trade, its economic 
and social structure, and the policies which its Govern-
ment puts into effect. In some cases the external and 
internal obstacles to growth make it difficult for Govern-
ments intent on economic development to avoid inflation, 
at least in the short run (i.e. until they can make structural 
improvements). In others, due advantage may not be 
taken of a favourable structural situation and possibilities 
of expanding trade. Perhaps the need to develop basic 
sectors is ignored, or export markets are lost because of 
ill-conceived policies in the spheres of public investment, 
or irresponsible fiscal, monetary or wages policy. Develop-
ments in Argentina in the years after the last war illustrate" 
these points. 
In the remainder of the present paper the experience 
of Latin America in the past three decades is summarized 
with special attention to these questions. First the situation 
in 1929 is described, with some reference to the inherited 
obstacles to structural transformation; then the same sec-
tion III deals with the decline in exports during the 
depression, the wartime shortages, the postwar boom and 
the problems raised by the attempts to pursue develop-
ment policies in the past decade despite recurrent weak-
nesses in commodity markets. Section IV discusses some 
features of the policies which have been followed in the 
attempt to cope with these problems. 
III . A SUMMARY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN GROWTH AND INFLATION, 1929 TO 1959 
1. THE POSITION IN 1929^ 
During the nineteenth century, the economy of every 
country in the region had become organized very largely 
around its export industries. By the time of the First 
World War, the main features of economic structure could 
be summarized as follows. A substantial part of the 
proceeds of exports was earned by plantations, large cattle 
farms or mines. Much of this income flowed straight out 
again. Some of it was remitted as profits to foreign com-
panies or absentee landowners; the rent and profits re-
ceived by local property owners were mostly spent on 
imports. The remainder entered the local economy by two 
main channels, namely, taxes on foreign trade and profits 
of export and import merchants. These sustained civil 
service bureaucracies and commercial life in the large 
cities, where some manufacturing activities could be 
found, such as food processing and the clothing industry. 
A considerable fraction of the population, often those of 
Indian or Negro stock, worked on estates, plantations or 
on smallholdings, or on communal land, for little or no 
' The reader should bear in mind that because not a great deal 
of research has been done on the economic development of Latin 
America, not enough is known of the structure of most countries, 
even in a period as recent as the 1920's. 
remuneration, so they hardly counted as part of the 
consumer market. They were also cut off from the city 
labour markets, not merely by distance and bad transport, 
but also by illiteracy, lack of technical skill, and quasi-
feudal obligations to their employers and landlords. 
It must not be inferred from these generalizations that 
all economies were at the same level in the early decades 
of this century. The scale of manufacturing, the extent of 
commercial agriculture, and the degree of urbanization 
varied greatly. Broadly speaking, they were aU much more 
in evidence in the Southern Zone of the region, where 
the original pattern of colonization had been modified by 
the extensive immigration of artisans, entrepreneurs and 
working farmers. In Argentina, particularly, the economy 
had become quite highly unified geographically and social-
ly, at least by comparison with that of other countries in 
the region. 
Where the process of industrialization had already got 
under way, it received a vigorous impulse from the condi-
tions produced by the war of 1914-18. Imports became 
hard to get. Shipping grew scarce; blockades were main-
tained by the belligerent powers; and both European and, 
eventually, North American industries were diverted to 
the manufacture of armaments and munitions. By the 
1920's, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and (especially) the south 
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of Brazil, were well on the same road that had been taken 
earlier by Argentina. Substantial proportions of the pop-
ulation were living in urban areas, and local industries 
could by now satisfy a significant fraction of local de-
mand. The same signs of progress were also appearing in 
Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela, although the degree 
of self-sufficiency they showed was lower, and typical of 
an earlier stage of development. Meanwhile, Argentine 
industry was expanding into new fields, such as engin-
eering. 
Yet all the Latin American economies were still vulner-
able to fluctuations in foreign trade. Their exports, which 
provided a high proportion of income, consisted of a 
few important products, perhaps orily a single item, and 
were sold to a limited number of buyer countries. The 
sectors producing for export had, except in the cases of 
Argentina and Uruguay, very limited possibilities of sell-
ing their output inside the economy. Even those countries 
which were becoming industrialized, and thus growing 
less dependent on the income generated by exports, were 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of external trade, though in 
a different way. Certain types of goods, not only advanced 
•consumer goods, but also nearly all capital goods and 
intermediate products had to be imported. The more 
advanced economies were coming to rely heavily on re-
.ceipts of foreign exchange to provide the materials and 
equipment for their industrial sectors. 
Despite the progress that had been made, internal 
developments continued to be hampered by the lack of 
economic integration. Some improvement had been made 
in the cultivation of export crops, but little technical pro-
gress could be seen in agricultural production for the 
home market. While owners of large estates still used the 
major part of their land, even when arable, as unorganized 
cattle grazing, the peasants on smallholdings or communal 
land were employing techniques which were decades or 
even centuries out of date. Industrial firms, lacking the 
domestic hinterland they needed for large-scale produc-
tion, were often inefficient and/or monopolistic. 
Nevertheless, as long as world trade was buoyant, as it 
was in most of the 1920's, economies did continue to grow. 
Exports expanded, private investment by foreigners was 
heavy, and Governments could raise considerable finance 
overseas for public works. Incomes rose, and with them 
consumption and tax revenues. The cities were able to 
absorb a continuous flow of migrants from the country 
districts, attracted not merely by higher incomes, but also 
by amenities and services such as electricity, water sup-
plies and schools, and in some cases by greater safety. 
These physical changes in Latin American economies 
had been accompanied by others of a financial nature. In 
the nineteenth century, a number of countries had still 
used dollars for local currency, while those with their 
own money had kept it tied to gold; foreign banks had 
provided most of the financial services. The countries of the 
Southern Zone which had made most progress economical-
ly had begun to show greater financial independence. In 
an attempt to alleviate the consequences of slumps in world 
trade, they devalued their currencies, on occasion, and 
often suspended convertibility into gold. In addition, lo-
cally-owned commercial banks played a growing part in 
the financial life of the more industrialized countries, and 
during the 1920's several central banks were established. 
These moves towards monetary independence had, how-
ever, met with setbacks from time to time. There had 
already been bouts of inflation, especially in Chile, and 
on occasion local banks had been forced to close their 
doors. Sometimes devaluation could be ascribed to plain 
mismanagement of national finance. After the severe 
financial crises of 1921, when commodity markets had 
collapsed, there was a general attempt to return to the 
gold standard. Latin America was in this matter following 
the example of European countries which were trying to 
re-establish the international monetary system that had 
broken down in the First World War.^ 
One of the consequences was that economic policy, in 
its present form and scope, was not applied in 1929 in any 
part of the region. Observance of the rules of the gold 
standard meant that certain problems never arose. A 
shortage of foreign reserves could hardly occur, and any 
incipient price inflation would be braked by shortage of 
money before it could gather momentum. Among the 
virtues of the gold standard was that it achieved these ends 
almost automatically, and problems requiring political de-
cision and administrative action were less acute. 
Few instruments for policy had as yet been created. 
Taxation was relatively low, being based mainly on import 
duties, and since a chronic budget deficit would have been 
hard to finance, expenditure was also limited. Despite the 
moves towards financial independence, monetary systems 
were still hardly developed enough to give much scope for 
deliberate policy. Exchange controls and multiple rates 
were as yet unknown. In any case, the material basis for 
a more active and independent policy hardly existed in 
most countries, at least in the short run, if the lack of local 
capacity for producing manufactures is taken into account. 
Monetary expansion would have led quickly to an increase 
in imports and an unacceptable loss of foreign reserves. 
Furthermore, the political pressures for such policies were 
limited, since power was effectively in the hands of those 
not entirely dissatisfied with developments, and even the 
discontented could still find some scope for the improve-
ment of their conditions so long as national products were 
rising and it was possible for them to move out of back-
ward sectors of the economy. 
But the almost complete absence of conscious economic 
strategy proved a serious handicap in the years that fol-
lowed. Administrations were not gaining experience in 
formulating policy and carrying it out; statistics were not 
being demanded because they were not needed, so they 
remained almost non-existent; and political leaders had 
become accustomed to thinking that economic develop-
ments were, broadly speaking, outside their control and 
therefore not their responsibility. 
2 . THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPRESSION: 
NEW ALTERNATIVES FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY EMERGE 
Great though its merits were, in retrospect it is hard to 
believe that this time the larger economies of the region 
would have been prepared, or indeed able, to maintain 
the rules of the gold standard indefinitely, even if fluc-
tuations in foreign trade had been avoided. These rules 
implied an overriding priority for balancing payments 
° In one respect most Latin American countries departed from 
strict gold standard conventions; holdings of the currencies of the 
industrial countries were treated as if they were gold for the 
purposes of currency regulations and conventions. It was con-
venient to hold the currencies of trading partners, and, since 
they were in fact fully convertible into gold, a "gold exchange 
standard", as it has been called, was for countries of the region 
a natural departure from practices followed overseas. 
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and for stabilizing the domestic price level. Income and 
employment could grow and recessions could be avoided, 
but only if foreign trade continued to expand. Thus the 
rate of expansion depended in the last resort on the pace 
at which national products were growing in the leading 
industrial countries of North America and Western Europe, 
a pace which might prove too slow for an area with low 
per capica incomes and a fast rate of population increase. 
However, the question was never put to the test. The 
depression which started in 1929 was so harsh that the 
gold standard was discarded as unworkable by the whole 
world, including the industrial countries themselves. World 
trade plunged sharply and speculative movements of capital 
were heavy. The leading industrial countries abandoned 
convertibility into gold one after another and devalued 
their currencies. Those that retained the gold standard, 
as France did, found their exports more and more difl&cult 
to market; they had to bring imports down by inducing 
a fall in activity, and therefore in employment, of a mag-
nitude that in the end proved to be intolerable. The 
abandonment of the gold standard was the necessary 
condition for the adoption of anti-cyclical programmes, 
such as public works schemes, which became increasingly 
necessary. 
The slump came as a particularly severe shock to Latin 
America. Public revenues depended heavily on the tax-
ation of foreign trade; and investment was being largely 
financed by foreign companies in export industries or in 
sectors which were linked with them. So the . decline in 
exports, which was in any case relatively much sharper 
than in the industrial countries, meant reductions in in-
come throughout the economy. At the same time, the 
foreign exchange shortage was aggravated by the drying 
up of the inflow of short-term capital, even in some cases 
by its reversal. Countries which were accustomed to relying 
on foreign sources for much of their supplies found it 
hard to make the necessary cut in their imports. 
Governments revoked convertibility, not only into gold, 
but also into foreign currencies. This led to the ap-
pearance of free markets in which exchange rates were 
at a discount compared with official quotations and fluc-
tuated from day to day. These were not the only breaches 
that occurred in the old economic order. Like many other 
countries, industrial or primary producer, those in Latin 
America introduced import quotas in an attempt to cor-
rect the deficit in foreign payments and increased duties 
on imports. (The United States had raised its tariff walls 
in 1930, under the Smoot-Hawley Act.) Many of them 
also defaulted on foreign debts, as a number of European 
countries were doing. Furthermore, several attempts were 
made, not very successfully, to stabilize commodity prices 
by international measures to control output. 
Apart from these steps, which were common to almost 
the whole region, one group of countries took additional 
measures, whereas the remainder did not, and there has 
been a clear distinction between these two groups ever 
since. The additional measures can be summed up as 
autonomous monetary expansion, autonomous in the sense 
that it was much greater than would have been justified 
by movements in reserves. This was accompanied by legal 
and institutional changes such as the establishmerit of 
new central banks, or an increase in the power of those 
that already existed. 
The countries which did take such autonomous action 
were, broadly speaking, the largest and those already 
partially industrialized—^Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia and Mexico. They had the greatest incentive to 
attempt some form of compensation. Unemployment was 
a severe problem for their large city populations, which 
were not by any means powerless politically, and domestic 
bankers were threatened by the inability to meet current 
obligations. These countries had, moreover, the greatest 
scope for action: they had industries which could supply 
some at least of the needs of the local consumer and 
absorb some of the unemployment (see table 1) . 
It must not be thought that compensatory action was 
in all cases deliberately chosen as an economic strategy 
and that exchange control was imposed to stop the conse-
quent loss of reserves. The crisis developed so quickly that 
administrations improvised as best they could. Budget 
deficits appeared because revenues were falling fast, and ] 
the expansion of credit was often decided on at a few \ 
hours' notice to save banks from having to close their 
doors. 
Although it was some time before the gold standard 
was consciously and finally rejected, each step represented 
a further break with conventional monetary standards. 
Backing for the currency fell; further devaluation oc-
curred vis-a-vis not merely gold, but also the United 
States dollar; and more controls were imposed on pur-
chases of foreign exchange. But the depression was grad? 
ually changing attitudes as to what constituted permis-
sible policy. Overseas, both professional and political 
opinion was swinging round in favour of the conscious 
use of fiscal and monetary policy, backed where necessary 
by direct controls, to prevent or cure cyclical depressions. 
The practical example of the "New Deal" in the United 
States was a particularly powerful stimulus to those Latin 
Americans who were urging a different and more auto-
nomous approach. 
Although a number of Latin American economies had 
already been in some degree diversified by the end of 
the previous decade, the depression demonstrated how far 
this process was from being complete by revealing how 
much they still depended on imports. Because of the , 
shortage of foreign exchange, the imports of Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico shrank in volume by more than one 
half between 1929 and 1932, and those of Chile fell by 
more than three quarters. Indeed, according to the League 
of Nations World Economic Report, 1932-33, Chilean 
exports and imports fell more than any other of the 
thirty-nine countries covered. The problem of maintaining 
living standards and limiting unemployment was in part 
one of adapting financial policy to the new circum-
stances, but in real terms it was a question of replacing 
imports with domestic products on a big scale and at 
short notice—^particulary imports of manufacture. 
A strong impetus was given to industrialization by the 
measures taken to protect reserves of foreign exchange. 
Devaluation, import quotas, higher tariffs—all these had 
the incidental effect of opening up new markets for the 
domestic producer, or strengthening his position against 
foreign competition. The sudden expansion of man-
ufacturing was not, however, easy. One obstacle was the 
difficulty of financing it. Investment by foreigners was 
now small; private savings had been depressed by the 
decline in incomes; and equipment had become expensive 
to import, because of devaluation. There were also more 
deeply-rooted handicaps to be overcome. The labour force 
lacked the range of skills needed; the land-owning class 
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ing output as 
% of G.DJ>. 
(3) 
Exports as % 
of G.D.P.' ' 
(4) 
Group U 
Countries which have experi-
enced rapid inflation 
(a) Semi-industrial economies 
Brazil 11000 13 21 12 
Argentina 10 000 37 23 9 
6 000 15 21 14° 
Colombia 3 000 15 18 14 
Chile 2 000 29 17 11 
Peru / 1 A A A 8" 16 16 
Uruguay > 1 ÜUU 33» . . . 18 
(b) Non-industrialized econo-
mies 
Bolivia \ Under 11 . . . 18 
Paraguay J 500 15 9 
Group total 33 000 18 21' 12 
Group 0 
Countries which have experi-
enced only moderate inflation 
Venezuela 4 000 17 8 35 
Cuba 2 000 22 32 
Costa Rica 18 17 
Dominican Republic . . . 9 ... 26 
Ecuador 15 14 13 
El Salvador Under 9 12 20 
Guatemala 500 10 18 
Haiti 4 ... 15 
Honduras 9 24 
Nicaragua 10 18 
16 ' i i 34= 
Group total 10 000 13 9' 29 
SOURCES: (1), (3) and (4), ECLA, on the basis of national statistics. 
(2) Demographic Aspects of Urbanization (Population Branch, United Nations, E/CN.12/ 
URB. 18). 
" "Cily" population is defined as the population in urban centres of more than 100 thousand. 
It should be borne in mind that the definition of an "urban centre" varies from country to 
country. 
The year is 1950 or the nearest census. 
" Exports of goods, except for Mexico and Panama (goods and services). 
" 1940. 
° Estimated by Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz (Bulletin of International Statistical Institute, 
Vol. XXXIII, Part IV, p. 237), since no census has been taken since 1908. 
' Average of countries for which data are available. 
was often unwilling to invest time and energy in new 
tasks to which, whatever their economic rationale, the 
traditional social prestige of agricultural activity did not 
attach; and those in trade and commerce usually pre-
ferred to follow in their customary family business, rather 
than undertake the risky and exacting work of founding 
industrial enterprises. 
As regards physical inputs, the new industries' needs 
in respect of fuel, materials and semi-manufactures were 
heavy. Moreover, industrialization induced an increased 
demand for foodstuffs in the cities. What was required, 
and what was indeed imposed by the circumstances, was 
a wholesale transformation of the economy. This placed 
novel demands on a transport system which had been 
designed mainly as an ancillary to foreign trade. 
The official bureaucracy was also hardly capable of 
meeting the administrative requirements of the new sit-
uation. There was, as in many other parts of the world, 
a severe shortage of public servants capable of framing 
economic strategy and administering import controls in 
such a way as to minimize the tensions of the process. 
Statistics were still, in any case, of such a low quality 
that policy was inevitably based on "hunches" or biased 
information. 
Although the industrial sector did, in general, grow 
in response to this stimulus, the products of the new in-
dustries were usually expensive. New factories, like the 
old, were often very small and inefficient and competition 
was still far from perfect. The response of agriculture 
was even more inadequate to the demands of the new 
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situation. If allowance is made for the imported fuel and 
equipment needed by the new industries and for heavy 
consumer demand, in part stimulated by excessively ex-
pansionist policies, it is not surprising that the demand 
for foreign exchange did not abate; exchange rates were 
under continuous pressure. 
In Brazil, Chile and Mexico, price levels tended to rise 
after 1932 (see figure I ) . This was not true of Argentina 
and Uruguay. One reason was that the failure of their 
export markets released foodstuffs which could be con-
sumed at home. Secondly, Argentina had made most 
progress in industrialization previously: a sizable indus-
trial sector was already in existence at the start of the 
slump, with some surplus capacity, so substitution for 
imports involved a less radical departure from previous 
economic patterns. Thirdly, both countries were reason-
ably supplied with basic social capital like transport and 
electricity which facilitated the establishment of new in-
dustries; and the social environment itself made it easier 
than elsewhere to find entrepreneurs and suitable workers. 
Fourthly, Argentina's fiscal and monetary policy was 
managed in such a way as to offset the effects of fluctua-
tions in foreign trade; and, finally, industrialization there 
was relatively well balanced. 
This experience is an interesting illustration of the 
relative significance of monetary and real factors, which 
was discussed above. It is possible to attribute currency 
devaluation and price rises to the laxness of the authorit-
ies, who expanded the supply of money, thus permitting 
Government deficits to occur and also the extension of 
more credit to the private sector. If this monetary ex-
pansion had not occurred, prices and exchange rates 
would probably have changed but little on balance over 
this decade. But we must take account of the context of 
monetary policy. Faced with a catastrophic fall in exports, 
which was the original cause of the trouble, those respon-
sible for policy had to make a series of choices between 
unpleasant alternatives. When revenue fell off, for ex-
ample, Governments were presented with a dilemma. On 
the one hand, they could make equally drastic reductions 
in expenditure and face the social implications of this, 
at a time when unemployment was already rising to 
dangerous levels. Alternatively, they could resort to deficit 
finance. Similarly, the monetary authorities had to decide 
whether to contract credit, when their foreign reserves 
declined, and they had to make this decision at a time 
when commercial banks and business houses were already 
under severe financial stress. In many cases, the strain 
on the balance of payments and price inflation would 
have been much less if policy had been carefully framed, 
but the authorities ran risks either way, whether their 
policy was expansionist or restrictive. In several large 
economies, they chose rising prices and devaluation rather 
than falling incomes and unemployment. 
In view of the political circumstances of the times in 
these countries, which included civil disturbance, it is 
doubtful whether any other choice was possible. Author-
ities who tried to adhere to strictly orthodox policies were 
usually removed from office. 
Most of the remaining countries of the region either 
refrained from carrying out autonomous monetary pol-
icies, or at any rate did less in this direction and stopped 
them sooner. Both the need and the opportunity in the 
small economies of Central America and the Caribbean 
were limited. For one thing, urban proletariats were 
relatively smaller. While the depression meant severe hard-
ship, a great part of the population worked in subsistence 
sectors only remotely affected by fluctuations in the com-
mercial part of the economy. Political pressure from this 
quarter to maintain incomes was therefore not very strong. 
The banking systems were, moreover, largely in foreign 
hands and there was opposition to measures which might 
lead to devaluation of the currency. 
In any event, the scope for expansionist policies was 
quite limited in economies which were still essentially 
dependent on exports and with relatively small manu-
facturing sectors. A country which has experienced only 
a little industrialization is particulary deficient in the 
economic, social and political conditions for further prog-
ress in this direction. 
Three such countries did attempt unorthodox financial 
policies at this time and in each case prices rose sharply 
during the 1930's though the evidence of this is partly 
the indirect one of exchange devaluation (see tab e 2 ) . 
Bolivia suffered from a severe decline in tin exports, 
which immediately unbalanced the budget, and on top 
of this came the Chaco war, fought in die midst of the 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: CURRENCY UNITS' PER UNITED , 
STATES DOLLAR," 1929 TO 1959 
1929 1940 1945 1951 1959 
(ave.) (end) (end) (end) (end) 
Group U 
(a) 
Brazil (Cr.) . . 9 20 20 20 202 
Argentina (Peso) 2 4 5 14 83 
Mexico (Peso) . 2 5 5 9 12 
Colombia (Peso) 1 2 2 3 7 
Chile (Peso) . . 8 34 32 93 1052 
Peru (Sol) . . . 2 7 7 15 28 
Uruguay (Peso). 1 3 2 2 11 
(b) 
Bolivia (Bol.) . . 3 61 64 247° 11 885 
Paraguay (Guara-
ní) 4 3 32 128 
Group 0 
Venezuela (Bol.) 5 3 3 3 3 
Cuba (Peso) . . 1 1 1 1 1 
Costa Rica (Co-
lon) 4 6 6 7 7 
Dominican Rep-
ublic (Peso)" 1 1 1 1 1 
Ecuador (Sucre) 5 15 14 17 17 
El Salvador (Co-
lon) 2 3 3 3 3 
Guatemala (Quet-
zal) 1 1 1 1 1 
Haiti (Gourde) . 5 5 5 5 5 
Honduras (Lempi-
ra) • • > 2 2 2 2 
Nicaragua (Cond.) . . . 6 6 7 7 
Panama (Bal-
boa)" 1 1 1 1 1 
SOURCES : League of Nations Statistical Yearbook, and Inter-
national Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics. 
• Free market rates, where applicable and available. This table 
is only designed to give a general indication of movements in 
exchange rates. For details refer to sources. 
It should be noted that the dollar was itself devalued by 41 
per cent in terms of its gold parity in January 1934. 
° August 1952. 
Prior to October 1947, the dollar was legal currency. 
" Currency consists of United States notes and currency together 
with the balboa and subsidiary coins. 
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depression. The consequence could only be an unman-
ageable demand for imports, leading to successive de-
valuations and internal price rises.^ In Ecuador and Ni-
caragua, also, monetary expansion led to steep price rises, 
without alleviating internal conditions appreciably. 
The countries of the region are usually divided into 
two groups. Exchange rates of countries in the Caribbean 
area and Central America which had suffered de facto 
devaluation nearly all regained the former parity with 
the United States dollar, or something close to it, as the 
depression came to an end and made their currencies 
once more convertible into dollars. They were in effect 
now on a dollar standard and they continued to maintain 
orthodox financial practices in the following decades as 
well. These countries experienced only moderate price 
rises over the three past decades. Nicaragua has reverted 
to more conservative practices in the past decade and 
price rises have slowed down there; Ecuador can also be 
included in the group, taking the period as a whole. 
Venezuela falls into this class too. It possessed in pe-
troleum an export which has proved easy to market until 
quite recently, and earnings of foreign exchange have 
climbed very rapidly. Even in the depression, the upward 
trend was halted, rather than reversed. The need for 
compensatory policy did not therefore arise in the 1930's 
and the Venezuelan bolivar was so strong that it ap-
preciated vis-a-vis the United States dollar. (See again 
table 2.) 
There are therefore eleven countries which have 
followed, in general, orthodox policies in the matter of 
reserves (see table 3) for most of the past thirty years 
and which have, on the whole, experienced only moderate 
increases in prices (see figure I I ) . These countries will 
be known as Group 0 . They are mostly small economies, 
unindustrialized and heavily dependent on foreign trade 
(see table 1 ) . Even Cuba and Venezuela, although much 
larger, had in 1950 only narrow manufacturing sectors 
by comparison with their export industries. This type of 
economic structure tended to be preserved, as in certain 
other countries, by reciprocal trade agreements with the 
United States, which offered special marketing advantages 
for sugar and petroleum respectively, in return for under-
takings to restrict the protection of local industries. 
The other nine countries of Latin America have mostly 
followed less orthodox financial policies and have ex-
perienced, particularly in the past decade, steady-to-fast 
price inflation and a series of devalutions. Seven of these 
are the more industrialized economies of the region, most 
of which are also large and highly urbanized. As a gen-
eral rule, exports account for a smaller proportion of 
output (see again table 1).® Bolivia and Paraguay are 
the other two countries which have followed unorthodox 
financial policies. Paraguay began to do so after the war. 
Structurally and in size they belong to the former group. 
But precisely because they lacked the industrial capacity 
needed for an expansionist policy, they experienced par-
ticularly violent bouts of inflation. So they form a special 
class. 
* Paraguay, Bolivia's protagonist in the war, financed its milit-
ary expenditures by means which were financially more orthodox 
and did not, at this time, experience inflation. 
" The figures shown for Brazil in table 1 may be slightly 
misleading, since the country includes a large, backward, rural 
area in the North-East. Thus about 20 per cent of the population 
in the Centre and South lived in cities. 
Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: BACKING FOR LOCAL CURRENCIES, 
1937, 1940, 1945, 1950 AND 1958 
(Central Bank foreign assets as percentage of currency issue"^ 
end-year) 
Country 1937 1940 1945 1950 1958 
Group U 
(a) 
23° 24° 89° 51 9 
Argentina*" . . . 158 134 220 23 — 8 
Mexico 37» 42° 95° 87 70 
Colombia . . . . 54 55 142 42 29 
Chile 25 15 55 28 7 
Peru 62 41 35 55 12 
Uruguay . . . . ... 131 261 124 27 
(b) 
Bolivia 60 62 98 60 33 
Paraguay . . . . ... 18 133 12" 44 
Group 0 
Venezuela . . . . 116° 112° 84° 144 239 
31» 32° 139° 138 83 
Costa Rica . . . 29 21 61 22 61 
Dominican Repub-
lic 122 210° 259 99 89 
Ecuador . . . . 81 120 139 118 67 
El Salvador . . . 113 115 147 134 95 
Guatemala . . . 90 126 152 96 88 
Haiti"" 96 — 17 
Honduras . . . . 'lb' 49° Í29° 108 44 
Nicaragua. . . . 25 91 74 29 43 
Panama' . . . . ... ... ... ... 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tistics. 
" Gross foreign assets of Central Bank except where otherwise 
indicated, and currency in circulation, as shown in the "mo-
netary survey" section of International Financial Statistics. 
" Net assets. 
For 1937, 1940 and 1945 Banco do Brasil only for both foreign 
assets and currency liabilities. Subsequently the foreign assets., 
of "other monetary authorities" were included, and the currency 
was the net total as for other countries. 
1952. The Central Bank was formed that year, and the figures 
for 1952 and 1958 refer to its reserves and currency liabilities. 
For 1937, 1940 and 1945 foreign assets are those of the Banco 
del Paraguay but currency is the net total in circulation. 
' Reserves of the whole banking system. 
' Currency consists of United States coins and notes, and a li-
mited number of silver balboas. There are also substantial hold-
ings of dollar assets by the Government, banks and private in-
dividuals. So the backing is much more than 100 per cent. 
3 . THE COMMON PROBLEMS OF THE WAR YEARS 
The fundamental contrast between these types of economy 
was for a time not very obvious. When the world pulled 
out of the depression, Latin American imports rose and 
local price inflations slowed down to a halt. Accordingly, 
by the end of the 1930's movements in prices appeared 
to be once more in step. During the war they accelerated 
again in almost every country. 
This even occurred in economies of Group 0 . Their 
exports rose in nearly every case. The entire crops of the 
sugar-producing countries were purchased, usually by 
the United States; and firm contracts were offered by the 
same country for supplies of certain minerals, cereals and 
agricultural materials. Some coimtries, for example Haiti, 
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the development of new products. Even non-essentials like 
cacao and coffee profited from high prices. An exception 
was banana exports, which fell to very low levels; because 
of the need for special shipping facilities, bananas did 
not have much priority in the supply programmes of 
belligerent countries. 
But imports were prevented from rising in step with 
exports. Goods from Western Europe became increasingly 
difficult to obtain. These could largely be replaced by 
purchases from the United States up to the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor; thenceforward the conversion 
of industry to war purposes in the United States, the 
shortage of shipping space, and submarine warfare in 
the Caribbean area severely limited supplies to Latin 
America. In some cases, the landed cost of imports rose, 
but the rise was limited because of price controls in the 
United States. 
The expansion of incomes in export industries was 
therefore much bigger than the rise in the value of 
imports, and the automatic brake on inflation in dollar-
standard countries ceased to function. Increases in foreign 
reserves induced an expansion of credit and thus stimulat-
ed investment in other sectors, so that the total expansion 
in demand was big. But these economies were quite 
unable to satisfy certain types of demands themselves. The 
net result was a moderate-to-fast rise in prices. Figure 
II shows the price increases in these countries during this 
period. 
The situation was not, in broad outline, very different 
in the countries which had been following more expan-
sive monetary policies in the 1930's. Heavy exports were 
expanding demand, and internal activity was not only 
stimulated by an export surplus but also by a great in-
crease in the liquidity of the banking systems of several 
countries owing to the arrival of foreign capital seeking 
refuge from the war. In some cases, the authorities tried 
to dampen the effect on credit of the growth of reserves. 
In Colombia, increases in deposits had to be invested in 
non-negotiable bonds, which businesses were also com-
pelled to buy, and in Mexico the authorities sold gold to 
absorb currency, as well as taking measures to limit credit. 
Authorities in other countries, however, followed less 
strict policies: now that the rules of the gold standard 
had been abandoned, there were no generally accepted 
set of principles for policy. 
A further fillip was given to import substitution, al-
though the reason was no longer the shortage of foreign 
exchange. The nine countries of Group U were beset not 
merely by the same supply problems as the other group, 
but also, excepting Mexico and Colombia, with the ad-
ditional difficulty of long hauls from the United States 
to their ports. Yet the very circumstances that made it 
difficult to import finished products also discouraged 
purchases of the machinery, materials and fuel which 
were needed to manufacture them domestically. 
Demand for the products of local secondary industry 
was so high that it stretched capacity to the limit. The 
war revealed weaknesses in other sectors too. In Peru, 
for example, food imports were cut by five sixths between 
1940 and 1942; and while local production was stimulat-
ed, areas of chronic shortage emerged, because of the 
poor communications inside the country. In Brazil, fuel 
was a serious problem. Wood and coffee were widely 
used as sources of energy; coal and gasoline were ra-
tioned; petrol was increasingly adulterated with alcohol. 
and by 1942 cars and lorries were running on gas gener-
ated from alcohol and lignite. In Argentina, too, there was 
an acute shortage of energy supplies. In 1943 alone, 1.7 
million tons of wheat, 1.5 million tons of flax and linseed 
and 0.1 million tons of maize were burned as fuel.® An-
other general weakness in the region was in basic metals; 
big efforts were made to develop local resources of iron 
ore, and such furnaces that existed were used intensively. 
The shortage of equipment was possibly most severe in 
transport. The railway from Sao Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, 
for example, was at times only allowed to carry foodstuffs 
and fuels.^ 
These structural weaknesses did not check the rate of 
growth. Despite difficulties, important acts of investment 
were carried out. For example, construction of the Volta 
Redonda steel plant was started in Brazil, and industries 
for making simple types of capital goods were established 
there. The consequence for many countries was a tenden-
cy for prices to rise, rather than stagnation. In the effort 
to avoid the dangers of inflation. Governments once more 
followed the example of the industrial countries. Although 
some excess demand was considered inevitable in the 
United Kingdom and the United States because of the heav^ 
burden of war finance, a big attempt was made to control 
prices in both these countries on the grounds that inflation 
would hamper the war effort. Price control plans were alsp 
drawn up in Latin America, in some cases with the as-
sistance of United States experts. In a number of countries, 
these were highly detailed: local price committees were set 
up in every Paraguayan town, for example: the Peruvian 
Government controlled food distribution; and in Brazil and 
Colombia, price controls were backed by elaborate systems 
of checking inventories and licensing production and 
imports. In practice, Latin American schemes seem to 
have had very much less success, judging by index num-
bers of prices, than those of the developed countries. 
The smallest price increases for this group occurred in 
Argentina. Rents were frozen there, but the main explan-
ation, as in the depression, was a better fit between the 
patterns of supply and demand than in other countries.^ 
Supplies of foodstuffs that could not be delivered to over-
seas customers were diverted into the home market. 
Government controls were actually used at times to prevent 
food prices falling severely. Manufacturing industry was" 
better placed to cope with the situation. It was able, for 
example, to keep much of the existing equipment in service 
by repairing or reconditioning it locally. 
The degree of inflation in various countries could again 
be explained by referring to changes in the means of 
payment. But this is not particularly enlightening. The 
origin of the problem was that imports were being reduced 
while exports were rising. It was this that led to a general 
expansion of credit and incomes in the countries where 
special steps were not taken to prevent it. Moreover, the 
shortage of imports was simultaneously creating supply 
bottlenecks which could not be relieved until more food, 
fuel, materials and equipment could be ordered from 
overseas. Consequently, price increases in particular com-
' ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949 (E/CN.12/ 
lóVRev.l), citing the Comité Argentino de Enerva. 
' One effect of the shortages of supplies was a vigorous increase 
in trade among Latin American countries. This more than doubled 
between 1939 and 1943. The industries of Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico were in the best position to meet this challenge and their 
exports of semi-manufactures and manufactures rose to several 
times the pre-war levels. 
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modities, notably food, led to wage demands. A purely 
monetary approach might lead to the conclusion that 
financial policy would have dealt with the whole problem 
successful y; certainly a firmer fiscal and monetary policy 
by the authorities in many countries would have checked 
the general excess demand and reduced the pace of infla-
tion. But supply problems in certain sectors could hardly 
be eased by global policies. 
4. THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD: THE RE-EMERGENCE 
OF ECONOMIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
The years following the armistice were, like the middle 
of the 1920's, a period of prosperity in primary-produc-
ing countries. Reserves were high and exports rose rapidly 
as transport difficulties were eased.' The industrial coun-
tries required big increases in supplies of primary com-
modities to enable them to reconvert their industries to 
peace-time needs and to build up their inventories at all 
stages from goods-in-transit to final products. 
Banking systems in Latin America were very liquid and 
sections of the public held big bank deposits, so demand 
was buoyant. All types of imports rose rapidly. The rise 
in imports of fuel and materials eased the restraints on 
domestic production. It took, however, a certain time to 
tnake up for the years in which investment had lagged and 
no equipment had been bought for transport and electric 
power and to re-equip local industries, for one reason 
because there were long delays before orders for capital 
goods could be filled. So certain shortages still lingered on. 
Price structures were quite distorted by the time the war 
came to an end. As international trade was resumed, it 
became clear that many Latin American currencies were 
now overvalued, and shortages and controls had produced 
internal price relationships which were not likely to en-
dure. It is theoretically possible for such distortions to be 
corrected by rises in some prices and falls in others. But 
under the booming conditions of trade, with rising export 
and import prices and some persistent shortages, the 
. general movement was upwards. 
In different parts of the region experience once again 
started to diverge. In the countries of Group 0 , currencies 
remained fully convertible, and these became known, to-
gether with Canada and the United States, as the "dollar 
area", or the "hard currency area".® Here the rise in 
prices was limited. As imports climbed and reserves were 
run down—if not in absolute terms, at least relative to the 
national product—the mechanism of a conventional mo-
netary system, which equilibrates the balance of pay-
ments and checks price inflation, gradually took charge 
once more. The price rises which did occur in these 
countries after the war were mainly the reflection of 
developments abroad. Many of them import not merely 
manufactures but also staple foods, materials and fuels, 
so increases in import prices spread throughout the whole 
economy. Moreover, since export prices were also climb-
ing and volumes increasing, the money supply could be 
expanded sufficiently to accomodate a general rise in the 
price level. This was a pure case of "imported inflation". 
The countries in this group, which had experienced the 
biggest price rise during the war, ended it with their 
banking system rather less liquid and with exchange rates 
which were more obviously overvalued. So the operation 
of the dollar standard mechanism was quicker and more 
drastic. Thus in Nicaragua, where prices trebled between 
1940 and 1945, they subsequently became stabilized at a 
lower level and in Cuba, the not-quite-so-fast rise went 
on until 1948, before tapering off. For most members of 
the group, the trend in prices was always upwards but it 
slowed down after the middle of 1948. This reflected the 
deceleration of price increases in the United States, which 
went through a brief recession in 1949. 
In the group of countries which were following more 
flexible monetary policies, developments were different. 
The exchange position at the end of the war gave a rather 
illusory impression of strength, since part of the reserves 
represented capital which had fled from the vicissitudes 
of war and which was now due for repatriation. Moreover, 
the rise in world prices was steadily reducing the real 
value of these reserves. Nevertheless, for some years, 
the foreign balance did not appear a very urgent matter 
in most of these countries. Consequently, there was some 
room for choice in policy. The growing acceptance of 
Keynesian doctrines overseas was having an impression on 
Latin American authorities after being improperly used 
to justify inflation. So were measures in Western Europe to 
redistribute income, such as the "Welfare State" in the 
United Kingdom. In the generally expansionist atmos-
phere, budget deficits and rapidly rising imports were 
common, while the possibilities of expanding export in-
dustries and seeking new ones were not widely explored. 
The most vivid example of this was the case of Argen-
tina. We have seen that since this country exports staple 
foods, it can absorb what it cannot sell abroad. For the 
same reason, the level of exports depends to a considerable 
degree on how much is left over from domestic consump-
tion. Price and wage policies after 1945 had the effect 
of raising the purchasing power of wages in terms of tra-
ditional export products. Real wages in Argentina rose by 
50 per cent between 1944 and 1947, while domestic prices 
of traditional exports (though not other farm products) 
were prevented from following the upward trends in over-
seas prices. Argentina therefore never fully recovered its 
pre-war markets for agricultural commodities, especially 
grains. Imports, on the other hand, rose to a high level, 
and there was a swift decline in foreign reserves (from 
1,700 million dollars at the end of 1946 to 700 million at 
the end of 1949) This increase in imports relieved the 
wartime shortages mentioned above, but nevertheless the 
increases in wages were greater than those in productivity, 
so the costs of production rose. Moreover, other forces were 
at work promoting inflation. A good deal of equipment 
was worn out and much economic and social capital was 
below the levels appropriate to post-war incomes. Public 
investment was heavy but, being badly planned, it widened 
the budget deficit without curing these shortages. Despite 
the import surplus and the use of controls from 1947 on-
wards, price rises averaged over 20 per cent a year in the 
period 1945-50. 
Chile was a different case again. Foreign reserves had 
not been built up so much during the war; exports fell 
slightly in volume after it ended; and the terms of trade 
only improved moderately. Consequently, the volume of 
" Trade in manufactures within the region fell back however to 
very low levels, once normal channels were reopened. 
' Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico were also usually considered 
members of this area. 
The imports came mainly from Western Europe after 1947 
through the use of blocked sterling and prices there were general-
ly higher than in the United States. 
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imports could hardly be expanded at all and supply pro-
blems continued to hem in the Government's room to 
manoeuvre. Investment was only moderate and the. in-
crease in the national product was slow. Although imported 
foods were subsidized, prices continued to rise at much 
the same rate as in the war years. In the cases of Bolivia 
and Paraguay, too, near-stagnation was associated with 
inflation. Apart from supply problems, cumulative forces 
had now emerged in these three countries because of the 
duration and pace of inflation and these forces in turn 
ropelled it further forward. Savings propensities were 
:ow, budgets were difficult to balance and investment 
tended to be directed to projects yielding high and quick 
returns rather than to developing the basic industries and 
services which were needed. 
Some other countries in this group did much better. In 
the first place, their exports expanded more quickly; and, 
secondly, they made use of the opportunity thus provided. 
Investment was high in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, and 
better balanced; and national products grew at about 5 
or 6 per cent a year. In these cases, now that imports 
r< 
could be obtained in sufficient quantities and internal 
supply problems were eased, price rises became more mo-
derate (5 per cent to 11 per cent a year) . 
Still, in retrospect, it seems that the region failed to 
profit fully by the opportunity presented by the export 
boom of 1945-50. A large fraction of reserves was spent 
on consumer durables, such as motor vehicles, instead of 
being used to strengthen economies against the lean period 
that obviously lay ahead in the not-so-distant future after 
the reconstruction period, when the industrial countries 
would have built up their inventories to normal peace-
time levels. 
5. THE POSITION AT THE START OF THE 1950'S 
Despite the developments of the 1930's and the 1940's, 
the structure of Latin American economies still showed 
many of the shortcomings of the pre-depression period. 
Capital was lacking in basic sectors of the economy (see 
table 4 ) . The, inadequacies of the educational system are 
shown by the low number of teachers relative to the child-
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF ADEQUACY OF CAPITAL IN VARIOUS FIELDS 
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SoüHCES: Columns (1), (2) and (4) : International Bank, Comparative Data on Latin American 
countries based on United States Department of Commerce, Comparative Statistics on the Amer-
ican, Republics, where original sources are listed in full. 
Column (3) : United Nations, Report on the World Social Situation Appendix A. Middle of range 
taken for population. 
' Estimate for arable land is closest available year. Roads include those unsurfaced but graded 
and drained. Railways exclude light railways. 
' 1952. Public schools only. 
° All types of tractors. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: SOME INDICATORS OF ADEQUACY OF 
PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL IN VARIOUS FIELDS 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Table 6 
LITERACY: URBAN AND RURAL," 1950 OR 
NEAREST CENSUS 
(Percentage of those aged 15 and over") 
Elementary school 
teachers 
(Per thousand of 
those aged 5-14) 
1953, 1954 or 1955 
(1) 
Graduates of 
higher education in 
agriculture 






Brazil 11 75 
Argentina. . . . 30 130 
Mexico 11 115 
Colombia . . . . 9 54 
Chile 248 
Peru 'Í2 52 
Uruguay 17 228 
(b) 
. Bolivia 12 52 
Paraguay . . . . 19 3 
Group 0 
, Venezuela. . . . 12 50 
Cuba 16 112 
Costa Rica . . . 24 567 
Dominican 
Republic . . . 7 1 
Ecuador . . . . 11 28 
El Salvador . . . 12 6 
Guatemala. . . . 10 3 
Haiü 5 66 
Honduras. . . . 12 7 
Nicaragua. . . . 13 21 
Panama 18 26 
United States . . 30 
SOURCES: Column (1) Calculated from United Nations, Report on 
the World Social Situation. 
Column (2) Un Estudio de la Educación Agrícola en América 
Latina by Alvaro Chaparro. 
ren of school age (see table 5 ) , and their consquences 
in one sector can be inferred from the very low figures, 
particularly in certain countries, for professionally trained 
personnel in agriculture (also shown in table 5 ) . The level 
of training of the labour force is indicated by the low 
level of literacy, especially in the rural areas (see table 6 ) . 
The distribution of income continued to be highly un-
equal, because of concentration of property in a few hands, 
as well as roonopolistic profit margins and the incomplete 
provision of educationa opportunity. A large proportion 
of personal income still accrued to those with habits of 
heavy personal spending on foreign travel or imported 
luxuries.^^ The internal market for domestic industries 
was correspondingly limited and it was broken up because 
difiFerent qualities were demanded by the various social 
groups. Mass-production techniques which are needed, 
especially in the metal-using industries, could therefore 
hardly be established. 
The same contrast can be looked at on another plane, 
In 1950, the richest 5 per cent of Mexican families received 
40 per cent of the total income, whereas the corresponding families 
in the United States received^  21 per cent (La Distribución del 
Ingreso y el Desarrollo Económico de México by Ifigenia M. de 
Navarrete). If taxation were taken into account, the contrast would 
be even more striking. 
Urban Rural 
Group U 
Brazil 80 42 
Argentina. . . . 93 80 
Mexico 82 49 
Colombia . . . . 80 51 
Chile 92 71 
Peru 89 35 
Paraguay . . . . 86 62 
Group 0 
Venezuela. . . . 76 40 
Cuba 90 72 
Costa Rica . . . 93 76 
Dominican 
Republic . . . 76 39 
Ecuador . . . . 86 49 
El Salvador . . . 77 34 
Guatemala. . . . 75 22 
57 8 
Honduras. . . . 78 34 
Nicaragua. . . . 77 31 
Panama 95 65 
SOURCE: Derived from United Nations, Demographic Aspects of 
Urbanization in Latin America, table 23. 
® "Urban" is defined as those living in centres with more than 
20 thousand inhabitants. "Rural" is the remainder. Sometimes 
the definition is slightly different: see original source. 
" Lower age limit is 20 for Cuba, 14 for Argentina, 10 for Hon-
duras and Panama, 7 for Colombia and Guatemala, 6 for Mexico. 
as the difference between urban and rural incomes. In the 
cities incomes were still very much higher and consump-
tion patterns were distinctly different.^® City dwellers ate 
different f o o d s , w e r e more accustomed to wearing 
shoes," and used far more electricity.^® 
Apart from the inflexibility of an economy fissured in 
this way, the pattern of demand would change rapidly 
during the coming wave of migration to the cities. 
Despite the degree of industrialization already achieved, 
economic structures were still unable to cope with various 
forms of rising demand. Conspicuous gaps could be found 
in even the more developed countries, such as industries 
for making equipment and heavy chemicals.^® Markets 
Data are only available for later years, but the position did 
not change greatly. In Mexico City in 1956, average family in-
comes were nearly 2,000 pesos a month; in the State of Oaxaca 
they were just over 500 Ungresos y Egresos de la Población de 
México, Sample Survey Dept. Mexico, 1958). In Venezuela, in-
come in the capital averaged ten times as much as rural income 
in 1957 (The Fiscal System of Venezuela, p. 32). 
In Oaxaca, more than half of the income was devoted in 1956 
to maize and maize products; in Mexico City, the proportion was 
small, less in fact than what was spent on other cereals (Ingresos 
y Egresos de la Población México, op. cit.). 
In rural areas oí Mexico, the proportion of the population 
in 1950 wearing no footwear of any kind ran as high as 60 per 
cent; in cities it was 2 or 3 per cent (El Nivel de la Vida en 
México by M. Huerta Maldonado, based on the 1950 census of 
population). 
Per capita consumption of electricity in 1950 (excluding 
manufacturing industry) was about ten times as high in the larger 
cities of Latin America as in the remainder of each country 
(ECLA Energy in Latin America, E/CN.12/384/Rev.l). 
In 1948, finished constimer goods accounted for over 50 per 
cent of secondary industry in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In 
Canada, however, the corresponding figure was 28 per cent, less 
than the output of either the capital goods sector or the group 
of industries manufacturing intermediate products (United Nations 
Processes and problems of industrialization, Appendix A, table 6). 
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were highly imperfect, as was shown by a wide range of 
different prices in various parts of the same country." 
Mining sectors, usually dominated by foreign capital, 
formed what amounted to separate enclaves within the 
economies concerned. 
Table 7 indicates the degree of fragmentation in the 
region's economies. If mobility were perfect in labour and 
capital markets, one would expect marginal productivities 
and thus average productivities in various sectors to be 
more or less equal (as they are in industrialized countries). 
For Latin America as a whole, there were still great differ-
ences between output per head, and data for individual 
countries would show even more striking contrasts. 
Socio-economic structures of this type were obviously 
not well suited to cope with the strains—sometimes se-
vere—of the new stages in which the process of import 
substitution entered. 
6. THE STAGNATION OF EXPORTS IN THE 1950'S: THE 
ACUTE ECONOMIC POLICY DILEMMA 
These strains, however, were late in making themselves 
felt. The post-war commodity boom continued into the 
early 1950's. The United States economy rebounded from 
the recession of 1949, and the recovery in the Federal 
Republic of Germany was gathering speed. Then the 
Korean hostilities led to the adoption of armament pro-
grammes in the industrial countries and had a more im-
mediate impact on commodity prices. But in 1951, as 
fears of a general war diminished, prices of primary 
commodities fell back. In some cases they recovered again 
for a while later. There was a boom in non-ferrous metals 
in 1955 and 1956; and petroleum and free-market sugar 
prices rose during the Suez crisis. Cofifee prices rose to 
a peak in 1954 and remained relatively high until 1957. 
But, broadly speaking, there was no further sustained rise 
in commodity prices after early 1951. Volumes of exports 
did usually continue to expand, though in most cases the 
rise was only moderate. On the other hand, although the 
upward trend in import prices slowed down, reflecting an 
increased emphasis on price stabilization overseas and the 
slowing down in the rate of growth of the world economy, 
it did not stop. So the terms of trade of Latin America 
started to deteriorate. 
In the countries of Group 0 (i.e. the countries of the 
Thus in Valdivia, Chile, the same items of clothing cost in 
1950 45 per cent more than in Santiago, while food products 
cost considerably less (Estadística Chilena). 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: OUTPUT PER WORKER BY 
SECTOR IN 1955 
Sector Dollars at 1950 
prices 
Agriculture 382 
Mining 3 667 
Manufacturing 1 057 
Building 955 
Services 1 313 
All sectors 816 
SOURCES: United States, Department of Commerce, Comparative 
Statistics on the American Republics, based on ECLA, Econo-
mic Survey of Latin America 1956 and United Nations, Estudio 
sobre la mano de obra en América Latina. 
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SOURCE: See figure II. 
Caribbean area and Central America following conser-
vative financial practices), price rises levelled off almost 
completely, in the sense that any further rises were in the ' 
margin of statistical error, owing to the unreliability of 
price indices. This can be seen from figure II . Figure III 
brings out more clearly the closeness with which price 
changes followed those in the United States, the main 
customer and supplier of these countries. It does this by 
comparing the movement of consumer prices in the United 
States with the median consumer price rise each year for 
this group. After the war-time discrepancy, attributable 
to the reasons explained above, both series moved almost 
in step and both virtually ceased rising from 1951 on. 
Inflation has continued to be discussed as a problem in 
the United States, but it has in fact been insignificant 
in the past decade. a 
Appreciation of the success enjoyed by these economies 
in holding inflation in check and then eliminating it must 
be tempered by the consideration that the closer the 
adherence to the dollar standard, the more do not only 
price movements, but also economic growth, depend on 
external developments. An upward trend in the value of 
exports raises incomes and reserves, increases the demand 
for locally-produced goods and also leads to rising imports. 
The whole set of variables can keep moving upward. But, 
because of the preponderance of manufactures in imports, 
the income-elasticity of demand for imports tends to be 
greater than unity, despite attempts to protect local in-
dustries. So the rate of expansion of the value of exports 
tends to limit the rate of growth of the gross product. 
Account must also be taken of import prices, since, if they 
rise, this will tend to depress the rate of growth even 
more by absorbing foreign exchange.^® Thus, "the pur-
chasing power of exports", i.e. the value of exports deflated 
by an index of import prices, is likely to be the main deter-
minant of changes in the domestic product of a dollar-
standard country. 
The inflow of capital would also of course stimulate 
growth just as an outflow would depress it. But, data on 
In Venezuela, where there is competition between imports and 
domestic output over quite a wide range of articles, a relative 
rise in import prices may stimulate local production. 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: CHANGES IN THE PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS AND IN DOMESTIC INCOME BETWEEN 
1950-52 AND 1956-58 










Argentina. . . . — 9 
Mexico +45 
Chile. +21 





- Paraguay . . . . — 4 
Group total. . . . +1 
Group O 
Venezuela. . . . +64 
Cuba + 2 
Costa Rica . . . +21 
Dominican 
Republic . . . +25 
Ecuador . . . . +36 
El Salvador . . . +46 
Guatemala. . . . +27 
Haiti -22 
Honduras. . . . +11 
Nicaragua. . . . +70 
Panama +39 























SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics. 
® Exports relate to goods only, except for Mexico and Panama 
(goods and services). The purchasing power has been obtained 
by deflating the current values of exports of individual countries 
by the total unit value index of imports into the whole of Latin 
America. This has been done because in several cases national 
trade statistics do not yield unit value series for imports which 
can be used. The main underlying assumption is that for each 
year the deflation between the national and regional weighting 
systems is uncorrelated with price movements. This assumption 
clearly may lead to error in individual cases. Since manufactures 
have risen more in price than primary commodities over this 
period, the import prices of Group 0 may have risen more than 
the regional average, so that the rise in the purchasing power 
of exports of this group may be somewhat exaggerated here. 
Allowing for changes in the terms of trade. These have been 
estimated by using the regional price index for the reasons 
given in the previous footnote, and with similar implications. 
It should be borne in mind that it is impossible to exclude, as is 
theoretically desirable, subsistence production from the correc-
tion made for the terms-of-trade effect. 
capital movements are particularly weak, so this is difficult 
to allow for statistically. In any case, the effect of trends 
in capital inflows is not comparable with that of trends in 
exports, especially if allowance is made for the rising 
expenditure of foreign exchange in the form of profits 
and interest, associated with growing foreign investment. 
Moreover, the progress of exports very much determines 
the extent of foreign investment even in industries pro-
ducing for the home market. So the purchasing power of 
exports can still be considered the main determinant. 
There are not many reliable macroeconomic estimates 
for the countries of Group 0 . It is possible to make ap-
proximate estimates of changes in the purchasing power 
of exports (see table 8 ) , and in some cases it is also 
possible to indicate roughly what has happened to domestic 
income. However, the estimates of domestic income refer 
mainly to changes in the monetary sectors of the economy. 
Since subsistence sectors have mostly stagnated or de-
clined, these indices probably have an upward bias. 
There was evidently some association between exports 
and income in the 1950's (see table 8 and figure I V ) . 
The dispersion around the diagonal line corresponding to 
equal changes in both variables shows that, in so far as 
this was not due to purely statistical errors, there were 
other influences at work, though of comparatively limited 
strength. 
For Venezuela, a big rise in domestic income was 
associated with a more or less equivalent rise in exports, 
although, with the heavy investment in the Venezuelan 
petroleum industry in 1956 and 1957, a bigger rise in the 
former variable might have been expected. Similarly, 
large increases in both income and exports occurred in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. In other 
cases, the extent of import substitution appears to have 
caused a faster (or slower) growth in income than in 
exports. In Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, the 
growth in income appears to have substantially exceeded 
that in exports, while the reverse was true in Ecuador. In 
Cuba, Haiti and Honduras, the purchasing power of ex-
ports hardly changed and may have fallen; total real 
incomes nevertheless rose somewhat in these cases, but the 
substantial reduction in the backing for their currencies 
Figure IV 
GROUP O: RELATION BETWEEN INCREASES IN GROSS 
DOMESTIC INCOME (Y) AND IN PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS (X) 
(Index numbers for 1956-58; 1950-52 — 100) 
LOGARITHMIC SCALE 
»X1 
SOURCE: See table 4. 
ISO eoo X 
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(see table 3) indicates again that the temptation to relax 
monetary practices is strong when exports stagnate. De-
spite these signs of some monetary expansion, the increase 
in the total product was so small in these three countries 
that there was little change, perhaps even a fall, in per 
capita terms. Since there was quite a close relation be-
tween changes in income and in the purchasing power of 
exports for the largest economy (Venezuela) and for most 
countries of the group, this was also true for the group 
as a whole. 
After the middle of 1957, the exports of several of these 
countries fared badly. Prices of petroleum and free-market 
sugar fell back from the peaks attained in the Suez crisis; 
coffee markets weakened as the world glut grew and 
volumes of exports were restricted by international agree-
ment; cotton prices declined; and among tropical com-
modities only bananas continued to be moderately strong. 
The penalty for failing to diversify the economy now 
became apparent in terms of economic stagnation and 
social unrest. I t appears from preliminary figures that, 
in most of the countries of this group, the rate of growth 
of income slowed down considerably. 
Its biggest members, Cuba and Venezuela, have in fact 
taken autonomous action to stimulate an expansion of 
internal activity. In these two cases, political and eco-
nomic developments have been intermixed, and it cannot 
be said that it is purely for economic reasons that the 
dollar standard has been relaxed. Moreover, in the case 
of Venezuela, the measures taken have not so far been 
incompatible with the principles of this standard. The 
budget has been unbalanced, but the deficit was partly 
attributable to the repayment of debt. Import controls 
have been tightened, tariffs raised and exchange control 
introduced, but the import surplus, like the budget deficit, 
has been covered by running down reserves and borrow-
ing. Although prices started to rise in 1958, tiie rise has 
been moderate. However, banking legislation has been 
reformed to allow a lower ratio of reserves to central bank 
liabilities (33 per cent instead of 50 per cent) and to 
permit lending by the Central Bank to the Government. 
The experience of Group U was very different. Prices 
continued to rise and, in several cases, the pace of infla-
tion accelerated (see again figure I ) . There was quite a 
different relationship between the growth of income and 
exports. Industrialization was a more deliberate policy, 
even in the face of difficulties in marketing exports. 
Governments refrained from taking steps to reduce inter-
nal activity when exports fell back from their peaks, so 
that a policy of compensation was in fact practised. Bud-
gets slipped into deficit, or deficits grew, particularly in 
Chile where taxes on profits of export companies form 
a big source of revenue. Moreover the basis of the mone-
tary structure was further attenuated by allowing credit 
to increase when reserves fell. 
The main problem was not however that exports slipped 
back from time to time, but rather that the trend was no 
longer definitely upward. Taking this group as a whole, 
the change in the purchasing power of exports over this 
period was virtually zero (see table 8 ) . Yet, population 
increases were accelerating, except in Argentina and Uru-
guay, as death rates were driven further down by improve-
ments in health services. The growth of cities, once it is 
under way, p i n s a certain momentum and a check to 
industrialization soon leads to serious social problems. 
Consequently, Governments had little option but to pro-
mote development and further diversification, and import 
substitution became an increasingly deliberate aim. Brazil 
in particular established a programme of priority targets 
for the basic sectors of the economy (steel, petroleum, 
transport, etc.). 
The consequence can be seen in figure V, which is 
strikingly different from figure IV. It shows that, for 
most of these countries, the growth of income has borne 
little relation to exports. Indeed, the purchasing power 
of exports did not rise greatly for any member of this 
group, except Mexico, and in this case it is partly due to 
3ie fact that the tourist industry has been included in 
exports. In Chile and Peru, moderate rises in exports were 
paralleled by similar increases in income. The exports of 
other countries showed only smaU rises or actually fell, 
but experience with income was much better. Brazil and 
Colombia, especially the former, achieved the most sig-
nificant increases in their domestic incomes, in view of the 
poor performance of their exports which actually declined 
in Brazil. (Note how far the points for these countries lie 
from the diagonal line which represents the same propor-
tionate increases in both variables.) Uruguay would doubt-^ 
less show a similar contrast, if data were available. Ar-' 
gentina achieved some increase in income, and in Bolivia 
the economy was stagnant, although exports fell some-
what in both cases. 
The total product of this group rose about 28 per cent 
(or over 4 per cent a year) even though the purchasing 
power of exports was unchanged. Much of this total eco-
nomic growdi was due to progress in Brazil. 
Figure V 
G R O U P U : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N I N C R E A S E S I N G R O S S 
D O M E S T I C I N C O M E ( Y ) A N D I N P U R C H A S I N G P O W E R 
O F E X P O R T S ( X ) 
(Index numbers for 1956-58; 1950-52 = 100) 
LOGARITHMIC SCALE 
SOURCE: See table 4. 
^ Index number for 1954-55; 1950-51 = 100. 
BO 200 * 
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7. A SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL TRENDS IN 
THE MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1 9 2 9 - 5 9 
It was not until after the Second World War that the 
purchasing power of Latin Americein exports recovered 
the levels at the end of the 1930's and only because it 
was helped by the improvement in the terms of trade, and 
since these swung back against Latin America in the 
1950's, there was no great further increase in the purchas-
ing power of the region's exports. In fact, if Venezuela 
is excluded, there was little change over the whole thirty 
years (see table 9 ) . Some countries were particularly 
severely affected. In Argentina, the purchasing power of 
exports in 1958 was only half what it had been thirty 
years earlier; and in Chile, too, exports—in this sense— 
never recovered their pre-depression level (see table 10). 
Much the same long-term trends are shown by the 
volume of imports, since this depends very largely on 
exports and the terms of trade. The total of imports for 
the region was in 1958 not very much greater in quantity 
than it had been in 1928, if Venezuela is excluded. In 
Argentina and Chile, the volume of imports actually fell 
over the three decades, and in Brazil the rise was limited 
(see table 11). 
This tendency of imports must be contrasted with the 
expansion of the region's gross product, which more than 
trebled in the same period (see table 12). This was ac-
companied by a rapid growth of cities,^® and it meant not 
merely a fast rise in total demand but a very fast ex-
pansion in the demand for manufactures (especially equip-
ment), for processed foodstuffs and for professional 
services. 
" In nearly every country, the city population grew faster than 
the rural population. For example, the number living in cities of 
more than 100,000 population grew at over 4 per cent per annum 
in Brazil and Mexico between 1940 and 1950, and the rate was 
nearly 7 per cent in Venezuela. 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS, 
1928/29-1958 
(19S5 = 100) 
Including Venezuela Excluding Venezuela 
Table 10 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OF GROUP U: 
PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS, 1928-1929 TO 1958 
(Index: 1955 = 100) 
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico 
1928-29 242 78 123 75 
1932 148 44 23 24 
1940 112 42 64 39 
1945 118 70 75 48 
1950 154 113 76 81 
1951 124 121 86 87 
1952 68 93 94 89 
1953 129 113 89 77 
1954 114 114 87 85 
1955 100 100 100 100 
1956 102 109 115 100 
1957 111 103 99 87 
1958 120 96 84 86 
SoDRCES: ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America 1949 and 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. V, No. 2. 
Table 13 shows that, in the "open economies" of Group 0 , 
rising demand was accommodated by imports increasing 
more quickly than the output of goods for internal con-
sumption. So imports formed a growing proportion of 
total supply though data only permit a comparison to be 
made for the period after 1950-1. No doubt a similar 
tendency would have been observed in Group U, if foreign 
exchange supplies had permitted, but in all members of 
this group, except Peru which was in fact an "open 
economy" for much of the 1950's, the opposite happened. 
The import coefficient, defined in this way, fell almost 
throughout the period, altogether by about a half from 
1928-29 to 1957-58. Only in Mexico did the coefficient 
cease falling after 1938-39. 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA: QUANTUM OF IMPORTS OF GOODS 
INTO THE REGION, TOTAL AND PER CAPITA, 1928-1958 












Latin America i^aiin /imenca excluding Venezuela 
Year Total Per capita Total Per capita 
1928-29 71 83 86 87 1928 72 127 82 144 
1932 39 64 60 46 1932 29 47 33 54 
1940 45 67 67 53 1940 47 67 52 73 
1945 56 82 69 64 1945 49 61 52 66 
1950 97 88 109 105 1950 84 95 87 97 
1951 98 86 114 106 1951 104 114 109 120 
1952 85 86 99 88 1952 98 106 102 109 
1953 98 95 103 105 1953 90 94 90 95 
1954 101 93 108 105 1954 101 103 102 104 
1955 100 100 100 100 1955 100 100 100 100 
1956 105 109 97 105 1956 104 101 103 101 
1957 107 110 97 107 1957 122 116 118 112 
1958 102 111 92 101 1958 113 105 111 103 
SOURCES: ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America 1949 and 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. V, No. 2. 
SOURCES: Figures worked out by ECLA on the basis of data ex-
tracted from the annual statistical publications of each country. 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA AND COUNTRIES OF GROUP U: DOMESTIC PRODUCTS, 1928-29 TO 1959 
(Indices: 1955 = 100) 
Year Latin America' Brazil Argentina Mexico Colombia Chile Peru 
1928-29 38 38 53 21 34 45 
1932 35 37 46 21 36 34 • • • 
1940 50 52 62 36 52 56 ... 
1945 61 60 71 55 62 72 61 
1950 80 78 90 74 77 84 75 
1951 85 83 93 81 79 86 82 
1952 86 86 87 80 85 91 85 
1953 89 89 92 84 90 95 92 
1954 95 96 95 91 96 96 97 
1955 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1956 105 105 100 108 103 101 103 
1957 111 115 104 111 106 104 104 
1958 116 125 107 116 109 106 107 
1959 119 134 101 121 115 108 105 
SOURCE: For the years up to 1945, estimates were taken from ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1949 in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (linked to estimates in 
Producto e Ingreso de la República Argentina, 1935-54 for the first-named countpr), and from 
ECLA, Economic Development of Colombia for this country. For sources or estimates of sub-
sequent years, see ECLA Economic Bulletin for Latin America Vol. V, No. 2, Statistical Ap-
pendix. 
• Weighted by products of individual countries in 1955 (expressed in dollars). For 1929 and 
1932, the regional index is based on 7 countries, representing 85 per cent of the total regional 
output in 1955; for 1940 on 9 countries accounting for 86 per cent; for 1945 and subsequently 
on all countries. 
A big task therefore confronted the domestic producers 
of this group of countries. They had to provide substitutes 
for imports which could not be afforded—at first during 
the depression, but subsequently too. In some cases the 
Table 13 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PARTICIPATION OF IMPORTS OF 
GOODS IN TOTAL SUPPLY, BY VOLUME 1928-9, 1938-9, 
1950-1 AND 1957-8 
(Imports as percentage of supply at 1950 prices)' 
Country 1928-9 1938-9 1950-1 1957-8 
Group U 
Brazil . . . . 15 9 12 8 
Argentina. . . 21 14 10 9 
Mexico . . . . 17 9 10 10 
Colombia . . . 22 14 13 10 
Chile 28 19 12 12 
Peru 15 17 
Group 0 
Venezuela. . . 11 17 17 
Costa Rica . . 22 25 
Ecuador . . . io" 11 14 
El Salvador . . 15 19 
Guatemala. . . 15 18 
Honduras. . . ! " Í5 ' ' Í 3 16 20 
SOURCE: ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. V, No. 
2, and published and unpublished estimates by ECLA. 
' 1928-9 and 1938-9 statistics of imports and supply were obtained 
by linking series at 1955 prices to 1950 estimates. 
" 1939. 
' 1929. 
task was made harder by price controls and subsidies that 
stimulated consumption, for example, of energy. Within 
a stationary or contracting total of imports, imports of 
petroleum grew rapidly, especially in Argentina and Brazil. 
Import substitution in steel also lagged in Argentina and 
Chile, although in the latter case it increased greatly in 
the 1950's. Output of capital equipment rose everywhere 
after 1939, but the demand also expanded very quickly, 
so that imports continued to climb except in Argentina. 
Nevertheless, because of shortage of equipment, there 
was growing pressure on capacity in several key industries, 
especially electric power production,^" and the railways.^^ 
One consequence of this series of developments was 
that the heavy industries had to be expanded rapidly. 
Thus, in Mexico the number employed in metallurgy, 
machines and vehicles rose from under 10,000 in 1930 
to 173,000 in 1955.22 -phe impact was, however, wider 
than this: industrial expansion on this scale means changes 
in many other industries, in fact a transformation of the 
whole economy. Another consequence was that the compo-
^^  The growth of capacity of electric power production slowed 
down after 1955 in Brazil, Mexico and Chile, although it acceler-
ated in Argentina and most countries of Group 0. The consequence 
was that reserve capacity had fallen to very low levels by 1959 
in many countries. (See Estado actual y evolución reciente de la 
Enerva Eléctrica en América Latina, ECLA.) 
^^  Argentina is a striking instance. The physical equipment of 
the rail system changed little between 1928 and 1954. The number 
of seats available for passengers rose by 19 per cent and the 
freight capacity grew by 4 per cent in these 26 years. (Effective 
capacity fell because of the time lost whilst rolling stock was 
under repair.) By 1956 the total of goods awaiting shipment 
amounted to 2 months' loading. (See Economic Development of 
Argentina, Vol. V, ECLA.) 
Industrial Census, 1956. 
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sition of imports changed greatly. While consumer goods 
accounted for almost half of all imports in 1928, by 
1957-58 this proportion had fallen to 7 per cent in Brazil, 
10 per cent in Argentina, and only slightly more in 
Colombia, Chile and Mexico.^^ On the other hand, capital 
equipment, which had accounted for about 20 per cent 
of imports of 1928 in countries of Group U, constituted 
more than a third in 1957-58 (over 40 per cent in Chile 
and Mexico). The only exception was Argentina, where 
the shortage of foreign exchange was especially acute. The 
share of petroleum in total imports also grew considerably 
in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, though not in the tradi-
tional producers such as Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Finally, there were fast increases in imports of materials 
—of metals in Argentina, because of the need for ore, 
scrap and steel products, and of non-metals elsewhere. 
This forced shift in the pattern of imports indicates 
the strain caused in several countries by the attempt to 
grow rapidly in a period of foreign exchange shortage, 
especially where, notably in Argentina, the necessary rate 
of expansion in output in key sectors had not been 
achieved. Although the deterioration in export markets 
" was less dramatic in the second half of the 1950's than 
in the first half of the 1930's, the impact was nevertheless 
comparable in some countries, because it came at a time 
- when it was difficult to reduce imports, whereas the import 
structure in 1929 had afforded room for substantial re-
ductions. 
Figure VI indicates there is a close relation between 
the import coefficient in various periods and the rate of 
price increase. One obvious exception is Argentina. Before 
1945, plentiful supplies of food and a fairly well-equipped 
economy meant that structural problems were only of 
limited importance in Argentina and in the early 1950's 
price and wage controls were being used to suppress in-
flation. But in general it appears that, in the countries 
of Group U, an import coefficient of less than 10 per cent 
has been associated with inflation. At levels below this, 
there is little possibility of using foreign exchange for 
imports that would relieve internal structural problems. 
°° It was still near 40 per cent in Group 0 countries such as 
Ecuador and El Salvador. 
Figure III 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN AVERAGE IN-
CREASE IN COST OF LIVING AND IMPORT COEFFICIENT» 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF GROUP U 
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The change in the cost of living is related in the figure to the 
average import coefficient over a period starting and ending 
one year earlier than those shown here. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929-59 
Any historical account of this kind can impart a some-
what misleading appearance of inevitability to economic 
developments. In order to see the picture as a whole ac-
count must be taken of the effect of decisions of economic 
policy. Whether circumstances have been propitious or 
otherwise, the whole climate of economic development 
and the success with which a country's problems have 
been faced depend in some degree on the way in which 
decisions of the authorities and of those with economic 
power have, perhaps unintentionally, influenced events. 
Policies can greatly aggravate or greatly improve the cur-
rent situation, and they can make the problems of future 
policy-makers either easier or more difficult to solve. 
Before trying to summarize briefly some of the prin-
cipal lines of policy followed in various fields and their 
relation to inflationary pressures, it must be emphasized 
that measures are not adopted in a social vacuum by a 
group of men in a position to choose freely from the 
whole range of alternatives. On the one hand, given the 
rapidly changing economic environment of Latin America, 
those who take decisions have been continuously facing 
new and serious problems and finding that they lack either 
previous experience or adequate machinery for dealing 
with them. On the other hand, conjunctures of social forces 
and interests impose certain boundaries on the scope for 
policy and may at times inhibit the adoption of necessary 
measures, or hamper their execution or cause other and 
inconsistent policies to be put into effect. 
1. WEAKNESS OF AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS 
With respect to the first point, sight should not be lost of 
the quality and the appropriateness of the mechanisms and 
instruments which have been available in the region for 
dealing with the tasks which emerged out of the depression 
and out of the subsequent need to transform the traditional 
economic structure. The central political task in these de-
cades can be summarized as that of achieving a rupture 
with the previous system of externally-oriented growth. 
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The situation was fa r from favouriible in many im-
portant respects. Public administrators, for example, had 
to leave a world of limited and conventional functions for 
one in which there were heavy responsibilities, of a type 
unknown in the old regime of laissez-faire and incom-
patible with the old organizational structure and the tra-
ditional limited status of the public servant. The intrac-
tability of this problem is evidenced by the widespread 
attempt to solve it by the creation one after another of 
new organizations, autonomous or nearly so, which could 
contribute to the solution of particular administrative 
problems, but represented in toto a series of makeshifts 
instead of a fundamental reform of the organization and 
methods of the public service, such as was needed in the 
new situation. Secondly, the key instruments of economic 
policy could only be used to a limited extent. Apart from 
the fact that their efficiency depended ultimately on the 
competence of those who used them, their operation was 
also hindered by serious institutional defects and by certain 
of the characteristics of the typical economic structure. 
Monetary policy, for example, faced the following obsta-
cles: the lack of scope for open market operations in 
government bonds; the size and independence of the ex-
ternal sector; the importance of credit arrangements out-
side the banking system; the relatively small amount of 
cash in bank tills; the limited or non-existent experience 
of the management and stafifs of central banks, which had 
to face novel situations and to shoulder unconventional 
responsibilities. 
An analogous set of defects hampered fiscal policy. 
Apart from any question as to the competence and im-
partiality of those administering policy, the extent of the 
increase in their responsibilities is indicated by the great 
changes which took place in a mere couple of decades 
in the structure of government accounts, on the sides of 
both income and expenditure. Treasuries were obliged to 
turn to new sources of taxation and find additional fin-
ancial resources of a non-budgetary nature, often in eco-
nomic conditions which were far from favourable. They 
also had to devise ways of carrying out the social and 
economic initiatives appropriate to the circumstances of 
the new era. 
2. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL INTERESTS 
Turning to the second element mentioned above, the most 
significant point is that only in a few countries was there 
a definite and irreversible decision on the need to follow a 
new path. Political power groupings which had been 
created in the course of the old scheme of development 
could at times be relegated to a plane of secondary im-
portance, but in most of the countries of the region they 
never entirely lost their former power. Accordingly, when-
ever the political climate became helpful to them once more 
or whenever it was possible—as it was bound to be on 
occasion—to point the obvious failures in the new lines 
of policy, these traditional forces found themselves in a 
position not only to affect the details of policy but also 
to change its orientation. On the other hand, the appear-
ance on the scene of new interests, such as the growing 
groups of manufacturing entrepreneurs and the associa-
tions of their employees, represented forces which had at 
times to be conciliated, and the customary exclusion of 
these interests from decision-making meant that the ex-
pression of their influence was often spasmodic and irres-
ponsible. 
In brief, there was in nearly every country a lack of 
widespread agreement on what constituted the national 
interest and an unwillingness to subordinate individual or 
sectional claims to it. Yet this seems something of an over-
simplification, when individual countries are considered. 
In one or two cases, at some point along the road of 
economic development, a social and political decision be-
came widely accepted about the main objectives of policy, 
and those who were adversely affected by this decision 
remained subsequently in an undoubted, even if important, 
minority. In this respect, the history of such countries 
reflected what had occurred at various stages of develop-
ment in countries already industrialized (for example, 
Germany, the United Kingdom or the United States), when 
forces which favoured a break with the traditional eco-
nomic way of life imposed their will. 
By contrast, in most countries of the region, either 
because the new trends were not powerful enough or 
because they were diverted by mistaken decisions, the basic 
political orientation remained essentially unresolved. In 
such circumstances, which are characteristic of countries 
in a period of transition, what appears as weaknesses in 
the instruments of policy, or as incompetence in their use, ' 
may really be in great measure an expression of the in-
coherent and unstable way in which political pressure 
groups affect the formation of policy, each bound a n d . 
committed to certain fundamentally incompatible eco-
nomic aims. 
This may help to explain the fact that only in a Very 
few countries has economic policy clearly played a key role 
in the elimination, or even the moderation, of the basic 
economic disequilibria. As a general rule, the measures 
adopted have been, at least in some degree and on some 
occasions, successful in dealing with short-term problems, 
but not in creating a sound and sufficient basis for the new 
patterns of economic growth. 
3. THE CHANGE IN ORIENTATION AFTER THE WAR 
Although no clear distinction can be made between the 
fifteen years that ended in 1945 and the fifteen years that 
followed, the latter period is more interesting, as well as 
more topical, because some of the main features of the 
picture have changed considerably, affecting the over-all 
balance of considerations. As a generalization, the relative 
importance of policy has increased somewhat since the end 
of the war. Governments have acquired, albeit in some 
cases despite themselves, the power to influence events over 
a wider range, and there has been a considerable increase 
in what is expected of them. The immediate post-war 
period brought an improvement in foreign exchange sup-
plies which, apart from stimulating the growth of income, 
created opportunities for correcting some of the more 
obvious existing defects in the economic structure. More-
over, the adjustments which had been forced on Latin 
America's economies by the depression had been at least 
in some degree completed. These adjustments had been 
carried out under extremely unfavourable conditions and 
had severely strained the equilibrium of nearly every 
economy, but they did provide both the physical basis 
and the human experience which were necessary precon-
ditions for further advances towards economic indepen-
dence. Developments in the institutions and instruments 
of economic policy, although incomplete, had changed 
the whole approach as to what it was feasible to expect 
from official policy. There was now, for example, factual 
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Table 16 
RELATION BETWEEN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Current values in percentages) 
Country 1947-48 1952-53 1956-57 
Group U 
Brazil 18 22 27 
Argentina. . . . 30 28 26 
Mexico" . . . . 7 8 8 
Colombia'' . . . 16 15 17 
Chile 23 24 23 
Group 0 
Venezuela' . . . (12) 26 28" 
El Salvador . . . 9 13 11 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of ofBcial national statistics. 
" The figures given are those of the Federal Government. However, 
in the case of public expenditure, the figure obtained for 
consolidated expenditure bears the following relation to the 
gross domestic product: 
1947-48 1952-53 1956-57 1958 
11 12 12 12 
In this study, the comparisons are made on the basis of the 
> Federal Government figures, since the consolidated figures for 
the sector were not available in every case. 
" Gross national product. 
° The fiscal year covers the period 1 July - 30 June in every table. 
Expenditure in 1956-57 is undervalued, since capital debts 
existed which were paid in 1958 and subsequent years. 
knowledge about the effects of policy and the risks involved 
in its operation. So the new period involved a challenge 
which, though by no means simple, was less overwhelming 
than had previously faced the Governments of Latin 
America. 
Nevertheless, as has been seen, the symptoms of dis-
equilibrium, such as inflationary pressures, tended in 
general to increase rather than diminish during the post-
war period, at least in countries attempting a diversified 
development of their economies. The analysis of the policies 
adopted in this period is therefore of special interest.^^ 
An examination of the field of public finance in certain 
Various fields of policy are discussed in more detail in the 
full study. Here only some general aspects which are of major 
significance will be dealt with and the examples limited to one 
or two representative countries for which data are available. 
Table 15 
DEFICIT IN TAX REVENUE WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
(Percentages) 
Group Ü Group 0 
Brazil Argentina Mexico CMe Vene, zuela 
El Salva-
dor 
1947 13 48 41 30 4 
1948 14 105 50 18 17 
1949 22 47 21 47 5 
1950 25 37 5 67 31 8 
1951 9 30 + 6 53 50 11 
1952 16 25 17 64 12 13 
1953 25 32 19 40 13 8 
1954 11 39 25 30 3 0 
1955 15 34 3 38 13* 3 
1956 28 11 8 27 8" 8 
1957 24 24 19 30 -t-23» + 4 
1958 27 36* 8 
countries reveals, first, a steady growth of the proportion 
of public expenditure in the domestic product, and second-
ly a persistent imbalance in the public accounts (see 
tables 14 and 15). Some countries, it is true, like Mexico, 
do not show this relatively fast rise in public expenditure, 
but the general tendency is unmistdcable.^® The fiscal 
problem was aggravated in most cases by the performance 
of exports—either by their fluctuations or by their rela-
tively slow growth.28 Still, even those countries which 
were less dependent on foreign trade for revenue, or which 
had a more favourable experience with exports, show the 
same tendency for a deficit to develop. There has been, 
throughout the region, a general failure to introduce the 
fiscal reforms which were necessary, especially those which 
would impart a greater flexibility to revenue and reduce 
widespread tax evasion. In the absence of these reforms, 
fiscal systems have suffered from two serious defects: they 
are regressive^" and they increase inflationary pressures 
in the economy through their tendency to deficit.^® 
The analysis of monetary developments is not more 
encouraging. Even if allowance is made for the structural 
limitations on the operation of traditional instruments of 
control, limitations which have already been mentioned, 
there was surprisingly little attempt to use them, even 
on a modest scale, to control the inflationary pressures 
arising in foreign trade or those deriving from forces at 
work in the private and public sectors.^® 
In the field of foreign economic policy, a more coherent 
rationale is evident. Objectives which were followed in-
cluded the conservation of foreign exchange, the reserv-
ation of scarce exchange for essential imports, the pro-
tection of existing local industries and the promotion of 
new ones. Unfortunately, however, these measures were 
often adopted without reference to their effects in other 
spheres of economic policy. At times they affected un-
favourably the promotion of exports, especially new pro-
ducts, and they caused an explosive upward movement in 
prices when exchange rates were adjusted belatedly, after 
having been held unchanged and overvalued for years. 
Table 16 shows how during the war and the immediate 
post-war years the domestic value of some currencies 
became completely divorced from international price pat-
terns, as exemplified by those current in the United States. 
In Argentina, for example, while the index of wholesale 
prices (1939 = 100) rose to 927 in 1953, the exchange 
rate increased in the same time by only 85 per cent; in 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of official national statistics. 
• In Venezuela, debts contracted in earlier years were paid in 
1958 under the head of capital expenditure. 
In some cases, such as Venezuela and also Mexico, the 
budget deficit was covered wholly or partly by foreign borrowing, 
but otherwise it was financed by central bank advances, leading 
in turn to currency issue. 
In some countries of Group U—Mexico, Colombia and Chile, 
for example—the proportion of revenue obtained from the external 
sector was significant (including import duties). In 1956 it was 
34 per cent, 15 per cent and 27 per cent respectively for each 
of these countries. In Venezuela and El Salvador, the corresponding 
figures were even higher: 87 per cent and 56 per cent. 
In the period 1953-57, the percentage contribution of indirect 
taxes to revenue was as follows: 
All taxes Excluding taxes paid by 
Brazil 75 big mineral companies 
Argentina 60 Chile 67 
Mexico 42 Venezuela . . . . 77 
Colombia 57 
Chile 57 
El Salvador 56 
There have also been well-known cases of political power 
being used for personal enrichment. 
A more comprehensive analysis of monetary factors will be 
included in the final version of the study. 
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Table 16 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND MEXICO: PRICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF UNITED 
STATES PRICES ON THE BASIS OF OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES 





















(A) (B) rcj (D) (E) 
Argentina 
1939 100 100 100 100 100 
1950 520 133 390 210 186 
1953 927 185 501 222 226 
June 1955 . . . . 1100 196 561 223 252 
December 1955 . . 1170 400 293 224 131 
1958 1990 756 263 240 109 
Brazil 
1939 100 100 100 100 100 
1946 275 109 252 155 163 
1950 440 111 396 - 210 189 
1953 630 215 293 222 132 
1955 920 464 198 223 89 
1956 1150 495 232 230 101 
1958 1490 691 216 240 90 
Chile 
1939 100 100 100 100 100 
1950 522 135 386 210 184 
1953 950 1 285 333 222 150 
1956 2 749 /' 2 378 116 230 50 
1958 4 618 4 260 108 240 45 
Mexico 
1939 100 100 100 100 100 
1946 225 94 239 155 154 
1949 261 160 163 199 82 
1953 365 160 228 222 103 
December 1954 . . 398 241 165 223 74 
1958 513 241 213 240 89 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of national price statistics and data from the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Chile, and to a lesser extent in Brazil, similar discrepan-
cies can be seen. Some countries, like Mexico, kept their 
exchange rates more closely in line with the relative 
purchasing power of their currencies/" 
With very few exceptions, wage policy does not seem 
to have had in Latin America the significance attributed to 
it in the analysis of inflation in the industrialized countries 
of the Northern Hemisphere. The reasons are not hard to 
find. Most of the active population is employed in the 
agricultural sector; trade unions are not very powerful; 
employment incomes are relatively small, as a proportion 
of national income; and there has been in most countries 
little or no official action to promote wage increases, 
although there have been conspicuous exceptions to this 
last generalization, as will be seen. 
Nevertheless, wage movements could still play a sig-
nificant role in the development of inflation. There have 
always been certain groups of wage or salary-earners 
quite highly organized, whose achievements in wage claims 
have constituted incentives and provided targets for the 
Naturally the exchange rate policy cannot be appraised in-
dependently of developments in other fields and the special 
characteristics of the economy concerned. 
other weaker sections. And while wage-earners have at 
times been powerless to achieve increases, they have con-
sistently been able to prevent a reduction in their remuner-
ation. 
Argentina is the outstanding case among countries 
where wage policy has at various times, among other 
factors, played a significant role in the process of inflation. 
It is t rue that the increase in the level of wages, which 
started in 1943, did not at first afi"ect the cost-of-living 
index. One reason was the pressures which unexported 
surpluses of foodstufl"s exercised on the price level. But, 
from 1944 until 1949, the general salary level was re-
adjusted annually, by substantial amounts, as can be seen 
from the table on page 49. 
An increase in wage rates which merely equalled that 
in prices could not be considered an autonomous source 
of inflation. Indeed, because of improvements that always 
occur in productivity, it would permit the rise in prices 
to slow up. But as the data show, the movements of wages 
and prices have been far from parallel in the last fifteen 
years in Argentina.^^ 
The figures given refer to total wages, but they reflect 
movements in wage rates. 
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Percentage annual increase from average of previous year 
Wage bill Cost of living 
1944 17 — 
1945 14 19 
194 6 36 19 
1947 42 12 
1948 36 13 
1949 34 32 
1950 20 25 
1951 30 37 
1952 23 39 
1953 11 4 
1954 15 4 
1955 13 12 
1956 19 14 
1957 22 25 
1958 45 32 
1959 62 114 
SOURCE: Central Bank, Producto e Ingreso de la República Argen-
tina, 1935-54 and Boletín Estadístico. 
This has meant that real wages have fluctuated violently. 
An increase in real wages in a sector which paralleled the 
upward trend in productivity could be considered in a 
'sense "neutral''.^^ So the fluctuation which ocurred in 
Argentina meant that the influence of wage increments, 
predominantly a result of policy decisions in this period, 
.were far from neutral in their effect. Figure VII compares 
" If it occurred in all sectors it would imply, ceteris paribus, 
a constant share of wages in national income. 
Figure V I I 
ARGENTINA: COMPARISON BETWEEN REAL WAGES AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING 1943-59 
(Indices: 1943 = 100) 
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SOURCES: Statistical Bulletin (Central Bank). Monthly Statistical 
Summary (Ministry of Trade). 
the movements in hourly real wages and in productivity 
in the manufacturing sector. From 1946 to 1950, real 
wages climbed much the quicker of the two, but in 1950 
the picture was reversed. Then after another climb in real 
wages, climaxing in the general wage increase of 1958, 
there was once more a sharp reversal, and real wages in 
this sector finally fell back to about the same relation 
vis-a-vis productivity as in 1943. 
It might therefore be concluded that over the whole 
period the influence of wage changes has been neutral. In 
fact, however, apart from any other element—and cer-
tainly there were others of importance in Argentine ex-
perience—this sequence of events militated against the 
stability of the economy. Wage policy, particularly in the 
later years of the 1940's, pushed up costs of production 
and helped initiate a chronic inflationary condition. 
The characteristics of policies in various fields which 
have been outlined, apart from the general considerations 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, bring out some 
of the fundamental weaknesses of policies followed by 
countries in the region, especially those most affected by 
inflationary pressures. 
4. FAILURES OF CO-ORDINATION 
One is the consistent failure to relate different types of 
policy to each other. Decisions on import controls, ex-
change rates, development projects, rates of taxes, credit, 
wages, and so on, have been taken without consideration 
of their mutual implications. It seems that individual minis-
ters often take decisions on the economic issues that face 
them without consulting their colleagues. In a tight situa-
tion, like that of most Latin American countries since the 
depression, a major decision in any one field changes 
the balance of considerations in all the others. Thus the 
extent of a wage increase in the economy will affect what 
tax rates need to be levied, what exchange rate will be 
viable, and so on. This lack of co-ordination has greatly 
aggravated inflationary tendencies. Where it has proved 
impossible for the proposals of various authorities to be 
reconciled by one or more of them agreeing to take action 
that would be politically unpopular, the final result has 
been that the demands on the economy have exceeded its 
resources. A second failing, which helps to explain the first, 
is the lack of over all economic development plans. If these 
had existed, it would have been easier to see the signifi-
cance of policies in particular fields, and to have kept to 
certain priorities. In particular, import substitution would 
then have followed more consistent and more rational 
lines. 
5. RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN EXAMPLES 
Another weakness, evident from the history of the past 
three decades, is that there have been "fashions" in the 
objectives of policy. Moreover, these fashions have mostly 
been imported—often with some time-lag—from overseas. 
The "demonstration effect" can be seen in ofiicial attitudes 
in peripheral countries, as well as in patterns of consump-
tion. The attempt to ensure stability by keeping the cur-
rency on a conventional gold standard was followed by a 
period of increasing recourse to deficit finance. In the war 
years, efforts were made to suppress inflation by price 
control, and subsequently doctrines of full employment 
and social welfare had their impact on the region. 
It can hardy be over-emphasized that these ideolo-
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gies were developed to solve the problems of industrial 
countries, and subsumed the structural features of such 
countries. Thus thé theoretical case for stimulating an 
economy by deficit finance rests on the assumption of 
elastic supply conditions throughout the economy, so that 
expenditure could be increased without either raising 
production costs or causing a big increase in imports. This 
is true of highly developed countries at times when de-
mand in nearly all sectors is less than would fully employ 
the labour and capital available. But the same assumption 
is hardly valid for countries like those of Latin America: 
even if there is spare capacity locally to satisfy increases 
in certain types of demand, there are limits to the ex-
pansion of output in some sectors, and a wide range of 
products can only be obtained from abroad. The con-
sequence, therefore, is inflation and/or a payments deficit. 
Similarly, those drawing up schemes for price control 
seem to have ignored the fact that they would only work 
if the public service was organized to administer them. 
Experience abroad shows that prices have to be fixed 
on the basis of careful study and judicious criteria; that 
they have to be comprehensive (otherwise excess demand 
spills over on to uncontrolled items), that they have to be 
backed by extensive rationing of supplies; and that they 
require the full support and co-operation of all sections 
of public opinion, especially trade unions and business 
men. 
Raising the levels of living of the masses can naturally 
go further in economies which are more highly developed, 
and better balanced. A condition for extensive schemes of 
social security is that incomes should exceed consumer 
needs by a suflScient margin to provide the means for 
financing both development and welfare. It is also implied 
that the fiscal machinery is effective enough to collect the 
finance which is needed for all forms of government ex-
penditure, and that there are spare resources of administra-
tion available to cope with all individual cases under 
welfare legislation. 
6. GENERAL APPRAISAL 
How much damage did misguided policies do? The first 
thing to make clear is that however bad the policies of 
Governments in the region were, the originating causes 
of Latin America's problems were the world depression, 
the Second World War, and the slowing-up in the growth 
of the industrial countries in the 1950's. Really, therefore, 
the question is rather this: given the adverse develop-
ments in world markets, to what extent have the diffi-
culties undergone by Latin American economies been due 
to the failure of government's policies or coherent develop-
ment plans? 
The most obvious possibility would have been to increase 
export earnings. The difficulty was that, in each period, 
the total sales of primary products depended on the needs 
of the industrial countries. All primary producing areas 
suffered more or less severely from these developments. It 
would of course have been possible for Latin America to 
gain markets from other areas, though the discrimination 
by France and the United Kingdom in favour of suppliers 
in the franc and sterling areas, together with the heavy 
subsidies and protection given by the industrial countries 
to their own primary producers limited what could be 
done in this respect. 
It would also have been possible for individual countries 
in the region to gain ground at the expense of others. In 
fact, it can be seen from table 4 that the countries of 
Group 0 did very much better than those of Group U 
in the 1950's. 
It cannot be concluded, however, that the whole region 
could have done as well as Group 0 . Their performance 
was due in part to the strong markets for two products, 
petroleum and bananas. Moreover, a small producer can 
push higher exports on to the market without drastically 
affecting the price. This special advantage is reflected in 
the international coffee agreements. Thus, in the first 
agreement of the current series (1958), Brazil accepted 
the responsibility of keeping 40 per cent of its exportable 
coffee out of traditional export channels, while the pro-
portion applicable in the case of Colombia was 15 per 
cent, and the countries of Central America and the Carib-
bean had to retain less than 10 per cent. It is also inter-
esting to note that even among dollar-standard countries, 
a large sugar producer—Cuba—fared much worse with 
its exports in the 1950's than small producers such as 
the Dominican Republic. 
Attempts by major exporters to force the pace of export-
ing would probably have brought about a fall in prices 
for many exports and almost certainly a decline in thé"' 
foreign exchange earnings of competitors, including those 
in the region. So the total value of Latin America's ex-
ports would have been more likely to fall than to rise^ 
It is true that policies in Group U countries were often 
such as to discouraige exports, in some cases needlessly 
so. To the extent that price or exchaiige policies hampered 
exports, or industrialization reduced exportable surpluses 
(as it did for Brazilian cotton), or income taxes discour-
aged the exploitation of minerals, export stagnation must 
be attributed to these policies. But it is difficult to believe 
that with different policies the export performance of 
the whole region would have been so much better that 
it would have induced by itself a satisfactory rate of 
growth. The purchasing power of all the primary product 
exporters in the world rose by less than 20 per cent in 
the 1950's. 
Some action was therefore necessary to enable the in- . 
come of the partially industrialized countries of this group 
to increase at a faster rate than their exports. The grow-
ing realization of the nature of the challenge to the region 
led to the appearance of economic doctrines which took ' 
as their starting-point the need for development and in-
dustrialization, and which were therefore more specifically 
Latin American in their orientation. A shift of emphasis 
was taking place, in favour of Governments' accepting the 
responsibility for economic growth, expressed in pro-
grammes to achieve certain necessary targets. The accept-
ance of this responsibility was not, however, matched by 
the realization that all aspects of policy had to be judged 
in the light of their contribution to the end in question. 
The necessity for policy to be expansionist was on occasion 
interpreted as meaning that it need not be disciplined or 
guided by strict principles. 
In the last two or three years, trends in opinion over-
seas have made their influence felt once more. This time 
they tended in the opposite direction, towards restrictive 
and deflationary policies. Pardy as a reaction to the sharp 
inflation that had developed, and partly because of the 
need for financial assistance, this shift too was reflected 
in Latin American policies. 
In Western Europe and North America, the expan-
sionist and egalitarian attitude of the early post-war years 
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was already, in the early 1950's, giving ground before 
the twin targets of price stability and balanced external 
payments, implying a quite different balance of economic 
policy. Direct controls had fallen out of official favour, 
and the main policy instruments used were fiscal and 
monetary. This was, in fact, the reappearance of the gold 
standard in a modified form. In some countries of Latin 
America, too, stabilization policies were adopted/^ Major 
attempts were started on the recommendations of foreign 
missions in Chile and Peru and by the end of the decade, 
similar programmes were being carried out in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia and Uruguay. In Chile and Peru further 
stabilization programmes were being put into force. 
Once again, it is not clear that the differences between 
the developed countries and the countries of Latin Ame-
rica have been fully taken into account. Monetary policy 
is only likely to be a successful regulator of the economy 
where the following conditions apply: an integrated eco-
nomy with competition in the markets for the factors of 
production and products; responsiveness of both invest-
ment and savings to changes in the rate of interest; a 
distribution of income that reflects human needs; full 
employment of labour; and exports which can be pro-
moted or discouraged by changes in home consumption. 
Merely to list these assumptions is to indicate that they 
'are not particularly applicable in the countries of the 
region. Moreover, the financial systems of Latin America 
are not at present very suitable for the administration 
of policies of financial restraint. As has been shown, there 
is not the range of monetary devices (such as open-
market operations and consumer credit control) which 
would enable monetary policy to be both balanced and 
flexible, and they cannot easily be developed so long as 
the habits of inflation prevail. 
The immediate cost of stabilization programmes has 
generally been a lowering in the level of economic activity, 
with declines in both investment and consumption. The 
attempt to remove the excess of demand from all sectors 
These are discussed in a paper by Raúl Prebisch in Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America (Vol. VT, 1), entitled: "Economic 
development or monetary stability: the false dilemma". 
implied a great reduction in its total, leading to inade-
quate demand in some of them. At the same time, the 
removal of price distortions, which were certainly in many 
cases severe, temporarily accelerated the rise in prices. 
Stabilization policies have usually failed to include, as 
an integral part of the programme, measures to stimulate 
the lagging sectors of the economy, and to achieve import 
substitution of the right type. Indeed, policies of this sort 
have not always been put into effect with a careful assess-
ment of their likely effects on investment in various sec-
tors, and of whether these effects correspond to the 
country's needs. There is therefore no assurance that 
growth will be resumed in the near future or that when 
it is resumed it will be free from further inflation, and 
renewed balance-of-payments pressures. 
It seems that opinion is changing again in the industrial 
countries themseves. Confidence in monetary policy as 
the main instrument of economic strategy has weakened 
somewhat. Thus, the Staff of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the United States Congress point out that prices 
have continued to rise slowly, despite the firm monetary 
policy followed from 1953 to 1958. "Given rapid shifts 
in demand, with an excess now in one sector, now in 
another, but with total demand not in excess, and the 
prevalence of market power and downward rigidities, 
monetary policy can stabilize the price level only if used 
in such drastic measure that a high level of unemployment 
is also generated."^^ Moreover, the ultimate test of policy 
in the industrial countries is increasingly whether the rate 
of growth is adequate to the country's needs. Although 
the balance of emphasis in policy, and the machinery for 
carrying it out, would naturally have to be very different 
in Latin America, this criterion is of course particularly 
appropriate for countries beset by poverty and by a rapid 
rate of increase in population. 
Congress of the United States, Staff of the Joint Economic 
Committee, Report on Employment, Growth and Price Levels, 
December 1959. See also Report of the Committee on the Working 
of the Monetary System (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), 
for rather similar conclusions on experience with monetary policy 
in the United Kingdom. 
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L A T I N A M E R I C A ' S P O S I T I O N I N R E L A T I O N T O W O R L D C H A N G E S I N T R A D E P O L I C Y 
b y Esteban Ivovich^ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. It is widely realized that for a number of reasons, of 
which the establishment of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) is one, developments of far-reaching im-
portance are taking place in world trade policy which 
may have a great influence on the rate of economic de-
velopment in Latin America. In view of the powerful 
motives underlying these developments it will be difficult 
for the Latin American countries, acting individually, to 
influence their course. However, the possibility of doing 
so can be increased if co-ordinated action can be taken, 
based on the common interest. 
Should the Latin American countries take such action, 
- it would undoubtedly bear fruit more readily if there 
were no undue delay in effecting the necessary co-ordin-
ation. As some of the developments now taking place have 
^not yet fully crystallized, there is still time to obtain 
satisfactory results from collective efforts. Once the events 
have taken place, any joint action designed to influence 
or offset their effects will encounter major and perhaps 
insuperable obstacles. 
The foregoing arguments are reinforced by the ex-
perience of Latin American countries in their valiant efforts 
to solve their foreign trade problems, and further still, by 
the serious threat to economic development posed by the 
loss of Latin America's position in international trade. 
During the last decade Latin American exports as a whole 
increased less, in terms of value, than those of other 
regions.^ 
2. The account that follows is an attempt to outline de-
velopments that have taken place recently or are under 
way in international trade policy, as referred to above. 
The intention is also to bring into perspective the reasons 
that, in view of those developments, make it desirable to 
integrate piecemeal action in Latin America so that a 
co-ordinated effort can be made, with better prospects 
than are likely to result from individual efforts, to deal 
with the already serious difficulties of Latin America's 
foreign trade, to end the present falling-off, and thereby 
to ensure that exports contribute effectively to the grow-
ing needs of economic development. 
I I . OBSTACLES TO TRADE 
3. Many Latin American countries that have in the past 
tried to protect their balance of payments by such direct 
control methods as prior import permits, import quotas 
* Director of the Trade Policy Division of ECLA. The present 
I article is a summary of the account of recent developments in 
trade policy given at Santiago, Chile, on 28 December 1960, 
during the Economic Development Training Programme. The 
views expressed are the personal opinions of the author, and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the ECLA secretariat. 
' GATT, International Trade 1960 (Sales No.: GATT/1961-4), 
establishes the following facts: Latin America's share in inter-
national trade fell in 1960 to about 7 per cent of the total, in 
comparison with the corresponding figures of 11 per cent for 
and prohibition of imports, have been replacing them by 
methods of indirect control, which generally preclude any 
form of discrimination by origin. This change in foreign 
trade systems is due to a number of different causes; it is 
related to international agreements on the elimination of 
obstacles to trade, and it has largely led to the abandoning 
of bilateral accounts, which were one of the instruments of 
direct control. 
4. Considerable light is thrown on the subject by studies 
on the results of efforts to eliminate obstacles to inter-
national trade made by inter-govemmental groups in 
GATT (Committees II and I I I ) . Such studies as these 
make it possible for the first time to define accurately 
certain highly significant facts. They show that in some 
European countries that have no balance-of-payments pro-
blems the importation of many items is still subject to 
a multitude of restrictive trade regulations, including dis-
criminations by origin that directly affect Latin American 
exports. Some of these restrictions do not appear to be in 
conformity with the rules of GATT. According to views 
expressed by Latin American Governments at the recently 
held nineteenth session of GATT, these restrictions nullify 
or impair the effect of the customs treatment agreed on as 
a result of negotiations through GATT in respect of the 
articles affected. 
5. These restrictive trade regulations bear particularly 
heavily on agricultural products, trade in which is also 
handicapped by the severe limitation resulting from the 
exceptions that GATT has agreed to with respect to these 
products for reasons that are widely known—in particular 
the United States surpluses. Many countries fear that in 
addition to these restrictive measures there will shortly 
be others, related to EEC's agricultural policy and to 
certain aspects of its external tariff referred to below. 
Within GATT a number of Governments have called 
attention to the apparent inconsistency between its 
trade liberalization policies and the provisions of the 
Agreement concerning the protection of agreed customs 
treatments on the one hand, and restrictive trade regula-
tions on the other. 
6. Uruguay provides an interesting example. This country 
carried out a very detailed investigation in Europe, and 
its results give a clear picture that can hardly fail to cause 
grave concern (see table 1) . With respect to Üie thirty 
products that make up practically the whole of Uruguay's 
exports, the nineteen European countries which together 
purchase 85 per cent of that total apply over 500 separate 
restrictions, including both those accepted by GATT and 
others that would appear to be in conflict with GATFs 
principles. 
7. As thus far little has been accomplished towards re-
medying the situation resulting from the restrictive trade 
regulations, at the nineteenth session of GATT official 
1950, 9 per cent for 1953 and 8 per cent for 1959. Between 1950 
and 1960, the total exports of current prices from all the non-
industrial countries increased by about 40 per cent, whereas those 
from Latin America increased by only 25 per cent. 
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Latin American sources announced their intention of in-
itiating proceedings under article XXIII of the General 
Agreement for the purpose of restoring reciprocity in 
trade treatment between the countries against which these 
regulations are applied and those which apply them. It is 
to be hoped that formulas less in conflict with the aim of 
increasing world trade can be found, since if the course 
of action referred to above is taken, under article XXIII , 
the Latin American countries will be authorized to apply 
discriminatory restrictions against imports of goods from 
any market in which Latin American exports are subject 
to restrictive trade regulations not in conformity with 
GATT. 
8. Essentially and technically, both for immediate practi-
cal reasons and because of the precedent involved, the 
problem goes beyond the scope of the Latin American 
countries which belong to GATT, since it is of equal or at 
least considerable concern to many of those which are 
not members. In this connexion it should be recalled that 
certain countries in Latin America still maintain some 
methods of direct control, which in practice can lead to 
discrimination against the market of origin of the im-
ported goods. Perhaps it would be as well to look into 
the question in relation to the whole of Latin America, 
to consider whether it could be advisable to foUow a com-
mon line in this respect, designed to speed up the elimina-
tion of obstacles to trade and the establishment of full 
reciprocity in this field. 
I I I . FINDINGS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE 1 9 6 0 / 6 1 TARIFF 
CONFERENCE 
9. The general title: 1960/61 Tariff Conference covers 
the fifth series of GATT negotiations; these include nego-
tiations between EEC and other members of GATT with 
respect to article XXIV, paragraph 6 of the Agreement, 
the Dillon negotiations, involving all those belonging to 
GATT, and the negotiations for the inclusion of certain 
additional countries as members of GATT. 
1. Compensatory concessions for the increase in the aver-
age incidence of EEC's external tariff (article XXIV, 
paragraph 6 of the Agreement) 
10. These negotiations were concluded in May 1961. It is 
expected that the treatments agreed therein will shortly 
be made known officially. 
11. The disappointment over the results of these nego-
tiations voiced in Latin American circles is in part an 
indication of the different standpoint from which they 
were viewed by EEC and the Latin American countries. 
EEC, on the strength of the rules of GATT, regarded the 
changes as essentially a revision of the external tariff 
based on the principle of maintaining the balance of the 
reciprocal concessions with respect to specific items when 
the incidence is increased through the establishment of the 
averages used as the basis for working out the tariff. 
The countries thereby affected, on the other hand, includ-
ing those of Latin America, apparently made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to have the negotiations conducted within 
a framework that would have taken account of economic 
and trade factors not strictly a part of the legal basis of 
the negotiations. 
2 . Dillon negotiations 
12. These negotiations are in progress at Geneva and are 
well advanced, but progress during the final stage is slow 
for a number of reasons, including the complex nature of 
the negotiations between EEC and the United States with 
respect to certain agricultural products. Another reason for 
the delay may be the fact that a new statute of association 
is under study, that from January 1963 on will govern the 
relations between EEC and the former overseas territories, 
which have now become sixteen independent countries. In 
the discussion of the over-all problem of their relations 
with EEC, these countries do not seem prepared to accept 
the prospect of losing any of the customs advantage en-
joyed by their exports to Europe under the present as-
sociation agreement as a result of EEC negotiations with 
outside countries. This perfectly legitimate stand cannot 
fail to militate against the favourable results that some 
Latin American countries had expected from the negotia-
tions concerning tropical products. 
13. Uruguay stated, with respect to its own interests in 
the negotiations, that as EEC had acknowledged, the ex-
ternal tariff resulted in less favourable treatment for the 
Uruguayan products covered, with no adequate compen-
satory concession. 
14. Brazil announced that in view of the unsatisfactory 
results of the tariff negotiations the Brazilian Government, 
would not ask for ratification by parliament. Brazil stated" 
that 75 per cent of its exports to EEC had been subject 
to the external tariff, and that it was facing one of the 
gravest threats ever offered to its foreign trade.^ " 
3. Quotas 
15. Ideas have apparently changed a litde with respect 
to quota systems, whether these consist in the alterna-
tive or the combined application of physical, seasonal 
and/or tariff quotas. In relation to imports from non-
EEC countries, the Rom© Treaty seemed to assign such 
systems a very limited role. In practice, developments 
suggest that quotas are proving more useful than saving 
clauses as a means to some sort of solution of a series of 
problems connected with third countries. 
16. GATT's fifth series of negotiations have been con-
ducted selectively, that is, product by product, the duties 
resulting from these negotiations being as a rule con- • 
solidated in order to safeguard them against possible in-
creases in their rates of incidence. 
In the case of various products, some of which are of 
great importance among the exports of Latin American 
countries (meat and fish meal, for example), the con-
solidation of duties will be valid for a specific tariff quota. 
Once this has been covered, further imports of the goods 
concerned may be subject to permits obtained beforehand, 
embargoes or the system of variable duties instituted as 
part of EEC's agricultural policy. 
The quotas referred to are fixed without it being de-
termined which EEC country or countries will be the 
purchasers. Under the GATT regulations, the quota cannot 
je reduced until it has been in force for three years. 
17. Another type of quota, to remain in force for a year 
at a time, has also been established, not officially on the 
basis of negotiations with third countries, but by agree-
ment on the part of EEC. Under this system a particular 
member of EEC is authorized to apply import duties lower 
than those contemplated in the common tariff on purchases 
of not more than a given quantity of a certain product. 
As can be seen in tables 2 and 3, prepared on the 
^ Statement made to GATT by Brazil's Minister of Industry 
and Trade, Mr. Ulises Guimaráes, on 27 November 1961. 
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basis of unofficial data, these quotas include several which 
might be of interest to Latin America. 
18. How do the findings of the 1960-61 Tariff Conference 
affect Latin American countries which are not Contracting 
Parties of GATT? 
Countries whose trade relations with one or more mem-
bers of EEC are based on agreements embodying the 
unconditional most-favoured-nation clause would have 
grounds for requesting the EEC countries in question to 
grant them the same treatment as that agreed upon at 
the Conference for specific products, in the shape of 
external tariff reductions or consolidations. They could 
also adduce cogent arguments in support of their right 
to a share in quotas. The products of Latin American 
countries which have no agreement with EEC members 
establishing the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause 
would be accorded the treatment indicated in the external 
tariff and not the reductions or the consolidation benefit. 
It would seem that these countries would have no sound 
basis for a claim to shares in quotas. 
19. If the distribution of the tariff quota were to continue 
exclusively in the hands of the EEC countries, as is already 
_ the case for certain goods, it might come about that when 
a particular shipment arrived at its destination the ex-
porter country would be unable to secure entry for its 
products because other suppliers had already used up the 
"whole of the tariff quota. 
The uncertainty deriving from such a system may be 
prejudicial to Latin America's production and exports, 
unless, as is to be hoped, appropriate agreements are 
reached to provide for some degree of participation by the 
supplier countries in quota arrangements, perhaps through 
joint consultative groups, or by means of some other suit-
able mechanism. 
20. As an illustration of the favourable aspects of the 
quota system and its potentialities, a project may be cited 
whereby, on the basis of adequate compensation, in the 
European Common Market and especially in the Benelux 
countries, meat production would be expanded at de-
creasing costs, with consequent social benefit to the farmer. 
This result would be obtained by using for meat produc-
tion land on which at present secondary grain crops are 
grown for fodder; if the system were successful, these 
would be imported at lower cost from outside the EEC 
territory. 
The quota system would also open up prospects for 
seasonal trade in specific commodities between Europe and 
other regions, based on the fact that their production 
periods do not coincide. 
I V . EXTERNAL TARIFF OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY (EEC) 
21. Reference was previously made to the external tariff 
of EEC and to the pertinent negotiations, which form 
part of the business of the Tariff Conference and have 
now reached their final stage. It was also mentioned that 
at the nineteenth session of GATT various countries, in-
cluding Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, insisted that EEC's 
external tariff had been prejudicial to their interest and 
felt that they had not been accorded adequate compensa-
tion at the Conference. 
In face of such declarations, it would seem that EEC 
will probably prefer to conform to the juridical inter-
pretation according to which, as its representatives stres-
sed at one of the meetings of the nineteenth session of 
GATT, the Rome Treaty is in good company—that of the 
Montevideo Treaty and of the instrument setting up the 
European Free-Trade Association (EFTA). It is not yet 
known whether the Contracting Parties of GATT will 
announce the juridical decisions pending in respect of the 
Rome Treaty at the session to be held in September-
October 1962, and whether these verdicts are likely in 
any way to affect the solution of the problem created for 
Latin America by the increase in the incidence of specific 
tariffs. It should be mentioned in passing that the type of 
pronouncement made will undoubtedly be strongly in-
fluenced by the position which the United Kingdom and 
the other EFTA countries will by then have taken up in 
relation to their ultimate membership of EEC or associa-
tion with it. 
22. Unofficially but persistently, certain authoritative Euro-
pean circles seem to be displaying a preference for finan-
cial and technical co-operation at the level of industrial 
development, rather than tariff agreements based on 
ad hoc negotiations, as a means of counteracting the direct 
or indirect restrictive effects on the Latin American eco-
nomy which might result from the formation of the 
European Common Market. In this connexion, it is an 
open secret that Latin American circles concerned with 
such problems generally take a very pessimistic view of 
the possibility that the Latin American economy can be 
sufficiently indemnified for the adverse effects of the 
common external tariff by compensations of this type. 
23. Incidentally, from the standpoint of the less developed 
countries, an idea frequently propounded is that in order to 
strengthen their capacity for external payments, recourse 
should be had preferably to customs facilities, not only 
for the primary commodities traditionally exported, but 
also for intermediate products and manufactured goods. 
At the proposal of the United States, GATT has just ap-
proved a declaration giving emphatic support to this 
suggestion which is one that ECLA has been advocating 
for several years pstst. 
24. In the same context, it seems to be felt in some quar-
ters in Europe that with the passage of time factors will 
come into play which may make it easier for them to give 
outside countries much more opportunity of access to their 
markets. In particular, attention is called to the fact that 
the dynamic quality imparted to the economic expansion 
of the EEC countries by the integration of markets opens 
up limitless prospects. Integration is already influencing 
the growth of the gross national product, which in 1957-60 
attained an average annual rate of 4.8 per cent in the 
EEC territories, as against 3.3 per cent in the other 
countries of Western Europe. It is also having substantial 
repercussions on intra-EEC trade. While this has been 
increasing since 1957 at an annual rate of 20 per cent, 
trade between the EEC countries and the rest of the world 
registers an expansion of only 10 per cent per annum. 
One of the main aspects of the liberation of factors of 
production deriving from the Common Market will be a 
marked increase in productivity, which will place EEC's 
industrial prices on a highly competitive footing. This 
may well mean that in the future, on the basis of nego-
tiations, the external tariff for a number of goods can be 
reduced and perhaps abolished. In the end, indeed, the 
only protection that will as a rule be needed by European 
production of goods similar to import lines will be that 
resulting from the cost of freight from the country of 
origin payable in the case of the foreign counterpart. 
25. In short, for the Latin American countries—members 
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and non-members of GATT alike—serious doubts arise in 
connexion with EEC's external tariff. Once the Tariff Con-
ference is over and its findings are officially known, there 
will be sounder basis for evaluating possible adverse effects, 
both individually and in the aggregate, and examining 
whether it would be feasible and desirable (as is thought 
in some Latin American circles) to approach EEC col-
lectively with a view to reaching some mutually satisfactory 
understanding, and if so, in respect of which goods and 
by what procedure, whether an attempt should be made as 
part of these same negotiations or through others of an ad 
hoc character, to obtain from EEC a tariff regime calcu-
lated to facilitate the export of certain intermediate pro-
ducts and manufactured goods to Europe on the strength 
of negotiations based on reciprocal compensations; and 
which intermediate products and manufactures these should 
be. Such measures would be in conformity with the prin-
ciple of differential treatment for countries at a relatively 
less advanced stage of development. 
V. OTHER ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY 
1. Entry of the United Kingdom into the European 
Common Market 
26. The developments still pending, whose final outcome 
it is impossible to foresee, include, in addition to those 
relating to market organization, to which reference will 
be made later, the possibility that the United Kingdom 
may join EEC and the future treatment which this would 
imply for the Commonwealth countries. The latters' ex-
ports, besides certain ores, metals and manufactured 
goods, include wheat, meat, fats, wool, coffee, cacao and 
bananas, products similar to those exported by Latin 
America. The competitive position of Latin America's 
export commodities in the EEC market would deteriorate 
if their counterparts from the Commonwealth were ac-
corded any kind of preferential treatment as a result of 
the United Kingdom's membership of the European Com-
mon Market. 
27. The problem to which the incorporation of the United 
Kingdom would give rise would affect agricultural com-
modities produced in the EEC countries. Objections are 
raised to the idea of some form of membership excluding 
agriculture because, inter alia, national agricultural po-
licies have a certain effect on industrial prices, and hence, 
on competition in general within the European Common 
Market. Furthermore, membership of the latter is con-
ducive to the solution of agricultural productivity pro-
blems. 
28. To judge from the preliminary stage of the discussions 
on the possibility of the United Kingdom's joining EEC, 
in authoritative European circles it is considered essential 
that for Common Market purposes insistence upon any 
requisite or evidence relating to markets of origin be 
avoided. The attainment of this objective, envisaged by 
EEC, is provided for through the establishment of the 
common external tariff. The admission of countries to 
membership on the basis of commitments not including 
the undertaking to participate in the common external 
tariff would imply a reversion to the system of the Free-
Trade Area, and therefore to the need for demanding 
evidence of the market of origin, which is a violation of 
the principle of unrestricted freedom of circulation of 
goods inherent in the Common Market. 
29. The possible bases for the accession of the United 
Kingdom are not yet known. In the realm of mere specula-
tion, formulae such as the following, for example, have 
been mentioned: reduction of the special treatment enjoyed 
by the Commonwealth countries in the British market 
and, to offset the repercussions of this measure, financial 
assistance to the countries affected, with a view to the 
improvement of productivity and the strengthening of the 
competitive position of their exports; association of the 
Commonwealth with EEC, on specific terms; or the solu-
tion of some of the Commonwealth countries' problems by 
means of ad hoc quotas in respect of particular goods. 
These quotas, subject to a pre-established tariff treatment, 
would be in force for the British market and perhaps for 
EEC during a given period of years. Mention is also made 
of a system which would consist simply in the reduction of 
the existing preferential treatment for the Commonwealth 
countries' exports to the United Kingdom without the 
Commonwealth being granted any kind of associate mem-
bership of EEC or quotas in its market. 
30. It is understood that the United Kingdom would be 
willing to waive the preparation of a new external tariff 
and to accept that of EEC on the basis of revision of 
specific items. 
31. If the general negotiation is successful, it is unlikely 
that the United Kingdom's membership of EEC would 
become effective before January 1963. 
2 . Association between EEC and former overseas 
territories 
32. The bases at present in force, and due to be renewed 
or superseded by others from the beginning of 1963, 
make provision for primary commodities and manu-
factured goods produced by the former overseas territories 
of the EEC countries to enter the latter duty-free. The 
territories in question, on their part, can establish duties 
on imports from their European associates. 
As yet there is a lack of background data on which to 
base conjectures as to the future of this system, although 
it is understood that political motives will play a vital 
part in the decisions ultimately adopted. 
33. It is worth while pointing out that reference is 
often made in Europe to the desirability—again for po-
litical reasons—of equalizing or reconciling the tariff 
regime instituted by the EEC countries for their former 
overseas territories and the concessions that will be made 
to the Commonwealth once the United Kingdom has joined 
the European Common Market. There is, in fact, a general 
wish to avoid the conflicts implicit in the establishment of 
different treatments for Europe's imports from former 
overseas territories and for its purchases from the Com-
monwealth. Equalization would, without precluding other 
forms of indemnification, afford the Commonwealth coun-
tries some compensation for the setback which their agri-
cultural exports will presumably suffer in the British 
market. It would be unwise to exclude another possibility 
—in the course of time the new bases for the association 
of EEC with Africa, and perhaps with the Commonwealth 
countries, may result in the establishment of a system of 
minimum prices and physical quotas for certain a ^ -
cultural commodities from supplier countries belonging 
to the association. 
3. Common agricultural policy 
34. Since in the case of most agricultural commodities 
produced in Western Europe production increases more 
intensively than demand, the system of support prices has 
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become widespread. It is not, however, an adequate solu-
tion for the social problems deriving from the smallness 
of the agricultural worker's share in the distribution of 
national income. In this connexion, the view is more or 
less universally held that the progress of industrial pro-
ductivity must, through the improvement of wages, con-
tribute resources permitting the maintenance of a policy 
of high prices for certain articles—meat, for example— 
which may help to enlarge the share in question. 
35. At the nineteenth session of GATT, EEC countries 
made statements which leave very little room for hope that 
it will be possible to apply the GATT liberalization regula-
tions to those items in respect of which the expansion of 
European production outstrips that of demand. 
36. Something has been said of the possibility that EEC 
might establish a system of variable duties on imports of 
agricultural commodities, as a species of movable protec-
tion. This system would be maintained within EEC for a 
certain number of years, until internal prices had been 
equalized. As regards the rest of the world, no time-limit 
for the duration of the system has been proposed. 
37. In view of the fact, referred to above, that agricultural 
.production in Western Europe is expanding more than 
demand, and of the social reasons for adopting a policy 
designed to improve agricultural productivity by efficient 
utilization of the facilities deriving from a broader market, 
'while at the same time maintaining a high price régime 
for agricultural commodities, only very clever handling 
on the part of Europe's traditional suppliers—among them 
the Latin American countries—could lead to an under-
standing which would enable them to retain a stable foot-
ing in the European market on mutually satisfactory basis 
of reciprocity. Such an arrangement would, in addition, 
safeguard the levels of reciprocal trade. 
38. Even on the assumption that co-ordinated effort would 
enable the Latin American countries to hold their own 
among the suppliers of the European market, the pros-
pects for Europe's production of temperate-zone com-
modities—under the aegis of a markedly protectionist 
régime and the momentum of its own swing towards self-
sufficiency—and the arguments for improving the agricul-
tural worker's share in income distribution by no means 
augur well for the safeguarding and development of the 
corresponding exports from Latin America. It is therefore 
worth while to consider the direction that should be given 
to production and intra-regional trade in respect of Latin 
America's temperate-zone commodities, with special re-
gard to the fact that the situation in Latin America is the 
converse of Europe's, inasmuch as the rate of growth of 
agricultural production is lower than that of demand. 
V I . LINEAR REDUCTIONS 
39. The experience acquired in the course of international 
tariff negotiations is gradually spreading the conviction 
that reciprocal concessions in respect of specific products 
are losing their importance as stimuli to trade. Further-
more, selective item-by-item negotiation of the traditional 
type affords the self-interest of individual countries or 
sectors opportunities which may militate against the im-
plementation of liberalization programmes tending to the 
common good. In this connexion, it is hoped that GATT, 
in pursuance of ideas long since mooted, will shortly make 
serious efforts to promote the application of the technique 
of linear reductions, either for the whole tariff or by 
sectors, through the adoption of mechanisms similar to 
that internally applied by EEC and EFTA. On this basis 
GATT would organize a new general series of tariff ne-
gotiations. 
Some Governments have stressed that negotiations on 
linear reductions would also fail to attain their objective 
unless supplemented by others designed to eliminate non-
tariff restrictions. 
40. As regards linear reductions, it should be recalled 
that a proposal formulated by EEC some time ago is 
awaiting consideration. According to this proposal, EEC 
would agree to a 20-per cent reduction on almost all the 
external tariff items if the other Contracting Parties 
granted similar treatment on a basis of reciprocity. 
It should be remembered that EEC's internal reductions 
already amount to 30 per cent of national tariffs and that 
they are extended by EEC to all the GATT countries up to 
the point of correspondence with the said 30 per cent, 
although only within the limits of the new rate of in-
cidence established by the external tariff. A further 10-
per cent reduction was to be introduced by the end of 
1961. EFTA, whose internal tariff reduction also amounts 
to 30 per cent of the national tariffs of its seven members, 
is contemplating another 10-per cent reduction early in 
1962. This would be ahead of time, since according to the 
Stockholm Treaty it is not due until July 1963. 
41. What would be Latin America's attitude to possi-
ble linear reductions, as an international method whol-
ly or partly superseding the system of selective negoti-
ations? 
Applied on a world scale, this system might be seriously 
prejudicial to Latin America, unless it were instituted with 
due regard to the principle of differential treatment—^pre-
sumably for a time only—for countries at a relatively less 
advanced stage of development. Otherwise, the system of 
linear negotiations, like the traditional selective method, 
would help to perpetuate the disadvantage for the weaker 
countries, inherent in the present structure of international 
trade. The Montevideo Treaty fully endorsed the principle 
of differential treatment as a means of promoting the 
smoothly co-ordinated development, on an increasing scale, 
of countries at varying levels of economic strength. So did 
the Rome Treaty, through the terms established for the 
associate membership of overseas territories. Unfortunately, 
at the 1960-61 Tariff Conference these principles were 
not taken into account, although the desirability of adher-
ing to them in the future was reaffirmed last November 
by the GATT meeting of Ministers of Foreign Trade, 
when it declared that in considering the application of 
the new methods of tariff reduction, greater flexibility 
must be demonstrated, with respect to the measurement 
of reciprocal concessions in favour of the less developed 
countries. 
42. If, as a result of eventual acceptance of the linear 
reductions system, the exchange of tariff concessions be-
tween groups of countries—for example, the EEC countries 
on the one hand and the Montevideo Treaty or Central 
American group on the other—were to be promoted in 
the future, the strengthening of the Latin American in-
dustrial process might be seriously jeopardized if such 
exchanges, instead of being based on the principle of 
differential treatment, were negotiated in accordance with 
the traditional procedures. 
43. In this connexion, too, as has been shown, doubtful 
pointe arise whose elucidation is of importance to all the 
Latin American countries. 
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V I I . MARKET ORGANIZATION 
44. In European official circles it is considered that the 
problems and anxieties relating to the future of exports 
of agricultural commodities from third countries which 
have been traditional suppliers of the European markets 
might perhaps be more satisfactorily dealt with by means 
of a policy of market organization. Such a policy, ceasing 
to attach basic importance to tariff negotiations and the 
eventual fixing of quotas, would aim at preventing the 
formation of surpluses by production in excess of demand, 
and at the same time reconciling the interests of EEC's 
internal agriculture with those of traditional imports, 
under a long-term programme. Hypothetically, market or-
ganization would pivot upon two main axes: physical 
quotas and remunerative price levels. This would represent 
a practical approach to a problem which is adversely 
affecting the economic growth of the less developed coun-
tries, namely, that of establishing a fair price for raw 
materials in respect of which the producer country's 
export trade is essential to its capacity for external pay-
ments. If such a plan were approved, the bases for the 
association of EEC with the former overseas territories 
as well as with the Commonwealth countries would have 
to be adjusted to the market organization framework. 
Market organization agreements would perhaps fall into 
two phases. The first, lasting until EEC's common agri-
cultural policy were defined, would aim at safeguarding 
the volume of regular trade. The second, that of full 
development of the organization, would be embarked upon 
once the said common agricultural policy had been de-
termined. 
45. At the nineteenth session of GATT stress was laid on 
the tremendous complications of the problem of eventual 
market organization both in the matter of principles and 
at the practical level. 
The question arose when a sort of crossroads seemed 
to have been reached in GATT's internal affairs, upon its 
becoming evident that several of the larger countries were 
not applying to their external trade in agricultural com-
modities the principles that world economy develops along 
sounder lines, from both the economic and the social 
standpoint, on a basis of freedom and non-discrimination 
in international transactions; and, furthermore, that mat-
ters were unlikely to improve in this respect within the 
predictable future. On the contrary, the traditional ex-
porters have new cause for anxiety lest their opportunities 
of access to the markets should diminish still further. This 
concern is related to such factors as EEC's agricultural 
policy, the use of artificial means to support and expand 
marginal lines of production and the placing of surpluses 
through non-commercial channels. In these circumstances, 
as was stated above, some of the Latin American exporter 
countries, invoking article XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, declared that they might be 
forced, much against their will, to restore the balance 
of concessions by applying in their own import market 
restrictive measures equivalent to those adopted by the 
large markets. The same countries, along with others, 
considered that to accord agricultural commodities a treat-
ment different from the general treatment established by 
GATT would be to practise inadmissible discrimination 
against economies whose situation depends upon the level 
attained by their agricultural exports. Argentina, for its 
part, categorically maintained that it considered the ex-
tension of different treatments to agricultural commodities 
and to the other international trade items incompatible 
with GATT. 
46. The discussion at the nineteenth session, while making 
no claim to pronounce upon questions of principle, sug-
gests that the idea of seeking some gradual form of practi-
cal action aiming at market organization will be considered 
at the inter-governmental level. By this means, if the idea 
were to find favour, an attempt would be made over the 
medium and long term to facilitate the reconversion of 
marginal lines of production, prevent the formation of 
surpluses whose existence upsets the balance of the market 
and regulate conditions of access to the latter on the basis 
of minimum prices, quotas and the building up of reserves 
for international aid to areas suffering from shortages of 
foodstuffs and of means of payment. An endeavour would 
also be made to find ways and means of reducing or 
preventing the occurrence of those situations, now so 
common, in which production has to be cut down in lines 
whose expansion falls short of that of real consumer re-
quirements. The gradual application of the programmes 
concerned would be facilitated if the larger countries lifted 
import duties on tropical agricultural commodities alto-
gedier, in compliance with the request submitted to GATT_ 
by the relatively less developed countries. It must be 
stressed that this would mean a market organization based 
on negotiation. 
47. As the outcome of the discussions at the nineteenth-
session of GATT, an inter-governmental group will carry 
out studies on conditions of acces to the world market, 
especially as regards trade in wheat, other cereals and 
possibly also meat. Among the tentative suggestions which 
are being informally put forward with respect to wheat 
is the idea of restricting import duties to those established 
by the amount of the difference between the price fixed 
for the domestic consumer market in the exporter country 
and that prevailing on the importer country's domestic 
consumer market. 
48. If this policy is to be put into effect on a world 
scale, one of the difficulties to be overcome will be that 
of co-ordinating the action of the various international 
organizations concerned and, consequently, centralizing 
the headquarters of the corresponding studies and nego-
tiations. I t should be noted that in the case of wheat alone 
there are at present an exporters' committeee, established 
in Washington, the International Wheat Council, oper-
ating in London, and the FAO Group on Grains, which 
works in Rome, and that, furthermore, OECD, EEC and 
GATT also take a hand in matters connected with the 
wheat trade. 
49. This fundamental question gives rise to the following 
queries among others. What would be the attitude of Latin 
America, or of the Latin American countries directly 
concerned, to the possibility of market organization? 
Would Latin America as a whole, or the countries con-
cerned collectively, make a co-ordinated effort to secure 
a voice in the study of the bases and machinery for the 
organization? On what guiding principles, and in relation 
to which articles? How would their course of action in this 
respect be reconciled with each country's policy vis-a-vis 
price and other problems connected with goods that would 
gradually be incorporated into the market organization? 
V I I I . NEGOTIATING CAPACITY 
50. There is no doubt that Latin America's negotiating 
capacity would be considerably strengthened by co-ordi-
nation. However; it may be useful to review, from the 
58 
standpoint of the region as a whole, the factors that will 
play a part in strengthening that capacity, including the 
aggregate importance of the Latin American countries as 
importers and the prospects offered by the region for the 
development of exports of capital goods and durable manu-
factures originating in other regions. 
To these factors should be added the existence of high 
import tariffs in Latin America for certain capital goods 
and durable manufactures; this constitutes a practical 
instrument for negotiations or establishing an understand-
ing with other countries or groups of countries. 
I X . FINANCIAL MATTERS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
51. As already stated, authoritative circles in Europe seem 
in general to incline towards collaboration with Latin Ame-
rica in financial and technical assistance matters rather 
than towards negotiable tariff agreements as a means of 
offsetting the damage that the establishment of an ex-
ternal tariff might do to the Latin American economies. 
In the specified fields, it is also important that Latin 
America should find some co-ordinated means of express-
• ing its views, since the fact that a number of different 
organizations deal with these questions in relation to 
Latin America is an obstacle to the definition of principles 
^and the establishment of agreements that would lead to 
practical action. 
These organizations include the Commission and Council 
of Ministers of EEC and the Development Aid Group 
(DAG) within the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD). It appears that another 
agency—the Commission—will shortly come into being 
which may be very important. This will have its head-
quarters in Paris and, within the political organization 
of Heads of State in EEC, will be chiefly concerned with 
financial questions and technical assistance to Latin Ame-
rica from the six European countries forming EEC. 
52. The role allotted to DAG is essentially to promote the 
co-ordination and efficacy of measures to aid the less 
developed countri^. It will begin by making a sort of 
inventory of the OECD countries' activities in this respect, 
and hold periodic meetings, at least once a year, to 
examine the situation and study the bases for consistent 
action. It is generally felt that progress will be slow, be-
cause of the variety of circumstances, motives and princi-
ples—some of them peculiar to the application of each 
country's foreign policy—that determine the respective 
conduct of OECD's members. 
It is understood that, during an early stage of develop-
ment, DAG's activities may to a certain extent specifically 
relate to the establishment of a minimum level of direct 
assistance for the less advanced countries, which would 
be fixed in accordance with the income of each DAG 
member. 
It has been proposed in DAG that, in due course, the 
group should concern itself with encouraging the forma-
tion of financial consortia to pave the way for the appli-
cation of specific over-all development plans. In such cases, 
the country assisted would be invited to join a special 
DAG group. 
53. DAG will consider the Punta del Este Charter at its 
next meeting, the date of which has not yet been fixed. 
54. With respect to the inflow of capital into Latin Ame-
rica, it is felt in Europe that the establishment of some 
form of multilateral insurance to cover non-commercial 
risks in foreign investment would have a highly favour-
able effect on the future level of such investment. The 
World Bank is at present studying certain economic and 
financial aspects of a draft agreement on the subject which 
was prepared by OECD without the participation of the 
Latin American countries or non-members of OECD. 
55. Viewed as a whole, European experience with respect 
to medium and long-term export credits cannot be re-
garded as satisfactory, according to competent observers. 
Not only does it to a certain extent make for the preser-
vation of bilateralism and adversely affect the mone-
tary régime, but it produces a type of competition whose 
repercussions have been felt equally by the different 
countries. 
The European experts theoretically believe that, in so 
far as Latin America is concerned, it would be best to 
regard any system of credit for inter-Latin American ex-
ports simply as a complement to import credits, and to 
make every effort to finance the latter by means of inter-
national public funds. In terms of interest this would cost 
much less to finance than commercial credit for exports 
and would not exert pressure on the monetary system as 
would export credits. 
56. EEC is controlling the policy of medium and long-
term export credits for third countries through an inter-
governmental group that reviews cases of exports for 
which total payment would be effected over a period of 
more than five years. By means of contact between this 
group and an appropriate Latin American organization 
it might be feasible to reach an understanding that would 
lessen or ward off the effects of competition, for the period 
of credit, between Latin American and European suppliers 
for sales in Latin America. 
57. In December 1961, the EEC Commission planned to 
examine a request from the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration that European organizations should 
participate in financing operations included in the Bank's 
programmes. 
58. It is hoped that the progress made by the ECLA secre-
tariat in its work on credits for inter-Latin American 
exports will enable a certain amount of material to be 
made available within the next few months for com-
munication to and consultation with the Latin American 
Governments. 
59. As regards technical assistance—to mention one aspect 
only—attention should be drawn to the invaluable assist-
ance that Latin America might receive from the EEC 
countries through EURATOM. 
Given the research that is being carried out in EUR-
ATOM's own laboratories and, on its behalf, in certain 
public and private institutions, it seems likely that a 
satisfactory solution will soon be found for the problem 
of obtaining types of reactors that are capable of produc-
ing energy at competitive prices and in conditions that 
afford adequate protection for health. It is expected that 
the construction of public power plants on a fairly large 
scale will be started in the EEC countries within the 
next four years or so. It is also estimated that by about 
1985 nearly a quarter of their energy requirements will 
be supplied by those plants. 
60. Apart from a contract for certain specific purposes be-
tween EURATOM and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy 
Commission ( lANEC), Brazil was the only Latin Ame-
rican country to sign an agreement to make use of the 
technical collaboration offered by EURATOM. This Agree-
ment offers Brazil the possibility of technical assistance 
in its prospecting for minerals of nuclear importance, in 
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the analysis of those minerals, in the construction of 
research and production plants, in the exchange of radio-
isotopes and in the processing of radiation fuels. Braz'l 
will also make use of some of the 200 fellowships provided 
by EURATOM. Similarly, Argentina has started negotia-
tions for an agreement on co-operation. 
61. The possible use of technical assistance from EUR-
ATOM implies the existence of certain resources that are 
either national or created by several countries acting in col-
laboration. Among them would be reactors and other labo-
ratory equipment, and the creation of university chairs, to 
provide basic training for physicists, chemists, biologists, 
engineers and other nuclear specialists so as to equip them 
to channel the co-operation of EURATOM and ensure that 
it is advantageous for the recipient country. I t should be 
noted in this respect that the fellowships are to be dis-
tributed among nuclear specialists of a certain standing, 
since the fellows work as an integral part of EURATOM's 
technical teams, mainly in the central laboratory at Ispra 
(I ta ly) . 
62. While the progress made in Latin America with the 
preparations for the peaceful use of atomic energy is very 
uneven, a new factor making for unbalanced economic 
growth will be brought into play in the region. This will 
be unfavourable to those countries which, mainly be-
cause they lack the necessary raw materials, do not make 
a start towards utilizing European technical assistance 
through EURATOM. 
X . CHANNELS AND MACHINERY 
63. This list of points should be rounded off by an ex-
amination of the most appropriate channels and machin-
ery for facilitating and imparting continuity to the con-
tacts between Latin America and the large groups of 
countries—particularly EEC—which, being in the na-
ture of customs unions, will have to develop a joint trade 
policy once the transition period is past. This policy is 
already being sketched out in some aspects. 
Three years ago EEC suggested to Latin America that 
a consultative group should be formed at the govern-
mental level, but did not obtain sufficient Latin American 
backing to put the idea into practice. 
64. It is constantly stressed in European circles that one 
of the obstacles to the achievement of the desired un-
derstanding with Latin America is the fact that the Latin 
American countries act in isolation, and offer no op-
portunity for the maintenance of continuous contact in 
the study of matters where joint examination would 
make it easier to f ind solutions and bring about reciprocal 
collaboration. 
65. Moreover, in Latin American circles, for various 
reasons—inter alia, the experiences gained at the 1960-
61 Tariff Conference, and the grave misgivings to which 
the present situation gives rise—it is beginning to be 
clearly understood, in view of the present policy of group-
ing, that if the Latin American countries persist in acting 
without any co-ordination they will continue to have too 
litde say in decisions that closely relate to their economy 
and their future. :• 
66. As f a r as it can, the ECLA secretariat, pursuant to 
the recommendations of the Governments represented on 
the Trade Committee, is following the trend of events^ 
—some of which cannot but give rise to acute disquiet—, 
maintaining contact at the working level with EEC, EFTA 
and OECD, and keeping a close watch on the progress of 
affairs in GATT that are important for Latin America's 
over-all external policy. 
67. There is no doubt that present circumstances and 
developments now under way, as very briefly dealt with 
in this paper, indicate that the views beginning to gain 
ground in Latin American circles as to the advisability 
of a joint governmental examination of the situation with 
a view to possible co-ordinated action are well founded. 
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Federal 
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frozen 2 2-10 6 1-3 1 5 5 10 1-4 1-8 1-3 1-3-8 1-6 1-3-4-6 1 2 2-4 2 
02.01 Meat of bovine animals, 
chilled 2-3 2-10 6 1-4 1 5 5 10 1-4 1-8 1-3 1-3-8 1-6 1-3-4-6 1 2 2-4 2 
02.01 Meat of sheep and lambs. 
frozen 2 2-10 6 5 5 1-4 1-8 1-3 1-3-8 1-6 4 1 2 2-4 2 
02.01 Offals of bovine animals 
or sheep (chilled) . . . 2 2-10 6 1 5 5 10 1-4 1-8 1-3 1-3-8 1-6 1-3-4-6 1 2 2-4 2 
16.02 Preserved meat 2 2-10 1-4 10 1 1-8 1-3 1-3-8 1 1 1 2 2-4 2 
16.03 Meat extracts 10 4 10 1 1-3 1-3-8 1 1-8 2 2-4 2 
10.01 Wheat 2-4-7 2-10 2 1-4-7 1-4-7 8 2 2-4-7 1-4-7 3-12 1-3-4-8 2 4-6-7 1-7 2 2-4 2 
11.01 Wheat flour 2-4-7 2-10 2 1-4 1-4 8 2 10 2 2 3-12 1-3-7-8 2 4 1 2 2-4 2 
10.03 Barley 2-4 2-10 11 1-4 4 2 10 2-4 1-4-8 3-12 1-3-4-8 2 I 1 2 2-4 2 
10.06 Rice 2 2-10 1-3 1-4 3-4-12 1-3 1-8 1 2 2-4 2 
15.07 Linseed oil, crude. . . . 9 2-10 1-3-8-9 1-4 10 9 1-3 1-3 1-8 1-8 2 1-3-4 2 
15.08 Linseed oil, refined . . . 1-9 10 1-8-9 4 10 9 1-3 1-3 1-8 1-8 2 1-34 2 
15.07 Edible oils, crude. . . . 9 2-10 7-9 1-4 4 9 10 1-9 2-4 1-3-4 1-3-8 1 4 9 2 2-4 2 
15.07 Edible oils, refined . . . 2-9 2-10 7-9 1-4 4 9 10 1-9 2-4 1-3-4 1-3-8 1 4 2 2-4 2 
23.04 1 10 1-4-8 1-3 1-3 4 1 2 2-4 2 
23.04 1 10 1-4-8 1-3 1-3 4 1 2 2-4 2 
41.01 Cow-hides, dried and salt-
ed 10 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-3-4 2 
41.01 Sheepskins, dried and salt-
ed 10 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-3-4 2 
41.01 Sheepskins in the wool . 10 1-3-4 1-3 1-8 2 1-3-4 2 
41.02 Bovine cattle leather . . 8 10 1-4 1 10 1-4 1-3 1-8-10 2 2-4 2 
41.03 Sheepskin leather. . . . 10 4 10 1-4 1-3 10 2 2-4 2 
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41.06 Chamois-dressed leather . a 10 4 1-4 1-3 10 2 2-4 2 
41.07 Parchment-dressed 
leather 8 10 1-3-4 1-3 10 2 24 2 
41.08 Patent leather and met-
allized leather 8 10 4 1-4 1-3 10 2 24 2 
53.01 Greasy. wool 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-34 2 
53.01 Washed wool 4 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-3-4 2 
53.03 Waste of combed and 
carded wool and other 
wool waste 10 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-34 2 
53.05 Wool tops 1-3 1-3 1 10 1-3-4 1-3 2 1-34 2 
53.07 Yarn of combed sheep's 
or lambs wool 1 1-3 4 10 1-3 1-3-4 1-3 10 2 1-34 2 
53.11 Woollen shawls 1 1-3 4 10 1-3 1 1-3-4 1-3 1-8-10 2 2-4 2 
KEY TO SYMBOLS: 
1. Import permit: Individual authorization granted subjet to certain conditions. 2. State trading: Direction and control of import trade by the State, either directly or through 
official agencies. 3. Discrimination: Extension of advantage to products from specific countries or currency areas. 4. Variable import duties of charges: Levies over and above 
customs duties, applied to imported goods for specific purposes, such as the stabilization or maintenance of domestic prices at a given level. 5. Health restrictions: Prohibition 
of imports from countries in which foot-and-mouth disease exists. 6. Maximum and minimum price system: Liberalization of imports when domestic price exceeds the maximum 
price fixed for the product in question, and automatic suspension of imports when domestic prices fall below the fixed minimum. 7. Tie-in purchase requirements: Regulations 
requiring importers or manufacturers to purchase a given percentage of similar domestic products. 8. Quota system: Establishment, at regular intervals, of maximum quantities 
that may be imported, on the basis of either volume or value. 9. Production or turnover taxes: Taxes applied when goods have been manufactured from the products concerned. 
10. Tariff preference: Application of a preferential tariff for specific countries. 11. Seasonal regulations: System whereby imports are suspended during certain periods of the 
year. 12. Corporate system: System under which imports are the responsibility of national associations or agencies to which the producers belong. 
EXPLANATORY NOTES: 
Table 1 was drawn up on the basis of data from the following sources: (a) GATT documents; (b) Information given to the Uruguayan delegation by other delegations accred-
ited to GATT; (c) Information furnished by the Governments of the countries mentioned in the table to diplomatic missions of the Republic of Uruguay in Europe. 
For the purposes of the table, nineteen countries were selected which are major consumers of Uruguayan products. As regards the latter, thirty items were taken which during 
1960 accounted for 97.5 per cent of Uruguay's exports. It should be pointed out that the table includes only twelve types of restriction applied to Uruguayan exports by the 
nineteen countries considered; no account is taken of other important types, such as the following: (1) Certain customs duties considered to be prohibitive; (2) Bilateral agree-
ments; (3) Domestic subsidies; (4) Preferential treatment arising out of the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free-Trade Association 
(EFTA). 
No distinction is made in the table between restrictions applied under GATT provisions and those which might be considered to constitute a breach of the General 
Agreement. 
Table 2 
1960-61, TARIFF CONFERENCE TREATMENT OF IMPORTS INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET OF SELECTED 
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40 A I C: from cod 
annual quota of 
34 000 tons. 
From other fish— 
free of duty. 
Smoked salmon: 
13 per cent 
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04.03 Butter 25 15 25 30 24 
04.04 Cheese 25 
10 
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07.05 Beans 10 
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08.01 A Bananas 5 
10 
15 20 40 20 
08.01 C Papayas 10 25 5 25 12 
08.01 C Pineapples 10 25 5 25 12 

















15-X to 15-X 
15 
ex: I-IV to 30-IX 
15 
ex: 1-X to 15-X 
08.02 E Lemons 0 13 15 5 8 
08.04 A Grapes, fresh 1-lX 5 
30-VI minimum 
amount chargeable 










1-VIII to 8 
14-VII minimum 
amount chargeable 
'DM 5 per 100 kg 
( Continued) 
63 







National tariffs External tariff EEC 
Commodity Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Benelux France Italy 





































6 per 100 kg 
l-I 'DM 1 per kg 
31-1 10 minimum 
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'DM 3 per 100 kg 
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able 0.5AJA per 
100 kg 
14 
M i n i m u m 
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able 2.4/UA per 
100 kg 
10 
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100 kg 
, 8 
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amount charge-
able 1.4/UA per 
100 kg 
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M i n i m u m 
amount charge-
able 0.5/UA per 
100 kg 
13 (others) 
M i n i m u m 
amount charge-
able 2 UA per 
100 kg 
10 
M i n i m u m 
amount charge-
able 1.50/UA per 
100 kg 
15 
M i n i m u m 
amount charge-
able 3 per UA 
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of Germany 
National tarifs 
Benelux France Italy 
External tariff EEC 
BTN sub-items Rates of incidence 
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National tariffs External tariff EEC 
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'DM 180 per 100 kg 'BF 413 or 
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55.01 Cotton, raw 

















































































































External tariff EEC 
BTN sub-items Rates of incidence 
Free (quota of 
170 000 tons); 
remainder 6 
per cent 
Free (quota of 
1935 000 tons); 








3 per cent (for 
quota of 500 
tons) 
others: 
10 per cent 
6 per cent ex: 



















National tariffs External tariff EEC 
Commodity Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Benelux France Italy 






























































































































Annual quota of 
12 600 tons 
Annual quota of 
21 500 tons 
Annual quota of 
2 400 tons. 
Bars and shapes 
containing up to 
0.1 per cent of 
carbon by weight 
and 30 to 90 per 

























Commodity Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Benelux France Italy 
External tariff EEC 
BTN sub-items Rates of incidence 
76.01 Aluminium 12 










Sacks of zinc 









































1.32 UA per 
100 kg 
10% 












The 1960-61 Tariff Conference is the title given to the fifth series of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). This series comprises: 
i) The negotiations of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the other countries members of GATT in connexion with 
article XXIV, 6 of the Agreement; 
ii) The Dillon negotiations, which are general in character and concern all the Contracting Parties of GATT; and 
iii) The incorporation of new countries as Contracting Parties of GATT. 
The table contains provisioned data from unofficial sources. 
Rates of incidence are expressed in ad valorem percentage terms. 
At the date when the table was drawn up—12 December 1961—the Tariff Conference had not yet ended, so that there may be 
changes in some of the rates of incidence noted. 
A list of quotas is presented in table 3. 
In table 2, "ex" implies that the duty is seasonal or that only part of a tariff item has been negotiated or consolidated, as the case 
may be. The seasonal duty is usually in force from 15 March to 15 September. 
Quotas negotiated under GATT remain in ' ' ' force for three years, and cannot therefore be reduced within that period. 
The rates of incidence which are not underlined in the appropriate column are those fixed by EEC's external tariff and 
not negotiated at the 1960-61 Tariff Conference. Once the quotas have been covered, imports in excess of their volume are subject 
to the régime of duties established by EEC for the product concerned. 
g) Underlining of the percentages or of the note "Free" in table 2 implies that the treatment accorded by the common external tariff 
was not negotiated or consolidated at the 1960-61 Tariff Conference. 
h) The value of the EEC unit of accounting, in terms of which the duties established by the external tariff are expressed, is 0.88867088 
grammes of fine gold. In other words, its gold equivalence is the same as that of the United States dollar. 
i) The following abbreviations have been used for national currencies: 
DM = Deutschmark 
FB = Belgian franc 
LF = Luxembourg franc 
FF = French franc (old) 
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Table 3 
CONFERENCE ON TARIFFS FOR 1960/61. QUOTAS FOR THE COUNTRIES INDICATED, 




Common ex- , • third countries 
Commodity temal tariff of granted to the 





established ing country quotas 
48.01 A Newsprint 7% France 75 000 T 0 
Germany 310 000 T 0 
ex 53.07 A Combed wool yarn 6% Germany 900 T 2% 
ex 54.03 A.I Flax yarn 10% Germany 500 T 3% 
73.05 A Iron filings or steel Germany 4100 T 3% 
powder 8% Benelux 850 T 0 
Netherlands 1400 T 0 
73.02 A.II Ferromanganese 8% Benelux 320 T 0 
Netherlands 500 T 0 
73.02 C Ferrosilicon 10% Benelux 20 000 T 0 
Netherlands 2 600 T 0 
73.02 D Ferrosiliconmanga-
6% 0 nese Germany 40 000 T 
Luxembourg 70 T 0 
Netherlands 420 T 0 
73.02 E.I Ferrochrome 8% Italy 9 000 T 0 
Benelux 2 950 T 0 
Netherlands 160 T 0 
ex 73.02 G Ferrotungsten 7% Benelux 60 T 0 
Netherlands 3 T 0 
ex 73.02 H Ferromolybdenum 7% Benelux 370 T 0 
Netherlands 27 T 0 
ex 73.02 H Ferrovanadium 7% Benelux 21 T 0 
Netherlands 9 T 0 
ex 76.01 A Unalloyed crude 
aluminium 10% Germany 120 000 T 5% 
76.01 B.I Aluminium scrap 5% Germany 24 000 T 0 
Benelux 54 T 0 
Netherlands 600 T 0 
77.01 A Crude magnesium 10% Germany 28 000 T 0 
Benelux 375 T 0 
Netherlands 180 T 0 
78.01 A Crude lead 1.32 UC Germany 54 000 T 0 
per Bélgica 10 000 T 0 
100 kg Netherlands 31 000 T 0 
79.01 A Crude zinc 1.32 UC Germany 74 000 T 0 
per Netherlands 7 700 T 0 
100 kg 
EXPLANATORY NOTE: This table contains preliminary data from unofficial sources. The indicated 
quotas are for 1961. It is understood that the quotas for 1962 will be approximately the same. 
Although under GATT regulations the quotas cannot be reduced within a period of three years, 
those included in this schedule apparently would fall outside these regulations, the reason being 
that the EEC countries presumably agreed on them of their own accord and not as a result of 
negotiations with third parties. It is to be noted that these import quotas are under a special 
tarifif system. Once a country has imported an amount equivalent to the total quota fixed for that 
country, any additional imports are subject to the duties established in the EEC external tariff. 
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H Y D R O - E L E C T R I C R E S O U R C E S I N L A T I N A M E R I C A : T H E I R 
M E A S U R E M E N T A N D U T I L I Z A T I O N 
A preliminary and brief review of Latin America's hydro-electric resources, with special reference to the amount of 
knowledge available on them, their approximate magnitude and the part they play in supplying the region's energy 
requirements, is given in this article. 
In analysing the last-mentioned point, it is stated in the Introduction that Latin American hydro-electric production 
is growing at a steady pace and that its share in the consumption of commercial energy—which is already nearly 15 
per cent—is increasing, in common with the averages for the world and its main regions. Latin America's contri-
bution to total electric power production is slightly more than 50 per cent and is expected to expand, whereas the world 
average is a little over 30 per cent and is on the decline. 
In section I of the present article it is stressed that the Latin American countries need to evaluate their water re-
sources and plan their utilization with a view to obtaining the greatest possible benefit, in keeping with the experience 
already acquired in the integrated multi-purpose development of numerous river basins. 
For this purpose, the salient concepts on hydro-electric potential are reviewed; the difficulties deriving from the 
use of this potential are pointed out and the particular potentials recommended that would be most suitable at the 
present stage of development in Latin America and the current position of water resources research there. The cor-
• responding methods of evaluation are also described. 
Generally speaking, a calculation should be made of the so-called theoretical potentials which, while constituting 
ceilings that are unattainable in practice, require a minimum amount of information and enable potentials for eco-
nomic use to be estimated within fairly narrow limits by means of empiric coefficients. 
As the irregularity of stream flow has a strong influence on the economic aspect of water resources development, 
a very useful coefficient, which has been recommended by the Economic Commission for Europe, is suggested for gen-
eral programming studies. 
In section II, up-to-date calculations of hydro-electric potentials in Latin America are given, together with the 
concepts in current usage and a broad outline of their application. 
With respect to theoretical potentials, the assessments made by the United States Geological Survey (the sole 
source that covers research throughout the world) are reported; the criteria adopted were fairly uniform but the data 
vary in accuracy and scope. The calculation based on average stream flow attributes 23 per cent of world hydro-
electric potential to Latin America, and there are no comparative data in the region against which the figures can 
be checked. 
Conversely, in the field of economic potential, individual country assessments are available and have been compil-
ed by the Economic Commission for Latin America. They differ considerably in method and principle. According to 
their data, the minimum economic potential of the region is 155 million kW. 
The data on the economic potentials of selected river basins shows that the geographical distribution of these 
• basins is irregular. 
It is clear that what is lacking is a systematic evaluation based on the same criterion in every country of the region. 
For purposes of illustration, an analysis is made of the variation in the stream flow of selected Venezuelan and 
Chilean rivers and, in the case of Argentina, a very tentative curve is constructed for this factor, in application of the 
calculation mentioned in section I. 
An examination is then made of the extent to which hydro-electric resources have been used in Latin America 
(in the proportion of about 4.5 per cent of the economic potentials), from which it emerges that the low percentage 
denotes the abundant nature of the resources rather than any lack of interest in their development. 
Section II concludes with an account of some general features of existing hydro-electric works and explores the 
possibility of establishing new plants in the next few years, which would accentuate the sustained upward trend of 
growth registered so far . 
In section III, the facilities for research on Latin America's water resources are studied, and stress is laid on 
the importance of flow and rainfall measurements (continuous statistical series covering an adequate number of years) 
for the proper execution of hydraulic works. 
Most of the analysis is devoted to ascertaining the number of rain gauges and flowmeters in service in the dif-
ferent countries and important river basins, the span of the records in years is noted and the coverage indices cal-
culated (number of stations per 10,000 square kilometres by average years of registration). 
Consideration is the given to the detailed plans showing contour lines that are available, since they are another 
essential item of information for the evaluation of theoretical potentials. It appears that, despite the shortage of fa-
cilities for investigating hydraulic resources in Latin America, it would be possible to make a co-ordinated, systematic 
and integrated evaluation of hydro-electric potentials. 
Lastly, a list is given of the organizations that are responsible for taking hydrological measurements in each 
country, together with observations on the co-ordination of the work, centralization and the publication of data. 
No analysis is made in this study of the unit costs of hydro-electric installation and production in Latin Ameri-
can countries, as they form the subject of a special secretariat paper.^ 
* See Prices and costs in the electric energy industry in Latin America (ST/ECLA/CONF.7/L.1.51). 
1% 
INTRODUCTION 
T H E PARTICIPATION OF HYDRAULIC ENERGY IN TOTAL 
WORLD PRODUCTION OF COMMERCIAL AND ELECTRIC ENERGY 
An analysis of the part played by water resources in 
supplying commercial energy during the last twenty 
years, and of their contribution to electricity production 
in the principal regions of the world—especially Latin 
America—^paves the way for an objective appraisal of 
the importance of their present role and an estimate of 
future prospects. 
Table 1 shows that, in all the regions indicated, hydro-
electric production increased in the last twenty years, 
usually far outpacing commercial energy but lagging 
behind total electricity production, as will be seen in 
greater detail later. Without dwelling on aspects which 
are dealt with at length in another ECLA study,^ mention 
should be made of the rapid rate at which commercial 
and hydraulic energy are developing in Latin America. 
Whúe the consumption of commercial energy in 1959 
amounted to 2,750 million tons of petroleum equivalent 
for the whole world, at a cumulative annual rate of growth 
of 5.5 per cent—^the average for the last decade— 
demand in Latin America reached 83 million tons with 
a growth rate of 7.6 per cent. In the United States and 
Western Europe, demand was 937 and 556 million tons 
of petroleum equivalent respectively, and expanded an-
nually at the rates of 3.5 and 3.8 per cent. 
During the same two decades, the use of hydraulic 
energy to cover the above-mentioned requirements in-
creased not only in absolute but also in relative terms, 
as may be seen from table 2. 
Nevertheless, owing to the very unequal way in which 
the rates progressed in the regions indicated, the per-
" See The electric power industry in Latin America—present 
status and recent development (ST/ECLA/CONF.7/L.1.01). 
Table 1 
CUMULATIVE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF HYDRO-
ELECTRICITY, TOTAL ELECTRICITY AND COMMERCIAL 
ENERGY,* 1937-59 
(Percentage) 
Latin America . . 
Western Europe . 
Eastern Europe . 
United States . . 
Other developed 
countries'" . . . 
Rest of the world 
World total . . . 
Commercial Total Hydro-
energy electricity electricity 
. . 6.2 8.1 7.7 
. . 1.8 5.9 5.6 
. . 5.1 8.5 10.0 
3.0 9.0 5.9 
. . 3.8 6.1 5.5 
. . 8.9 9.7 6.1 
. . 3.7 7.6 6.0 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information for Latin 
America, and on United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series J. 
1-3, for other regions and countries. 
* Commercial energy comprises petroleum—including natural gas 
and its derivatives, mineral coal and hydro-electricity. Hydro-
electricity has been evaluated by the amount of petroleum (at 
10,700 kCal/kg) that would be needed to produce the same 
amount of electricity, due account being taken of the average 
yields of thermoelectric plants. For further details see The 
electric power industry in Latin America—present status and 
recent development, op. cit. 
" Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Union of 
South Africa. 
Table 2 
PARTICIPATION OF HYDRO-ELECTRICITY IN COM-
MERCIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
(Percentage) 
1937 1949 1955 1959 
Latin America . . . . 13.5 13.6 12.7 14.6 
Western Europe . . . 7.6 9.7 11.6 13.7 
Eastern Europe . . . 1.6 1.4 2.3 3.4 
United States . . . . 4.1 5.4 5.3 5.8 
Other developed 
countries' 24.0 26.6 27.4 28.9 
Rest of the world . . 5.3 7.0 3.0 3.7 
World total 6.6 7.5 8.0 8.7 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information for Latin 
America, and on United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series J. 
1-3, for other regions and countries. 
' Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Union of 
South Africa. 
centage contribution of hydraulic energy also changed-
in dilferent degrees. It was highest—nearly 29 per 
cent—for the group of countries composed by Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Union of South. 
Africa, and lowest—3.7 per cent—for the less-develop-
ed countries, excluding those of Latin America. 
Apart from the above-mentioned group of countries, 
in which hydraulic energy supplies more than a quarter 
of the commercial energy required to satisfy consump-
tion, its contribution is greatest in Latin America and 
Western Europe, where it amounts to an eighth of the 
total. 
The relative reduction in the part played by hydro-
electric power in Latin America in 1955, which is ob-
servable from tables 2 and 3, was mainly due to the 
fact that the public utility systems in Brazil, in spite of 
having several hydraulic units in process of installation 
at Peixotos, Cubatao, Nilo Peganha and Salto Grande, 
did not begin to function until 1956. 
The share of hydraulic energy in world electricity 
production may be studied in table 3, which covers the 
same regions and years as table 2. 
Table 3 
PARTICIPATION OF HYDRO-ELECTRICITY IN TOTAL 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION' 
(Percentage) 
1937 1949 1955 1959 
Latin America . . . . 50.9 52.1 49.8 52.1 
Western Europe . . . 44.5 41.9 41.0 39.2 
Eastern Europe . . . 11.5 9.7 11.2 16.8 
United States . . . . 37.0 30.8 19.0 17.8 
Other developed 
68.0 countries'" 74.3 n.6 71.5 
Rest of the world . . 46.2 51.4 23.0 26.3'= 
Worid total 42.8 38.8 30.5 30.0 
SotmcE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information for Latin 
America, and on United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series J. 
1-3, for other regions and countries. 
° Comprising production for public consumption and production 
by private services for their own use. 





HYDRO-ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION AND AVERAGE RATES OF ANNUAL GROWTH 
Production 
(millions of mlTh) 
Rates of growth 
(percentage) 
1937 1949 1955 1959 Í937/49 1949/55 1955/59 
Latin America . . . . 6.3 13.6 2 H 33.2 6.6 7.6 12.0 
Western Europe . . . 62.3 92.1 159.7 211.0 3.3 9.6 7.2 
Eastern Europe . . . 7.0 11.0 27.3 61.7 3.9 16.5 22.6 
United States . . . . 44.0 90.0 120.4 158.4 6.1 5.0 7.2 
Other developed 
countries" 51.0 85.2 131.4 (178.0) 4.4 7.5 (7.9) 
Rest of the world . . 6.2 12.8 11.4 (27.3) 6.3 —1.8 (24.3) 
World total 176.8 304.7 471.3 (670.1) 3.4 7.6 (9.1) 
SotmcE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information for Latin America, and on United Nations, 
Statistical Papers, Series J, 1-3, for other regions and countries. 
° Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. 
In contrast to the trend of events observed in the 
production of commercial energy, hydraulic energy is, 
on the whole, taking an increasingly small part in total 
electricity production in spite of its steady increase in 
absolute terms. This contraction is due to the more rapid 
development of electricity in recent decades which, from 
constituting 15 per cent of world commercial energy 
consumption in 1937, expanded to 20 per cent in 1949 
and to over 29 per cent in 1959, without any apparent 
pause in its upwards climb. 
The only regions where hydro-electric power increased 
its participation in electricity production during the last 
two decades were Eastern Europe (mainly because of 
progress in the USSR) and, to a lesser extent, Latin 
America. 
Together with the group of highly-developed countries 
consisting of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and 
the Union of South Africa, the Latin American region 
and Eastern Europe used water resources more exten-
sively in their total electricity production (in proportions 
of 68, 52 and 39 per cent respectively), while the world 
average was 30 per cent. 
A summary of world hydro-electric production, which 
reveals the accelerated development of water resources 
in the world and in Latin America in particular, is given 
in table 4 in absolute terms. 
Nevertheless, it may be said that Latin America has 
barely started to tap its hydraulic potential. The first 
confirmation of this statement comes from table 5, which 
shows the amount of hydro-electric power that was 
produced per unit of area in 1959.® 
When the table is analysed, it is interesting to note 
that the Latin American and other less developed countries 
account for only 1.6 and 0.4 mWh/km^, while the world 
average is 5.0, and the respective figures for Western 
Europe, the United States and Eastern Europe are 22.5, 
20.3 and 13.8 mWh/km^. It is undeniable that hydraulic 
potential varies considerably from one basin to another, 
in accordance with topography, precipitation, evapo-
transpiration and underground infiltration, but even with-
' It should be remembered that available head and flow are 
the prime factors determining potential in each hydro-electric 
plant. The former is a function of the topographic conditions 
and the latter of a number of elements, such as precipitation, 
evaporation, underground infiltration, and the extension of the 
catchment area up to the point under consideration. For this 
reason, it is customary, in evaulating potential and hydro-electric 
uses, to relate them to the unit of area. 
out going into these aspects in detail, it may safely be 
stated that in no case are they sufficiently adverse in 
Latin America as a whole as to give rise to potentials 
that are equal to only a third part of the world average, 
which is the state of development in Latin America today. 
On the contrary, and despite the fact that the investi-
gations made so far in this field have been on a small 
scale, it may be accepted that the potential per unit of 
area is considerably higher than the world average as 
it stands at present. Hence, it is obvious that development 
of hydraulic energy in Latin America is exceptionally 
low, although this source plays an important part in 
electricity production. 
Of the dififerent ways in which water will help in the 
economic development of the region, not the least im-
portant will be its role in the production of electric 
energy. On the one hand, the growth of demand for this 
form of energy, which is expected to increase at a rate 
of between 7 to 12 per cent annually (doubling or trebling 
in 10 years' time) according to the country in question,^ 
and, on the other, the wealth of hydraulic potential, on 
which little is known as yet, will provide a sound economic 
basis for multi-purpose river development. 
'' Expansion of the electricity sector in Latin America and its 
capital requirements for 1960-70 (ST/ECLA/C0NF.7/L.1.11). 
Table 5 








Latin America . . 
Western Europe . 
Eastern Europe . 
United States , . 
Other developed 
countries» . . . 
Rest of the world 






















SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information for Latin 
America, and on United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series J. 
1-3, for other regions and countries. 
" Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the Union of 
South Africa. 
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For this reason, it is becoming increasingly necessary 
to make a proper evaluation of the inherent possibilities 
of the Latin American river and lake systems. 
The general review of facilities for investigating water 
resources from the standpoint of stream flow, which 
comprises the last chapter and was specially undertaken 
for the purposes of the study on hydro-electric poten-
tials, is wholly valid and can be used as a basis for 
other analyses, including that of multiple-purpose de-
velopment. 
I. HYDRO-ELECTRIC RESOURCES: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF EVALUATION 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Water is in limited supply on every continent and is of 
vital importance to mankind. It must therefore be used 
in the best interests of the community as a whole. While 
this becomes more essential everywhere as time goes on, 
it may even be a critical factor in some areas and seri-
ously curtail their prospects of economic development. 
The experience gained in many parts of the world with 
respect to the multiple-purpose development of rivers 
and basins and the evolution of the many theories on 
the subject have clarified a number of problems arising 
from optimum use of water. 
The Latin-American countries, with their vast ter-
ritories and untapped water resources, thus have the 
opportunity to plan their development in the light of pre-
sent-day concepts and methods, and they must do so. 
The following characteristics of a body of water must 
be determined before it can be equitably distributed 
among consmers and used to the best advantage: on the 
one hand, the volume, quality, geographical distribution 
and rate a flow (within a hydrological year and from one 
year to another) and, on the other hand, the amount 
required for various purposes (drinking water, irrigation, 
power production, industry, navigation) as well as the 
benefits to be derived from regulating increases in the 
flow of water. 
It should be borne in mind that hydro-electric potential 
does not only depend upon the volume of water available 
in the time unit; it also implies that changes in elevation 
must be considered as well as the rate of stream flow. 
Hence, the hydro-electric potential is proportional to the 
product of these two factors. 
It should also be noted that the operation of a hydro-
electric plant as a source of energy depends as much on 
the demand for electricity within the network or system 
to which it is attached as it does on the volume of water 
available in the basin on which it is located to supply all 
the water requirements for which it is intended. Hence, 
its method of operation should combine the requirements 
of the various sectors in the best possible way to secure 
the maximum benefit for the community. Specific cases 
arising in practice may cover a wide range, from a river 
primarily used for electric power generation to one where 
such production is merely the lesser of several uses to 
which the water is put. 
It is essential that the organs responsible for the devel-
opment of electricity services and those concerned with 
planning the multiple-purpose use of water resources 
should work in close co-operation. Experience in Latin 
America nevertheless shows that authorities often give 
high priority and adequate funds for investigation of a 
specific development which can be completed within a 
short period of time. They are less inclined to invest in gen-
eral research aimed at planning the over-all development 
of a basin or region, particularly those involving long-
term measurements. These specific projects often waste 
other possibilities of river use which might have been ob-
tained had more time been taken over them, as advocated 
here, for research and planning.® 
Data essential to the planning of specific hydro-electric 
projects should be divided into two types: information 
which can be obtained in a relatively short period of time 
provided the necessary staff and technical equipment (topo-
graphical maps, geological surveys, soil mechanics, etc.) 
are available and the hydrological and hydro-meteorolo-
gical data requiring several years of uninterrupted obser-
vations. With regard to the latter, it generally takes from 
twenty to thirty years before mean statistical values are 
obtained which can be considered reliable for future use as 
mean average values,® It should be pointed out, however, > 
that in many cases much less time is required, provided 
there are adequate correlations by which statistics on 
stream flow can be extended within a tolerable margin of 
error and, secondly, if the economic loss resulting from 
this lack of absolute accuracy is less than the loss suffered 
by the community if a particular hydro-electric project were 
not carried out. 
Generally speaking, over-all development planning for 
an entire basin, involving as it does many experts in 
various fields and diversified research, must proceed slow-
ly in view of the size of the investment required and the 
benefits to be derived. 
In any case, a good knowledge of the geographical dis-
tribution of water resources and their specific features, in-
cluding a knowledge of the hydro-electric potential, is clear-
ly a basic requisite for river basin development planning. 
Full knowledge of a country's hydro-electric resources fa-
cilitates proper power development programming, the se- " 
lection of the most suitable sites for electric power plants 
of different types (hydro-electric and thermal) and their 
relative role within each network, including the lines of in-
terconnection and transmission. Similarly, if hydro-electric 
power can be at sufiiciently low cost, a valuable basic ele-
ment will have been provided for the location of certain 
chemical and metallurgical industries which require a large 
supply of electric power. 
2 . DEFINITIONS OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC POTENTIALS 
The United Nations specialized agencies, and particularly 
the Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East, have carried out 
studies for the purpose of laying down rules governing the 
uniform evaluation of hydraulic potentials at various levels, 
® See: Comisión Federal de Electricidad de México, Planning a 
system. Study based on the development of the Sonora-Sinaloa 
system (ST/ECLA/CONF.7/L,2.3), a document in which are 
analysed the hydraulic development of north-west Mexico and the 
consequences of inadequate research and planning. 
' See: ECAFE, Flood Control Series, No. 7, Multiple Purpose 
River Basin Development, Part I, Manual of River Basin Planning 
and ECAFE Methods of Assessment of Hydro-Electric Potentials. 
I & Nlt/Sub.l/HPWP/1. 
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based on available data. Only thus can valid international 
or inter-regional comparisons be madeJ 
The present position, while already discussed at length, 
is summarized below simply for the purpose of clarifying 
and emphasizing some practical aspects of immediate in-
terest to the area. At the same time, a few specific sug-
gestions are offered. 
Two definitions of potentials are of particular interest to 
over-all hydro-electric evaluations: 
(a) The theoretical potential (sometimes called the gross 
potential) fully measures the resources of a hypothetical 
annual production of energy of a basin or river system in 
their natural state, that is to say without any alterations 
produced by works built to generate that energy. It is con-
sidered that all water at an elevation above sea level is 
susceptible of producing electric power, with a 100 per 
cent output. 
(b) The technical potential (also called "exploitable po-
tential" or "practical potential") measures resources by 
existing power plants and those capable of being installed 
at a given moment by conventional technical methods for 
this type of structure or with present techniques, without 
- exceeding a previously set ceiling to the cost of installed 
kW. 
The concept of technically exploitable potential may seem 
^ very vague if no cost limit is set. In fact, if any construction 
is considered physically realizable (excluding the cost fac-
tor) the exploitable potential, or potential that can tech-
nically be achieved, is close to the theoretical potential. 
It should be pointed out that the theoretical potential, as 
defined earlier, is an unalterable characteristic of each 
basin and is completely independent of the attitude of 
man,® unlike the evaluation linked to development, either 
technical or economically achievable. 
Theoretical potential should be divided into two parts: 
(i) The gross run-off potential which measures the theo-
retical annual output of energy (or respective mean poten-
tial) by unit of area (kWh/km° or kW/km") correspon-
ing to the water of a basin or region, neglecting the losses 
of water, and measured by each unit of surface with its 
altitude above sea level in its initial run-oiF. 
Rain water falling on an area, it should be remembered, 
is divided into three parts which follow one of the three 
processes set out below: 
1. Evaporation and transpiration from vegetation; 
2. Surface run-off; 
3. Infiltration with underground run-off. 
The gross surface potential of a basin should preferably 
be estimated by "surface run-off" provided that there is 
adequate hydrological data or enough general information 
on which to base an adequate indirect assessment of the 
run-off coefficient (relation of volume of run-off to volume 
of precipitation). 
If this cannot be done, the volume of precipitation (ex-
cluding losses) can be used to calculate the gross potential. 
As very different results are achieved, depending upon 
the method used (by using the first method the estimated 
potential may be anywhere from 20 to 80 per cent of the 
figure obtained by the second method), every estimate of 
this type of potential should include: (a) the uniform ap-
plication of one method for the entire project; (6) a clear 
indication of the method used, together with the specific 
values. (For more details, consult the UN, ECE and ECAFE 
documents referred to.) 
(ii) The gross river potential—on river beds—which 
measures the potential of the mean flow (or annual energy) 
along the course of each waterway and thus gives the kW 
(or annual kWh) for the whole river or for each unit of 
length. 
The criticism levelled at theoretical potentials, namely 
that they are of no practical value because they only con-
stitute unattainable upper limits, is valid if the problem is 
only considered from that point of view. However, once 
this fact has been recognized, they nevertheless serve some 
purpose in the over-all approach to the problem. In fact, 
such limits should be considered unchangeable yardsticks 
against which actual progress in use achieved in a country 
or region can be measured. The same practical purpose 
can be served by the theoretical limit of thermo-dynamic 
efficiency (also unattainable) in the steam cycle. 
Similarly, within the technical potential a fraction is usu-
ally separated under the name of economic potential to de-
fine the potential that can be used on a short—-or medium— 
term basis within the framework of the general economic 
development of the country concerned. In relation to the 
technically exploitable potential, the economic potential ex-
cludes that part of the development or portion of annual 
production which^ in the event of insoluble conflicts with 
other water uses, do not have any priority over them when 
an integral analysis is made. It also excludes those incap-
able of supplying the same category of power (load factor, 
reliability of service, etc.) at a cost equal or less than that 
obtainable from other sources of electric power®. 
The economic potential varies with changes in a number 
of factors: competitive price of power, cost of equipment, 
interest rates, construction costs, etc. 
3 . DIFFICULTIES IN METHODS OF EVALUATION 
Estimates of the hydro-electric potential of river basins and 
countries, linked always to development sites considered 
economically exploitable, have for some time now been 
made in various parts of the world. 
If the results of separate estimates on the same country 
or river system are compared, they will be found to differ 
widely, the most recent estimates being frequently the high-
est.^" The explanation for these anomalies may be briefly 
summed up in the following main points: 
' See: Economic Commission for Europe, Hydro-electric poten-
tial in Europe and its gross, technical and economic limits (E/ECE/ 
EP/131), Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Report 
of the working party on assessment of hydro-electric potential to 
the sub-committee on electric power (E/CN.ll/I & NR/Sub.1/2) 
and Methods of Assessment of Hydro-Electric Potential (I & NR/ 
Sub.l/HPNP/1). 
' Not including changes in the rain pattern which may be pro-
duced by the method of "artificial rainfall" (increase in moisture 
nuclei by such agents as vapours of silver iodide). 
° The cost of hydro-electric power, when used for multiple pur-
poses, obviously must be determined after a judicious distribution 
of investment among the several consumers. It is equally obvious 
that in each specific case the delay before the plant begin? to 
operate and the foreign exchange investment are factors which 
must be borne in mind. 
There are numerous cases in Latin America, among which the 
following may be mentioned: 
(i) Argentina, with estimates of 6.5, 7, 11, 13 and 20 million 
kW within a period of not more than ten years (Guillermo 
A. Mazza, paper IA2/2 submitted at the Madrid Sectional 
Meeting of the World Power Conference held on 9 June 
1960). 
(ii) Colombia, with an estimated power potential of slightly 
over 4 million kW up to 1954. Very broad estimates on 
the subject made by Electricité de France and Gibbs & Hill 
Inc. (1955) now place the figure at 40 million kW. 
(iii) Venezuela, with a potential previously estimated at 3.2 mil-
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1. Lack of hydrological and geomorphological data; 
2. Lack of uniform evaluation criteria; 
3. Evolution of construction techniques and methods. 
Proper investigation of a river or lake system calls for 
the establishment of measurement units along the main 
waterways and the installation of flowmeter and hydro-
meteorological stations by which the flow at key points 
can be measured over a period of years. The statistical 
series relating to basic pluviometer stations must at least 
provide measurements covering a period of several decades, 
with a minimum of 15 years for the flowmeters in order to 
establish a correlation with the former by which the statisti-
cal series can be extended to 20 or more years (preferably 
over 30) before the final plans for hydro-electric develop-
ment are carried out. The difficulty of obtaining the above 
statistics will be more clearly appreciated if it is pointed 
out that very often a high percentage of the hydrometric-
•al stations required have to be maintained over a period 
of years in remote areas difficult to reach. In Latin Ameri-
ca the sites must range from high mountain zones to 
wooded areas with a tropical climate. 
On the other hand, changes in elevation along rivers 
are diflicult to measure mainly because of their inacces-
sibility, there being few roads over which they can be 
reached. However, general estimates of hydroelectric po-
tential can now be made and civil engineering projects 
planned by means of aerophotogrammetry, which has be-
come an efficient and rapid method of obtaining the neces-
sary preliminary data, except perhaps in very densely 
wooded areas. 
It should be pointed out that the data provided by the 
type of investigation mentioned above merely covers "vo-
lume of flow" and "head", to the product of which the 
theoretical potential of a waterway is proportionally re-
lated; it does not provide other information which is 
essential to the definition of the technical or economic 
potential of a site, such as data relating to geological 
characteristics, soil mechanics, volume of flow regulation, 
the complementary or conflicting nature of the development 
with other uses of water, etc. 
Determination of hydro-electric potentials in Latin Ame-
rica has not only suffered from lack of basic hydrological 
and topographical data but also from lack of uniformity 
in the definitions and procedures used in different countries 
and even within the same country. Estimates have been 
made with respect to the same rivers or river systems, based 
on the same background information, which have produced 
vastly different results depending upon the expert or in-
stitution entrusted with the survey." 
It is therefore essential that the countries in Latin Ame-
rica should agree on specific definitions of potential so 
that uniform estimates at various levels can be achieved 
lion kW up to 1955, is now considered to have a potential 
of 16 million kW following studies and research carried 
out mainly on the Caroni River. 
The following cases can be mentioned for Europe. 
(i) Switzerland, with estimates of 15, 20 and 27 million mWh 
in 1914, 1934 and 1946 respectively, for annual technically 
exploitable energy. 
(ii) Sweden, with 40, 50 and 80 million mWh in 1938, 1952 
and 1955, also for technically exploitable power. (E/ECE/ 
EP/131) Hydro-electric Potential in Europe and its Gross 
Technical and Economic Limits, and A. J. Dilloway "Com-
parative Study of Hydro-electrical Resources as Exemplified 
by European Experience"—paper submitted to the World 
Power Conference—9 June 1960. 
^^  For instance, the potential of Lake Titicaca has been estimated 
at anywhere from under 1 million kW to over 2.5 million kW. 
on the basis of the data available. Only a very few countries 
in the area have adopted the relevant recommendations of 
the World Power Conference and even in many of these 
the recommendations have not always been carried out. 
The widespread practice in the region of evaluating po-
tentials solely on the bases of sites "considered to be eco-
nomically exploitable" has, it should be pointed out, created 
specific difliculties even though it has been applied on the 
basis of uniform criteria. 
In fact, the personal factors which afl'ect the over-all 
concept of every project in determining its possible use 
introduce an element of extreme variability which must 
be reduced to the minimum. Moreover, improved tech-
niques and construction methods, inter alia, may in time 
substantially modify the economic aspect of projects so that 
some, considered unjustified in the past, may be recom-
mended as feasible in the future. 
Since a study of the "economic electric exploitability" of 
water resources should include not only electric power but 
the other uses to which the water can be put, harmonic 
plans should be formulated for its multiple use on the basis 
of general economic considerations which lessen the viable 
and categorical nature of the estimates of the potential in ^ 
question. There should be, among other things, standard 
criteria for determining the priority of a group of structures 
within the over-all developement plan. 
In practice, it is diflicult to lay down a rigid method by' 
which systematic determination of economic potentials on 
a 10 or 15 year basis can be effected. The conditions affect-
ing the economic character of a project are linked to a num-
ber of unpredictable factors such as the volume and struc-
ture of demand; the availability and price of other com-
peting sources of electric power production; characteristics 
of the consumer pattern to be met not only as a result of 
demand growth but also of the type and economic features 
of the plants built prior to the development project under 
consideration; the complementary or conflicting nature of 
the project with other uses of water and criteria for the 
distribution of investments made in multiple-purpose pro-
jects; development of construction techniques and costs, 
etc. Even the rates of interest on capital, which vary, have ' 
a substantial effect on changes in the cost of electricity 
from a single source since, under present average condi-
tions, capital costs represent up to 85 per cent of the cost 
of power in a hydro-electric plant as against only 40 per 
cent for a thermal plant. 
Moreover, its general application is hardly feasible in 
Latin America at present because so much data and back-
ground information of different types is needed which re-
quire time and specialized staff and equipment. 
In short, for developing countries such as those in Latin 
America it is essential that the study of a particular river 
development project under construction should include an 
evaluation of the hydro-electric potential limited to the 
economically exploitable "quantum" (together with crite-
ria for the optimum utilization of water). However, evalua-
tions on a larger scale for purposes of planning, which 
should be carried out as rapidly as material conditions in 
each country will allow, call for the adoption of simpler, 
more expeditious, concepts and criteria. 
4 . SUGGESTED METHODS OF EVALUATION 
(a) Gross runoff potential 
The method of determining the gross runoff potential 
requires the division of the region or country under study 
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into small sub-basins for which information is available 
on stream flow, with statistics covering a long period (not 
less than twenty years) or, if the period covered is only 
some twelve or fifteen years, with statistics that can be 
extended by co-variation with rainfall, subject to prior 
verification of a satisfactory correlation. 
In brief, the theoretical runoff potential in millions of 
kWh a year is given by formula (1), assuming full utili-
zation and a 100 per cent yield. 
(1) = 
367 
Here V is the volume of annual runoff in millions of 
cubic metres (average for a period of years as described 
above) originating exclusively in precipitation in the sub-
basin in question, and H is the average height of the sub-
basin above sea level in metres. The addition of these 
values gives the hydro-electric potential in a region or a 
country. 
Dividing the potential, thus calculated, of each sub-
basin by its area in square kilometres gives the specific 
value of its potential in kWh/km^. 
If the value of the specific potential of the sub-basin is 
marked at its geometric centre on a map, and the process 
is repeated on a larger scale (national or regional) cover-
ing Üie whole area, equipotential lines can be interpolated. 
In such countries as those of Latin America, where hy-
drological information is limited, the main problem is that 
of the means of determining the value of V, and in some 
cases of H, for each sub-basin. 
In this connexion, the best method of establishing V in 
the absence of direct hydrological information is by use 
of runoff data deduced from rainfall data but checked 
against actual flow data recorded at a stream-gauging sta-
tion. (Details are given in the Annex, section 1.) 
In countries with rivers that cross the frontier it is ne-
cessary in determining the national potential to reduce the 
potential of the basins concerned, since the average eleva-
tion of each sub-basin is reduced by being calculated not 
from sea level but from the elevation at the point where 
the river into which it flows crosses the frontier. 
Land-locked lakra in which underground filtration and 
evaporation balance the flow of the affluents (enclosed 
basins) are a special case. Automatic application of the 
principle of evaluating the hydro-electric potential as link-
ed to the area of the basin of its first runoff, with 100 per 
cent utilization of the slope to the sea, would exclude any 
exceptions, although nature itself limits the slope by the 
level of the lowest point in the basin. A typical example 
in Latin America is the Lake Titicaca-Desaguadero River-
Lake Poopó system, where a high proportion of the poten-
tial can be exploited on the basis of the potential head 
above sea level, by substantial reduction of evaporation", 
" Given the known formula P (kW) = 9.8 X Q X H, which ex-
presses the output of a fall of water in kW in function of the 
flow Q (cubic metres per second) and height H (metres), with an 
ideal yield of 100 per cent, the formula can be found for the annual 
power in kWh: 
V 8,760 
Ps = 9.8 X H X ^ 
31.5 10° 
where the new numerical coefficients are: 
8,760 = number of hours in the year 
31.5 = number of seconds in the year, in millions. 
" It would clearly be possible from the strictly technical point 
of view to reduce evaporation by lowering the level of Lake Titicaca 
by construction of a drainage sptem that would reduce the area 
of that lake and of Lake Poopó, with a consequent reduction of 
the volume of water evaporated. 
and a result of other favourable features such as altitude, 
geographic situation, topography, and so forth. 
Examples of a diametrically opposite situation are to be 
found in the case of enclosed basins in Mexico in the States 
of Chihuahua, Durango and Coahuila, where it would ap-
pear logical in view of natural features very different from 
those described to regard the potential as limited by the 
level of the lakes concerned. 
For the sake of uniformity it would be advisable in 
every case to give the theoretical surface potential in rela-
tion to sea level, with a specific separate indication of the 
potential that should be discounted because of the differ-
ence in elevation between the surface of undrained land-
locked lakes and sea level. 
(b) Gross river potential 
The recommended method for calculating the gross river 
potential, which is also a constant intrinsic characteristic 
of the river system of a country or region, is as follows 
each river or water course in the area is divided into sec-
tions bounded by the points of confluence of successive 
tributaries; however, for practical reasons these sections 
should not exceed 10 kilometres in length. 
For each section the potential is calculated by the for-
mula: 
( 2 ) PI , = 9.8 X Qm X H 
Here PL is the average potential in kW; Qm is the average mean 
flow at each end of the section 
QA-I-QB 
(Qm = - 1 — ) • , 
2 
and H is the difference in elevation between the water level at 
each end, in metres. 
Repeating the same procedure for all sections of the 
river and its tributaries and adding the results gives the 
gross river potential of the whole basin, country or region. 
However, this method is not usually employed in the 
upper reaches of the tributaries or the lower reaches of 
the river (near the mouth), those stretches being excluded 
from the point where the potentials are lower than 15-20 
kW per kilometre. In Latin America the higher limit could 
be adopted. 
To calculate the annual energy that corresponds to the 
gross river potential given in kW, it is sufficient to multiply 
the latter by 8,760 (number of hours in the year) to get the 
number of kWh. 
The river potential can conveniently be marked on a 
map by drawing lines of different thicknesses following the 
river, varying according to a given scale with the potential 
per unit length obtained in kW per kilometre for each 
section. The graphic representation of this potential and 
the advantages it provides are given in the Annex, sec-
tion 2. 
(c) Technical potential 
The best method of evaluating this potential, and the 
only direct method, is to draw up detailed schemes for the 
regulation and utilization of the waters of the river or river 
system in question. By this method it can be clearly es-
tablished what will be the geographical location, quantity, 
seasonal characteristics and hydrologic dependability of 
the power in proposed electric power plants, in addition 
to the probable proportion of base and peak energy that 
can be expected. The difiBculty of this method is obvious: 
" This method is that used in France to evaluate hydro-electric 
potential by Electricité de France (see, Hydroelectric potential in 
Europe and its gross, technical and economic limits (E/ECE/EP/ 
131)). 
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even for a single moderately large basin it could require 
much time and considerable funds. Nevertheless, this is 
the method that should be adopted for the final plan for the 
multiple purpose development of a basin. 
In general evaluations for planning purposes, the recom-
mended alternative to direct determination of the exploit-
able potential, both because it is simple to apply and be-
cause it is no less reliable than other indirect methods, 
is to obtain it as a fraction of the gross river potential by 
analogy with other basins or river systems that have been 
studied in detail and have similar geographical and physi-
cal features, as indicated in the following section. 
5 . COMPARISON BETWEEN T H E TWO TYPES OF POTENTIAL 
Although the two theoretical potentials referred to give ceil-
ings that are unattainable in practice (and that do not 
agree), the gross river potential is closer than the runoff 
potential to technical and economic potentials. Moreover 
the gross river potential has the great advantage of indi-
cating on the maps representing it the location of the rivers 
and which sections have a high potential, thus pinpointing 
the places that should be studied in greater detail (by 
geological prospecting, soil mechanics investigations and 
studies of regulation and of other complementary or con-
flicting uses of the water, etc.) in order to compile the 
information required for an economic study. Maps of run-
off potential, on the other hand, link the potential to the 
source of the water without necessarily indicating possible 
sites for the production of electric power. 
The information required to give the runoff potential, 
however, is simpler than in the case of the gross river 
potential, and thus easier to obtain in countries where 
there are large under-developed areas about which there 
is a lack of information, as in the Latin American countries. 
Experience in more developed countries in various parts 
of the world shows that generally speaking the relationship 
between the theoretical potentials under discussion and the 
economic potentials, which in the last analysis are what 
matter, fall within a fairly narrow range of values. In a 
number of European countries with a high level of hydro-
electric production it has been shown in the last decade 
that the exploitable potential as a whole is from 20 to 25 
per cent of the gross runoff potential, with wider local 
variations.^® In the ECE paper referred to it is stated that 
a study of eight European countries showed the ratio be-
tween the real economic potential and the gross runoff 
potential to be between 0.17 and 0.20. 
The results of some other studies,^® however, show that 
the ratio between the real economic potential and the gross 
river potential is roughly between 0.33 and 0.40. 
Here lies the main interest for under-developed areas 
and countries in determining their theoretical potentials, 
since even with relatively simple hydrological and geo-
morphological investigations, and without great expendi-
ture of time, they can estimate the upper and lower limits 
In Sweden the proportion is exceptionally high, being 40 per 
cent. In view of Sweden's highly favourable runoff conditions and 
geological conformation, this is probably an upper limit. See A. J. 
Dilloway, United Nations, "Comparative study of hydro-electric 
resources as exemplified by European experience" (paper presented 
at the Madrid Sectional Meeting of the World Power Conference, 
July 1960). 
ECAFE study op. cit., which includes references to V. M. 
Yevdjevic and 0. Marjanovic, Power resources of Yugoslavia (Bel-
grade, 1956), Vol. 1, and to United Nations, Determination of 
hydro-electric potential in the USSR (ECE, Committee on Electric 
Power, Working Paper No. 46, 13 February 1956). 
that will establish the approximate hydro-electric potential 
for economic use. 
ECE is preparing a map at scale of 1:2,500,000 with 
the theoretical runoff potential covering the greater part 
of the countries of Europe with lines of equal hydro-electric 
power per surface uni t ." 
This map will make it possible to revise the relations 
between the runoff potential and the technical and economic 
potentials for some river systems and countries, by making 
use of information available for those where a greater part 
of the water resources have already been developed and 
where a full investigation has been conducted for the areas 
where the water resources still remain to be developed. 
This information will be of great value for the countries 
of Latin America and for other under-developed areas. 
Some countries that have reliable hydrologic and geo-
morphologic information have in practice omitted the eva-
luation of the theoretical potentials in order to concentrate 
their investigations directly on the technical and economic 
potentials. This is the type of work being undertaken by 
the Federal Power Commission^®, and to some extent the 
Geological Survey^® in the United States. However, some 
authorities in the latter country favour evaluation of do+ 
mestic hydro-electrical resources at the previously-men-
tioned theoretical, technical and economic levels.^" 
6 . IRREGULARITY OF STREAM FLOW IN THE RIVERS 
It has already been seen that the proposed theoretical po-
tentials (runoff and river) are concerned by definition 
with the average annual stream flow and take no account 
of the changes that actually occur in the course of time, 
both from year to year and during the course of a single 
hydrologic year (seasonal variations). However, it will be 
readily appreciated that the irregularity of the stream flow 
of a river is a factor that appreciably affects that part of the 
potential that can be economically developed in relation 
to the theoretical potential. 
The study of any particular hydro-electric project nor-
mally includes detailed technical analysis of the duration 
of natural flow and the instaflations required to regulate it , 
in order to obtain, on economic terms, the optimum use of 
the resource, but, as previously indicated, such analysis is 
of little practical value in investigations relating to general 
planning and programming of the use of the water re-
sources of an area or a country. Hence for some time an 
index has been sought that would make it possible to draw 
maps showing the territorial distribution of the runoff 
irregularity of rivers, and a number of proposals on these 
lines have been made in different countries at different 
times. The most appropriate seems to be that selected by 
ECE to indicate irregularity during the course of the hydro-
logic year.^^ 
" The line of least potential drawn on this map is that represent-
ing 0.25 kWh per square metre, and the other lines represent 
successive multiplication by two (0.5, 1.0, 2.0, etc.) up to the line 
showing 6 kWh per square metre in the central zone of the Alps. 
See A. J. Dilloway, op. cit. 
' ' See Frank L. Weaver, "Hydro potentialities as indicated by 
Federal Power Commission" (paper presented at the Twenty-First 
Annual Meeting, American Power Conference, Chicago, April 
1959). 
See Developed and potential water power of the United States 
and other countries of the world (op. cit.). 
See ST/ECLA/CONF.7/L.3.5. 
See Specifications for construction of an index of stream-flow 
irregularity (E/ECE/EP/205), which should be consulted for more 
general information, since the present study does no more than 
examine briefly some relevant aspects of the question. 
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For a given year, the formula is: 
Vi 
Cri = . 
Wi 
where Cri is the coefficient (index), Vi is the storage 
capacity required for full regulation of runoff for that 
year, and Wi is the volume of runoff for the year. 
The mean value of coefficient Cr for a set of observations 
covering n years can be obtained merely by taking the 
average of the values for Cri. 
For the sake of simplification, in preliminary studies a 
coefficient Cr can be used that corresponds to a fictitious 
year, for which the figure for each month is the arithmetic 
mean of the flow figures for the month concerned. The 
same method can be used to arrive at final conclusions, 
provided that the Cr value used is multiplied by a correc-
tion factor greater than 1, but the advantage of this pro-
cedure is open to question, since the correction factor has 
to be calculated separately in each instance. 
There is little or no correlation between the values of 
Cr and the size of the catchment area concerned, a fact 
which justifies the drawing of maps showing this coefficient 
as basic background irrformation for planning activities, 
together with estimates of hydro-electric potentials. In cal-
culating this coefficient special care must be taken not to 
include lakes or reservoirs, as the resulting distortion of 
the corresponding values would be so great as to invalidate 
the map concerned. In order to draw lines of interpolation 
joining points where Cr has the same value, the Cr value 
should be entered at the centre of the basin or sub-basin 
concerned. Care should also be taken to avoid drawing 
these lines across mountain ranges or extensive depressions. 
It should not be overlooked that a run-of-river plant de-
signed for an average river stream flow of Qm will produce 
an average of: 
kWh = (1 - Cr) X 9.81 X 8,760 X Qm X H 
with a yield of 100 per cent. For normal yields, the value 
of 9.81 should be replaced by another of the order of 8.3. 
I I . L A T I N A M E R I C A N H Y D R O - E L E C T R I C P O T E N T I A L 
1. CONCEPTS AND CURRENT ESTIMATES 
Generally speaking, knowledge of hydro-electric potential 
' in the Latin American countries is in its infancy, as will be 
seen from the analysis of the method and concepts used 
and of current research facilities. The biggest handicaps 
to an estimation of the region's total potential on the basis 
of the direct information available are the lack of uni-
formity in the evaluation criteria and the meagre explan-
ations that accompany the calculations supplied by each 
country. 
(a) Estimates prepared by the United States Geological 
Survey 
The paper on "Developed and potential water power of 
the United States and other countries of the World De-
cember 1954" ^^  estimated hydro-electric potentials at the 
end of 1954 from two different standpoints. 
The first, based on ordinary minimum flow (flow avail-
able 95 per cent of the time) attributes to Latin America 
as a whole a potential of 57 million kW (12 per cent) out 
of the figure of nearly 480 million estimated for the whole 
world. 
The second, based on mean flow, attributes to the region 
as a whole 520 million kW, out of the estimated world total 
of almost 2,270 million kW (see table 6 ) . 
The most important points elucidated by the above-men-
tioned study with respect to its method of execution refer 
mainly to potentials estimated on the basis of ordinary 
minimum flow, and are as follows: 
Developed and undeveloped sites are considered on the 
basis of 100 per cent efficiency; 
The regulatory effect of storage reservoirs has been dis-
regarded, except in those sites where they are already oper-
ating; 
The estimates for the United States, Canada and Europe 
are based on known sites; 
United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey 
Circular 367, 1954 (reprinted 1958). The authors are Benjamin E. 
Jones and Lloyd L. Young. It should be pointed out that this was 
the only estimate made on a world wide basis up to 1954 and it 
was used in studies such as Schurr and Marschak, Economic Aspects 
of Atomic Power; P. C. Putnam, Energy in the Future, and the 
ECLA study on The Electric Power Industry in Latin America, 
op. cit. 
For the Asian countries (except Japan), Africa and 
South America (except Brazil),^ the estimates are based 
principally on rainfall and topography and consequently 
are not as dependable. 
These few indications suffice to give a fairly good idea 
of the general criterion adopted by the author of the paper, 
which was brought into line with the relevant recommenda-
tions by the World Power Conference. 
The comments which may be made on this type of study 
in relation to countries with large under-developed areas 
and little information (as in Latin America) relate mainly 
to the concept of ordinary minimum flow and endeavour to 
assimilate it to that of flow available 95 per cent of the 
time. 
(i) The determination of ordinary minimum flow from 
data that are predominantly on rainfall is much 
more difficult than the mere determination of mean 
flow, which was done in the other evaluation 
made in the same document and in the definitions 
of theoretical potential that have been examined 
earlier. There is no doubt that the accuracy with 
which this type of flow has been estimated differs 
considerably from one country to another, and this 
has militated against the uniformity that is to be 
aimed at in such evaluations. 
(ii) The estimate of potentials for Q 95 per cent auto-
matically places the countries that already have big 
reservoirs (taken into account in the evaluation) 
on a different level from those that have none, since 
a regulated flow is generally greatly preferable to 
the natural run off available 95 per cent of the time. 
The overestimation of potential in countries already 
possessing storage plants would disappear with the 
adoption of the concept of mean flow. 
Hence, the evaluation that will play the most important 
part hereafter will be that based on mean flow in the Geolo-
gical Survey Circular, which comes very close to the de-
finition of theoretical linear potential. The only discrepan-
cy between the two would seem to be the fact that the 
former was limited to "known sites" in the United States, 
Canada and Europe. 
^^  It coincides with the official estimate made in 1951 by the 
Divisao de Aguas do Departamento Nacional da Produgao Mineral. 
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Table 6 
HYDRO-ELECTRIC POTENTIAL IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD 














( r per 
capita) 
Latin America . . . . 57 398 520024 25.50 2 700 
Western Europe . . . 32 356 111382 29.78 350 
Eastern Europe* . . . 61138 288 414 12.31 950 
United States . . . . 26 864 85 376 10.91 490 
Other developed 
980 countries'" 40 517 133 952 6.86 
Rest of the world . . 259561 1126 959 16.61 670 
World total 477 834 2 266107 16.74 800 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis oí data presented in United States Department of the Interior, 
Geological Survey Circular 367, with respect to hydro-electric potentials; and United Nations, 
Statistical Yearbook 1958 for territorial areas and population. 
• Including the total for the USSR. 
" Australia, Canada, Japan, New 2fealand and the Union of South Africa. 
Table 6, which was prepared from data given in the 
reference paper, enables a comparison to be made between 
Latin America and other regions of the world. 
From column 2, it appears that Latin America's hydro-
electric resources are equal to the sum of the same resources 
in Europe (including the USSR total) and in the United 
States. They also constitute more than 22 per cent of the 
world potential. 
The penultimate column shows an average of about 25 
kW/km^ for the region, which exceeds both the world aver-
age (16.7 kW/km^) and those of the other regions and 
groups of countries considered, with the sole exception of 
Western Europe, for which the average is 30 kW/km^. 
The other group of less developed countries. Eastern Eur-
ope and the United States, follow in descending order with 
approximately 17, 12 and 11 kW/km^. In pointing out 
that the evaluation was limited to "known sites" in the case 
of Canada, the United States and nearly all the European 
countries, the document raises the question of whether Latin 
America's potential has not been over-estimated, in com-
parison with the figures for the other regions on which 
little information is available. 
The last column of the table contains a per capita evalua-
tion of the same potential, in which the figure for Latin 
America, also because of die region's low population den-
sity, is almost 2,700 watts; this is more than three times 
the world average of 800 watts and far exceeds the aver-
ages of the other regions and countries in question. The 
areas that come closest to one another are the group of 
countries formed by Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the 
Union of South Africa, with 980 watts per capita, and 
Eastern Europe (including the USSR total), with 950 watts 
per capita. The United States and Western Europe appear 
with only 490 and 350 watts per capita respectively. 
Lastly, the table confirms the previous observation, made, 
for the sake of comparison, on the determination of po-
tentials solely on the basis of the flow Q 95 per cent in that 
the estimates for countries already possessing large storage 
plants are also too high. Whereas, in fact, the Q 95 per 
cent potential in Latin American and other less developed 
countries is only 11 and 23 per cent of the mean flow 
potential, in the United States, in the group of developed 
countries consisting of Australia, Canada, Japa n, New 
Zealand and the Union of South Africa and in Western 
Europe, it amounts to 31.5, 30 and 29 per cent respectively. ^  
It should not be forgotten, of course, that the degree of 
regularity of the rainfall régimes also has a direct bearing 
on these results. 
(b) National estimates 
The following observations may be made on the inform-
ation which the ECLA secretariat has compiled on the 
basis of the estimates of potential prepared in every Latin 
American country: 
(i) Some countries have no data on potential nor have 
they undertaken any research on the subject; 
(ii) In other countries, the data difl"er considerable ac-
cording to their source, and explanations of the 
concepts and methods used are either non-existent 
or else so concise as to be impossible to classify; 
(iii) The data are often limited to a few basins only or 
to the best-known areas within each country; 
(iv) Lastly, a few countries have already made over-all 
studies on their hydro-electric resources, and are 
currently engaged upon a more systematic survey, 
improving and expanding their hydrometeorologi-
cal and hydrological networks. 
An initial selection was made, from all the background 
information available, of those estimates which, because of 
the reliability of the source and related considerations, 
could form part of a general scheme with some possibility 
of classification—however remote—despite the fact that 
lack of uniformity and consistency were the salient charac-
teristics revealed by the evaluation methods in many of the 
figures presented (see table 7) . 
An analysis of table 7 shows the most common evalua-
tion concept is undoubtedly installable economic capacity, 
in known localities or sites, notwithstanding the major pro-
blems and limitations which, as seen earlier this estimate 
assumes. 
In spite of these observations, which rule out the possi-
bility of a close comparison between national hydro-electric 
resources in the absence of a standard concept of economic 
potential, provisional estimates have been made in table 8 
on the basis of national surveys and studies, although some 
of these do not provide more than partial coverage. Map 
I-l (a) and (b) is included on the same provisional basis. 
82 
Map M (a) 
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC HYDRAULIC POTENTIAL FOR GEOGRAPfflCAL REGIONS 
(In million of kfF) 
ECU. 
0.1 - 0.3 
0.3 - 0.6 
OS - 0.9 
OS - 1.2 
1.Z - 1.8 
IS. - 30 
3.0 - 6J0 
6.0 - 10.0 
> 10.0 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply officieil endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
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Map I-l (b) 
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC HYDRAULIC POTENTIAL FOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS 
(In million of kW) 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: HYDRO-ELECTRIC POTENTIALS 
(Official and private estimates in each country) 
Year of Potential 
Country estimate (millions 
ofkW) 
Source of information Remarks 
Argentina 1934 20.0 Adolfo Niebuhr, La electrificación en la República 
Argentina. 
1958 12.5 Water and Energy. Reply to questionnaire. 
Bolivia 1959 2.7 Department of Water and Electricity, (data sent 
to ECLA). 
Brazil . . . 16.4 Official estimate (see General Carlos Berenhauser 
Jr. (ECLA/TAO, O Problema de Energía Elé-
trica no Brasil 1959. 
30.0 Estimate by competent agencies. (See General 
Carlos Berenhauser, Jr., op. cit., and the Joint Bra-
zil-United States Economic Development Com-
mission, Relatorio sobre Energía Elétrica no Brasil. 
Colombia 1960 7.6 Institute of Water Utilization and Electricity De-
velopment. Reply to questionnaire. 
1954 40.0 National electrification plan (Gibbs & Hill, Inc., 
and Electricité de France). 
Costa Rica 1959 1.5 Costa Rican Electricity Institute, Investigación de 
recursos hidroeléctricos (CCE/SC.5/I/DT.8). 
Cuba 1954 — Agricultural Development Bank. Preliminary re-
connaissance of 19 rivers and 2 swamps. 
Chile 1952 10.6" ENDESA, Plan de electrificación del pais. 
1952 23.6'' ENDESA, Plan de electrificación del pais. 
1952 26.6" ENDESA, Plan de electrificación del pais. 
1952 20.9" ENDESA, Plan de electrificación del pais. 
Ecuador 1958 2.0 R. Schroder, Study of water resources in Ecuador 
joint ECLA/BTAO/WMO study in draft form; 
Mr. J. Rittershaussen (BTAO). 
0.91 Atilio Garcia Prieto, La investigación de recursos 
hidráulicos (CCE/SC.5/1/DT.12). 
0.15 Department of National Electrification, Directorate 
of Public Works, Investigación de los recursos hi-
droeléctricos (CCE/SC.5/I/DT.4). 
Honduras 1959 0.4 Julio A. Lang, Investig(KÍón preliminar y parcial 
de los recursos hidroeléctricos (CCE/SC.5/I/DT. 
18) . 
Mexico 1939 4.7 Ministry of Agriculture and Development, Catá-
logo General de Aprovechamiento de Aguas Na-
cionales para Generación de Fuerza Motriz. 
1948 5.7 Guzmán Cantú, Energía en México. 
1948 21.0 Guzmán Cantú, Energía en México. 
El Salvador 1959 
Guatemala 1959 
1953 11.0 C. Lara Beautell, La Industria de enerva eléctrica. 
9.0 Barragán Vega and others, Aspectos del estado 
actual de la industria eléctrica (1961). 
15.0 Idem. 
Estimate of utilizable potential based on precipita-
tion and differences of elevation in national terri-
tory. 
Power stations in operation and economically-
utilizable sites during next development period. 
Capacity of generating units." 
Power stations in operation and economically-
utilizable sites. Capacity of generating units. 
Q (95 per cent) corresponds to the norms of the 
World Power Conference. 
Power stations in operation and economically-
utilizable sites. Flow regulation and inter-valley 
exchanges. Capacity of generating units. 
Some economically-utilizable sites (Q 50 per 
cent), with 85 per cent yield. Capacity of gener-
ating units. 
Estimate for whole country. Capacity of generating 
units. Annual plant factor 0.57. 
Economic potential. Capacity of generating units 
(?) . 
The estimated potential is less than 0.1 million 
kW. 
Linear potential for Q (95 per cent). Norms of the 
World Power Conference. 
Linear Potential for Q (50 per cent). 
Linear potential for Q (mean) = gross river po-
tential. 
Economic potential. 
Power stations in operation and economically-
utilizable sites. Capacity of generating units. 
Economic potential of some sites studied.' Capacity 
of generating units. Annual plant factor 0.5. 
Economic potential of some sites studied." Ca-
pacity of generating units. Annual plant factor 0.5. 
Economic potential of some sites studied." Ca-
pacity of units to be installed. 
Potential of 2 604 known sites. The reference seems 
to be to Q 95 per cent. 
Corresponding to the fundamentals of the above 
appraisal. 
Described as "practical". It seems to be based on 
conditions similar to those of "exploitable" po-
tential. 
This seems to refer to plants in operation and to 
economically-utilizable sites in a forthcoming de-
velopment period. Capacity of generating units. 
Estimate based on minimum river runoff. 




Table 20 (continued) 
Year of Potential 
Country estimate (millions 
ofkW) 

















0.33 National Electric Power Commission, Ministry of 
Development and Public Works, Plan de Electri-
ficación nacional e investigación de los recursos 
hidroeléctricos (CCE/SC.S/I/DT.l & DT.15). 
0.9 Economic Development Institute, Proyecto de re-
cursos hidráulicos y electrificación del S.C.I.F.E., 
1960. 
3.1 H. Foster-Smith (TAO). Information for 1960. 
25.0 Pablo Boner, El problema de la energía eléctrica 
(Reports of the Society of Engineers). 
10.0 Swiss-Peruvian Consultative Economic Council, 
L'industrie électrique au Pérou. 
6.5 Jorge Grieve, Potencial hidroeléctrico del Perú 
(Forum on energy problems). 
15.0 Jorge Grieve, Potencial hidroeléctrico del Perú 
(Forum on energy problems). 
1.2 José L. Buzzetti, El potencial hidroeléctrico en 
nuestro pais; Elvio Sacco, Política energética en el 
Uruguay. 
16.0 R. Schroder, Study of water resources in Vene-
zuela, a joint ECLA/TAO/WMO study in draft 
form. 
1.5 Brokopondo Bureau, Government of Surinam, Ap-
praisal survey of Hydroelectric power resources in 
Surinam, 1959. 
Economic potential of some sites studied.' Ca-
pacity of generating units. Annual plant factor 0.5. 
Economic potential of some sites studied. Capacity 
of generating units. 
Q 95 per cent. No further data available. 
This seems to refer to "exploitable" potential. 
The potential dealt with may perhaps be compared 
with minimum economic potential. 
Power stations in operation and known sites that 
are likely to be economically-utilizable.® Capacity 
of generating units. 
Gross river potential. 
Economic potential with regulated flow. Capacity 
of generating units. Annual plant factor O.Sl."* ^ 
Economic potential of some sites studied. Capacity 
of generating units.' 
r 
Economic potential of main rivers. 
' Only 700,000 kW, i.e., half the international utilization are considered in the case of the River Uruguay (Salto Grande). 
" Including 0.6 million kW—half the international resources shared with Argentina. 
' Rivers: Lempa Grande de San Miguel, Paz, Goascorán, Jiboa, Cucumacayán, Mirazalcos and La Cabrera. 
" Corresponding to Lakes Amatitlán, Atitlán and Ayarza and to the Rivers Samalá, Aguacapa, Cahabón, Yocotán, Negro or Chixoy 
and Chilasco. 
" Corrresponding to Rivers Ulúa, Patuca, Choluteca and to Lake Yojoa-River Lindo. 
' Corresponding to Rivers Tuma, Viejo, Matagalpa, Coco and Grande de Matagalpa. 
' Half of the Lake Titicaca International Project was considered, i.e., 1.2 million kW. 
Only 700,000 kW, i.e., half the international utilization, are considered in the case of the River Uruguay (Salto Grande). 
' Fourteen million kW are linked up with the total utilization of the River Caroni. 
2 . GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
Out of an approximate total of 155 million economically 
installable kW in Latin America (see again table 8 ) , about 
70 per cent is concentrated in four countries—Colombia, 
Brazil, Chile and Venezuela—which have 40, 30, 21 and 
16 million kW respectively. They are followed by Mexico, 
Argentina and Peru, which, with 15.0,12.5 and 6.5 million 
kW, constitute 20 per cent of the total for Latin America. 
The distribution of this potential per unit of area is also 
fairly uneven. El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica and Chile 
would seem to be the best endowed, with 45, 35.2, 29.5 
and 28.3 kWAm'', followed by Venezuela with 20.6 kW/ 
km^. Then come Panama, Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador and 
Uruguay, but with much lower figures ranging from 11.8 
to 6.5 kW/km^ 
Moreover, in relation to their current population levels, 
the countries that are best provided with water resources 
for electricity production are Venezuela, Colombia, Chile 
and Paraguay, with 2,990, 2,940, 2,910 and 1,850 watts 
per capita respectively. 
As national estimates do not afford any possibility of 
building up a complete picture of homogeneous hydro-
electric potentials at another level, table 9 presents, by 
countries, the figures estimated by the United States Geo-
logical Survey in 1954, with particular reference to the 
evaluation based on mean Q. According to this table, the 
best-endowed countries would seem to be Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela, with 176.6, 73.6, 40.5 and 36.8 mil-
lion kW respectively, followed by Mexico (33.1) Argen-
tina (29.4) and Ecuador (25.8). 
When the same potential is measured by unit of area, 
the countries best provided for would seem to be the West 
Indies, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and British Gui-
ana, with 177.9, 115.7, 97.9, 81.1 and 68.5 k W A m ^ fol-
lowed consecutively by Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Surinam and Venezuela. 
The last column of table 9 shows that Surinam, British 
Guiana, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are richest in 
hydro-electric resources in relation to their current popula-
tion levels, with 30.6, 27.4, 6.7, 6.4, and 5.8 fcW per capita 
respectively. 
No direct inter-country comparison can be made be-
tween the estimates of the United States Geological Survey 
and the over-all group of national assessements. In the first 
place, the national estimates are governed by theoretical 
concepts that are at different levels; secondly, as explained 
before, varying criteria and methods were used and differ-
ent territorial areas were covered. Thirdly, the coverage of 
the basic data employed must have been very irregular 
—at least in certain areas—since the exceptional case of 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: HYDRO-ELECTRIC POTENTIAL 
(Estimates of economic utilization, 1960)'^ 
Resources per capita and 
Country Millions per square kilometre 
^ ^ r/per capita kW/km' 
Argentina 12.5 615 4.5 
Bolivia 2.7 814 2.5 
Brazil 30.0 477 3.5 
Chile 21.0 2 910 28.3 
Colombia 40.0 2 940 35.2 
Costa Rica . . . . 1.5 1 430 29.5 
Cuba — — — 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 2.0 498 7.4 
El Salvador . . . . 0.9 373 45.0 
Guatemala . . . . 0.2 56 1.9 
Haiti 
Honduras 0.4 220 3.6 
Mexico 15.0 460 7.6 
Nicaragua 0.4 292 2.7 
Panama" 0.9 856 11.8 
Paraguay 3.1 1850 7.6 
,Peru 6.5 647 5.1 
Uruguay 1.2 438 6.5 
Venezuela 16.0 2 990 20.6 
British Guiana . . . . . . . . . . . 
West Indies . . . . . . . . . 
Surinam 1.5 6 200 10.5 
Regional total" . . 155.8 835 7.8 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information, and United 
Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1958 for territorial areas. 
" National estimates. They correspond to the sum of the capacities 
of established plants and those of plants that can be economically 
set up in known localities or sites. 
'' Including the Canal Zone. 
" Excluding countries for which information is not available. 
Chile, for which the estimate of economic potential ex-
ceeds that of theoretical potential, is otherwise inexplicable. 
Elsewhere, on the other hand, the estimate of theoretical 
potential is several times larger than that of economic po-
tential; in Ecuador, for instance it is more than ten times 
as big. However, for Latin America as a whole (after com-
pensation of errors), the relation of 0.29 between the two 
potentials seems to be reasonable provided that due account 
is taken of the fact that errors by omission undoubtedly 
predominate in national estimates. 
The distribution of economic potential in each country 
is also very unequal. This is revealed in table 10, which 
gives the estimated' potential of an economic development 
of selected basins, according to each country's surveys (see 
again map I - l (a) and ( b ) ) . 
It is interesting to note that, in some cases, high propor-
tions of the country's total estimated potential are con-
centrated in one or two rivers only. The real phenomenon 
of irregularity in geographical distribution in undoubtedly 
understated in table 10 in the case of a number of countries 
because of the way in which the potentials were estimated, 
and its extent is increasing in proportion to the improve-
ment in the facilities for investigating resources. As many 
of the basins chosen are those which have been most 
thoroughly studied (with, of course, a few exceptions), the 
potentials assigned to them are closer to the real figures 
than those forming part of the total country appraisal, 
which are relatively underestimated. In addition, the lack 
of uniformity in certain data justifies a sample demonstra-
tion of special cases of inconsistency, such as that of the 
River Grande in Brazil (Slo Paulo-Minas Gerais) whose 
potential, in the table, has been more recently estimated 
and is higher than that attributed to it in the country 
assessment. 
Table 9 















Argentina 3974 29 440 10.60 1.45 
Bolivia 2 650 22 080 20.10 6.72 
14 720 176 640 20.70 2.81 
Chile 5152 18 400 24.80 2.52 
Colombia 3 974 73 600 64.65 5.44 
Costa Rica 1030 5 888 115.67 5.47 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic . — — — 
Ecuador 1472 25 760 97.90 6.44 
El Salvador 221 1104 55.20 0.46 
Guatemala 1546 8 832 81.10 2.47 
Haiti 
Honduras 1030 5 888 52.50 3.21 
Mexico 6 256 33120 16.80 1.02 
Nicaragua 810 4 416 29.80 3.17 
Panama 515 2 944 38.80 2.80 
Paraguay 2 061 7 360 18.10 4.42 
Peru 4 710 40 480 31.50 3.96 
Uruguay 294 2 208 11.80 0.82 
Venezuela 3165 36 800 40.30 5.82 
British Guiana . . . . 2 650 14 720 68.50 27.36 
West Indies 368 2 944 177.90 2.80 
800 7 400 51.80 30.60 
Regional total . . . . 57398 520 024 25.50 2.70 
SODRCE: ECLA, on the basis of data from the United States Department of the Interior, Geo-
logical Survey Circular 367, with respect to hydro-electric potentials, and direct information for 
territorial areas and population. 
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Nevertheless, it is worthy of consideration that the River 
Lempa in El Salvador, the Caroni in Venezuela, Lake 
Yojoa-River Lindo in Honduras, the Negro in Uruguay, the 
Alto Beni in Bolivia, and the Turna, Matagalpa and Viejo, 
in Nicaragua, appear to comprise more than 90, 85, 40, 
40, 35 and 30 per cent of their respective national hydro-
electric potentials. Fairly high concentrations of this re-
source are also to be found in other countries, as may be 
seen from table 10. Sometimes, as in the case of the Rivers 
Tunuyán, Diamante, Atuel and Negro in Argentina, a big 
potential is concentrated in an area that is relatively remote 
from the principal centres of electricity consumption. 
Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: HYDRO-ELECTRIC POTENTIALS, 1960 
(Estimated economic potential of selected basins) 
Potential Potential 
Country, basins 
















Upper Beni (Bala) 
Rivers Coranstel-Espiritu Santo. 
Brazil 
River San Francisco" 
Rio Grande"* 
Rivers Paranapanema and Tieté 
River Paraná , 
Chile® 
River Maule . 
River Bio-Bio 
River Maipo . 
Colombia 
River Bogotá' 
River Cauca (as far as Buga, in-
cluding the Cauca Dagda project) 
Costa Rica® 
River Reventazón 

















































Lake Yojoa - Rio Lindo . . . . 0.17 42.0 
Mexico 
River Balsas' 1.6 10.6 
Rivers Lerma-Chapala-Santiago' . 1.83 12.2 
River Papaloapán"" 0.89 5.9 
Nicaragua" 
Rivers Tuma-Matagalpa-Viejo . . 0.13 32.5 
Panama" 
River Chiriqui 0.2 22.2 
Paraguay" 
River Acaray-Monday 0.35 11.3 
Peru' 
Rio Santa 1.00 15.4 
Uruguay"" 
Rio Negro 0.49 40.8 
Venezuela' 




River Surinam' 0.2 13.3 
Water and Electric Energy. Economically-utilizable potential, study by G. A. Mazza, 1958. 
Department of Water and Electricity. 
San Francisco Valley Commission, A Valerigao do Vale do Sao Francisco, 1957. (Regulated by the Tres Marías reservoir.) 
Brazilian National Committee, World Power Conference, Electric power in Brazil 1960, (regulated by the Furnas reservoir). The 
capacity of this basin differs from that assigned to it in the country estimate. Some estimates place the river potential as high as 10 
million kW. _ 
Plan de electrificación del pais, op. cit. Economic potential. 
Data supplied by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute. 
Estimate by i. Rittershaussen (TAOK 
La investigación de recursos hidráulicos, op. cit. 
Investigación preliminar y parcial de los recursos hidroeléctricos, op. cit. 
Estimate based on power stations in operation and established projects. 
C. Lara Beautell, La industria de energía eléctrica. Economic potential. 
Papaloapán Commission, Department of Hydraulic Resources, Econornia del Papaloapán. 
Plan de electrificación nacional e investigación de los recursos hidroeléctricos, op. cit. 
Proyecto de recursos hidráulicos y electrificación del SCIFE, op. cit. 
Direct information Supplied by the National Electricity Administration. 
S. Antúnez de Mayolo, Plan de instalaciones hidroeléctricas de la Corporación Peruana del Santa en el Valle del Río Santa en el 
Perú, 1949. 
El potencial hidroeléctrico en nuestro país, op. cit. 
Study of water resources in Venezuela, op. cit. Economic potential. 
Appraisal survey of hydro-electric power resources in Surinam, op. cit. 
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3. IRREGULARITIES OF STREAM FLOW BY COUNTRIES 
There is no information to indicate that extensive regional 
maps or studies have been undertaken on the irregularities 
of stream flow in Latin America. 
In order to obtain some idea of the degree of over-all 
stream flow irregularity in each country, particularly for 
purposes of comparison, the relation between the potentials 
estimated by the United States Geclogical Survey on the 
basis of ordinary minimum flow and on that of mean flow 
should be studied. Due consideration should be given to 
the fact that the storage works set up so far are generally 
unimportant as far as nation-wide regulation is concerned; 
the most significant work in this respect having been done 
by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.^* The relevant figures 
are given in table 11. 
Chile and Paraguay appear to have the most regular 
stream flows, the most irregular being found in Brazil, Co-
lombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The near-uniformity of 
the irregularities recorded for Mexico and the other Cen-
tral American countries contrasts with the situation in the 
remaining countries of the region, and seems to bear out 
.the author's own observation that Latin American estimates 
are more inaccurate than those for developed areas because 
of the scarcity of basic data. In view of the difficulty oí 
determining ordinary minimum flow from data that deal 
"almost exclusively with rainfall, as stated before, it seems 
only reasonable to place less dependence on estimates of 
potential that are based on Q 95 per cent. 
In any case it is obvious that more information is re-
quired on rainfall and stream flow and that the existing 
data should be processed more satisfactorily, by means of 
a systematic research on hydro-electric potentials. 
Whenever studies evaluating hydro-electric potential by 
countries or basins are carried out, the relevant maps should 
also be prepared on flow irregularities during the hydro-
logical year under consideration. 
Flow coefficients have been calculated for a rather limited 
number of rivers in the studies by the ECLA/BTAO/WMO 
Water Resources Survey Group on Chile and Venezuela.^^ 
In the case of Chile, it was thought worthwhile to make 
a quantitative evaluation of the variation in irregularity 
of the rivers flowing from north to south. Its qualitative 
aspects are already well-known, because of both the lon-
gitudinal variation in the rainfall régime and the accumu-
lative action of snow in the Cordillera as a storer of large 
volumes of water which varies according to latitude. 
This estimate is based on a different concept from that of the 
recommended coefficient of irregularity Cr. 
Los recursos hidráulicos de Chile (E/CN.12/501/Add.l), 
United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 60.II.G.4, and Water Re-
sources in Venezuela (E/CN.12/593). 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN POTENTIALS 
BASED ON ORDINARY MINIMUM FLOW AND 
POTENTIALS BASED ON MEAN FLOW 
Table 12 
CHILE: DEGREE OF IRREGULARITY IN THE FLOW OF 
SELECTED RIVERS IN A HYDROLOGICAL YEAR 
Argentina . . . . 0.14 Mexico 0.19 
Bolivia 0.12 Nicaragua . . . . 0.18 
Brazil 0.08 Panama 0.18 
Chile 0.28 Paraguay 0.28 
Colombia . . . . 0.05 Peru 0.12 
Costa Rica . . . 0.18 Uruguay 0.13 
Ecuador . . . . 0.06 Venezuela . . . . 0.09 
El Salvador . . . 0.20 British Guiana . . 0.18 
Guatemala . . . 0.18 West Indies . . . 0.13 
Honduras . . . 0.18 
River River gauge Latitude (approximate) Cr 
Carmen Ramadillas 28''47' 0.10 
(Huasco) 
Claro Rivadavia 30° 0.11 
(Elqui) 
Choapa Cuncumén s r s s ' 0.34 
Maipo La Obra 33°35' 0.25 
Tinguiririca Bajo Briones 34°44' 0.24 
(Rapel) 
Achibueno Los Peñones SS-SS' 0.23 
(Maule) 
Maule Afluentes de Lagu-
na de La Inver-
nada 
34°48' 0.20 
Laja Afluentes del Lago 37-22' 0.18 
(Bío-Bío) Laja 
Allipén Los Laureles 38°57' 0.16 
(Toltén) 
Pilmaiquén El Salto 40°37' 0.15 
(Bueno) 
Maullin Llanquihue 41 "13' 0.10 
Puelo Carrera de Basilio 41-37' 0.09 
SOURCE: LOS recursos hidráulicos de Chile, op. cit. 
The coefficients for the different rivers were calculated 
at what may be regarded as transitional points between the 
Cordillera of the Andes proper and the flat area or lon-
gitudinal valley. The results are given in table 12. 
In the case of Venezuela, it was also important to show 
in quantitative terms the marked irregularity of flow of its 
rivers (with the exception of the Motatán), which seriously 
affects their utilization and reflects the seasonal distribution 
of rainfall; the Guarinco, for example, which registers the 
Table 13 
V E N E Z U E L A : I R R E G U L A R I T Y C O E F F I C I E N T S O F T H E 
R I V E R S I N T H E L L A N O S A N D T H E R I V E R M O T A T A N 
Approximate 
River Station irregularity 
coefficient' 
Guárico Puente Carretera El Sombrero 0.45 
Pao Paso La Balsa 0.36 
Tinaco Puente Carretera Tinaco-El Pao 0.38 
Tirgua Paso Viboral 0.21 
Cojedes Puente Carretera San Carlos-Aca-
rigua 0.23 
Agua Blanca Puente Carretera San Carlos-Aca-
rigua 0.28 
Acarigua Puente Carretera Acarigua-Gua-
nare 0.31 
Guadie Puente Carretera Acarigua-Gua-
nare 0.32 
Baconó Peña Larga 0.25 
Masparro Puente Carretera Guanare-Barinas 0.27 
Santo Domingo El Curay 0.25 
Uribante Puente Colgante 0.23 
Motatán 0.13 
SOURCE: Ministry of Public Works, Resumen de Datos Hidra-
métricos 1940-59 (Summary of Hydrometric Data 1940-59), Ca-
racas, 1960 (taken from the ECLA/TAO/WMO study, in draft 
form, on the water resources of Venezuela. 
" Calculated on the basis of the mean hydrological year and of 
monthly mean figures only. 
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Map 1-2 
ARGENTINA: IRREGULARITY OF FLOW OF RIVERS 
Equal index lines (provisional tracing) 
+ + + + International border 
(See text for definition) 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' J ' 
T^ SF ^ ^ 
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NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. 
Table 14 
INSTALLED HYDRO-ELECTRIC CAPACITY IN 1958 IN 





Latin America . . 
United States . . 
Western Europe . 
Eastern Europe . 
Other developed 
countries . . . . 
















SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by United States 
Department of the Interior, Geological Survey Circular 367, with 
respect to hydro-electric potentials; direct information for in-
stalled capacity in Latin America; and United Nations, Sta-
tistical Yearbook 1960, for the rest of the world. 
highest coeflBcient, has a wet season of only 5 months (see 
table 13). 
. By way of a sample of the methodology used, a map of 
Argentina was veiy provisionally constructed on the basis 
of the index cited (see map 1-2). 
In the Cordillera, owing to the regulatory action of the 
'tenow on the high summits, curves with a low index of 
irregularity are recorded, especially between 26 and 32 
degrees of latitude. This phenomenon probably extends 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA:» UTILIZATION OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC 
POTENTIAL IN 1958 




of kW economic 
potential 
Argentina 290 2.3 
Bolivia 85 3.2 
Brazil 3 316 11.1 
- Chile 594 2.8 
Colombia 489 1.2 
79 5.3 
Cuba 4 ... 
Dominican Republic . — — 
Ecuador 37 1.8 
El Salvador 56 6.2 
Guatemala 28 14.0 
Haiti — — 
Honduras 3 0.8 
1197 8.0 
Nicaragua 10 2.5 
Panama*" 52 5.8 
Paraguay — — 
Peru 440 6.8 
Uruguay 128 10.7 
Venezuela 159 1.0 
British Guiana . . . . — — 
Surinam — — 
West Indies 13 
Regional total" . . . 6 967 4.5 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information and miscel-
laneous publications. 
» Excluding in the second column, the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, British Guiana and the West Indies, for want of data 
on economic potentials. 
" Including the Canal Zone. 
Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: UTILIZATION OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC 
POTENTIAL IN THE CASE OF SELECTED RIVER 
BASINS (1959) 
Installed hydro-electric capacity 
Country, 
basin or 








Rio Negro 12 
Córdoba System . . . . 100 
Bolivia 
River Corani — 
Brazil 
River San Francisco . . 198 
River Jacui 77 
Rio Grande 105 
River Uruguay . . . . 7 
River Paraiva 664 
River Tiete 876 
Chile 
River Maule 102 
River Bio-Bio 136 
River Maipo 118 
Colombia 
River Bogota 128 
River Cauca (as far as 
Buga) 18 
Costa Rica 
River Reventazón . . . 5 
River Grande de Tarcoles 62 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic — 
Ecuador 
River Mira 3 
River Esmeraldas . . . 16 
El Salvador 
River Lempa 45 
Guatemala 
River Michatoga . . . 12 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Yojoa-Rio Lindo . . . — 
Mexico 




Rio Viejo — 
Panama 
River Chiriqui . . . . 6 
Paraguay 
Peru 




River Caroni 150 
British Guiana — 
Surinam 
River Surinam . . . . 






















SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information and miscel-
laneous publications. 
" The installation of 300 MW was completed by 1961. 
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farther south, but .the map does not show it for the simple 
reason that very few of the data required for tracing the 
relevant curves were available. Around the Rivers Paraná 
and Uruguay, the low irregularity coefficient curves mainly 
reflect the regularizing influence of the magnitude and 
diversification of the river systems in the tributary basins 
concerned (particularly in Brazilian and Paraguayan ter-
ritory), and also, although on a lesser scale, the uniformity 
of the rainfall régimes in the areas lying between the two 
rivers and in the provinces of Santa Fe and El Chaco. 
Conversely, for the Jujuy, Salta, Tucumán and other 
neighbouring areas curves with a high index of irregularity 
are registered, in consequence of fluvial characteristics 
which vary during the course of the hydrological year, of 
undiversified tributary characteristics. 
4 . PRESENT DEVELOPMENT 
Table 14 enables a comparison to be drawn, although only 
approximately, between the proportions of hydro-electric 
resources developed by different regions, on the basis 
adopted for the construction of the table. 
The table indicates that Latin America has developed 
only a very small proportion of its potential, since the per-
centage in question would amount to no more than one-
fifth of the world average and to about one thirty-seventh 
and one twenty-ninth of the relative utilization figures for 
Western Europe and the United States. 
An analysis of the degree of development by countries, 
on the basis of the estimated economic potentiM, appears 
in table 15. 
For the region as a whole, the utilization referred to 
above is 4.5 per cent. The countries showing the highest 
relative development figures are Guatemala, Uruguay, Me-
xico and Brazil, with 14.0, 11.1, 10.7, and 8.0 per cent 
respectively. 
Guatemala appears with a high percentage, not because 
it has developed its resources to an exceptional extent in 
relation to other countries, but because the rated potential 
would seem to be under-estimated inasmuch as only part of 
the country's river system has been taken into account. 
Obviously, in general terms, all the Latin American 
countries are still a very long way from utilizing their 
hydro-electric resources in the same proportion as other 
more developed countries. In the United States, the propor-
tion of utilization in 1959, calculated on bases similar to 
those adopted here, was over 24 per cent.^ ® Similarly, for 
Switzerland, France and Austria the corresponding propor-
tions were, in the same year, 17.7, 14.6 and 8.5 per cent 
respectively.^' 
Nevertheless, if the resources situated near the large 
population centres or the areas of most intensive industrial 
activity in each country are studied individually, it be-
comes evident that there are some which are already 
fairly well developed, especially in comparison with the 
corresponding national averages. Among the cases for 
which information is available, special mention may be 
made of the Rio Grande de Tárcoles (Costa Rica), with 
nearly 40 per cent of its potential now utilized, the Cór-
doba system (Argentina), with over 35 per cent, the Balsas 
Select Committee on National Water Resources, United States 
Senate, Water Resources Activities in the United States, Print No. 
10 (estimates prepared by the Federal Power Commission). 
" Information supplied by ECLA, on the basis of data given in 
The electric power situation in Europe in 1958-59 and its prospects 
(ST/ECE/EP/2) and Hydroelectric potential in Europe and its 
gross, technical and economic limits (E/ECEVEP/lSl). 
(Mexico), with 28 per cent, the Rio Negro (Uruguay), 
with more than 25 per cent (1958)^® and the Maipo 
(Chile), with almost 20 per cent (see tableló). 
Of the estimated potential of the Rivers Bogotá (Colom-
bia) , Lerma-Chapala-Santiago (Mexico) and Esmeraldas 
(Ecuador), 13, 11 and 10 per cent respectively is utilized. 
In Brazil, a high proportion of the Rivers Paraiba and 
Tieté is already being utilized. The former has an in-
stalled capacity of 664 mW and the latter of 876 mW. 
5 . DEVELOPMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Approximately 45 per cent of thé aggregate capacity of 
those hydro-electric power plants for the public service 
which were in operation in Latin America in 1959 and on 
which data are available was contributed by plants of 
the run-of-river type, and the rest by hydro storage plants 
(see table 17). The proportion of power produced by 
the former was 36 per cent. In most countries—the excep-
tions being Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and, on a smaller scale. El Salvador which in 
the year in question had a larger proportion of hydro-
electric capacity in a storage reservoir—run-of-river^ 
hydro plants were predominant. In fact, for many years' 
the general tendency was to develop hydraulic resources 
of the Cordillera type—small flows and relatively high 
heads, without regulation. Plants were projected for mini-^ 
mum river flows frequently available for more than 95 
per cent of the time. This is the type of plant for which 
investment requirements are proportionally smallest, but it 
implies very low percentages of development of natural 
resources. Later, in response to the simuhaneous pressure 
of increased demand for electricity and of agricultural 
and drinking-water requirements, large regulation works 
began to be constructed with a view to more rational, 
and usually multiple-purpose, water utilization. At the 
present time, in almost all the countries of the region, the 
idea is gaining ground that no hydraulic project should 
be put into execution without prior study of the optimum 
use of water in the widest interests of the public, due 
consideration being simultaneously given to the needs and 
possibilities for irrigation, drinking-water, flood control, 
navigation, etc., with the production of electric energy, 
generally speaking, as the economic-financial basis for 
any and every programme. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uru-
guay in particular afl'ord good examples of this policy. 
There can be no doubt that the contribution of hydro 
storage plants to the production of hydro-electricity will 
gradually increase in all the Latin American countries, 
along with the concurrent tendency to make more use of 
them for producing energy during peak-load hours (low 
plant factor) in systems fed simultaneously by thermal 
electric plants and by difl'erent types of hydraulic plants 
(in so far as other water uses permit), as is the case in 
the majority of the more highly developed countries. 
In an extensive system fed by power stations of different 
types, it is desirable that the base load be served as far 
as possible by the run-of-river hydro plants (or by nuclear 
plants where these exist), with some help—as a rule sig-
nificant—from thermal power plants (those with the highest 
yields) and/or a few of the hydro storage plants. The 
upper part of the load curve is assigned to a considerable 
proportion (or all) of these last, with the support of gas 
With the Baygorria power station brought into service (1960), 
over 45 per cent of this river's potential is utilized. 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER 
STATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 1959 
I Run-of-river plants'" Storage plants Storage 
Capacity Energy Capacity Energy TmiVions 
Country (thousands (millions (thousands (millions ( I 'mi \ 
of kW) of kWh) of kW) of kWh) 
Argentina 88 KO" 202 500"^  484 
Bolivia 52 220 18 50 29 
Brazil" 1442 4 593 1580 11897 3 360 
Chile 242 1020 240 1 140 515» 
Colombia 198 860° 258 1 126*^  75 
Costa Rica . . . . 73 334 — — — 
Cuba 3 . . . — — — 
Dominican Republic — •— — — — 
Ecuador 31 135 — — — 
El Salvador . . . . 11 60 45 167 38 
Guatemala . . . . 28 106 — — 
Haiti — — — — — 
Honduras 3 12 — — — 
Mexico 427 2 040 706' 3 667 3170 
Nicaragua 1 3 — — — 
Panama® 6 16 — — •— 
Paraguay — — — — — 
Peru 68 165 166" 633" 159 
Uruguay — — 128 760' 600 
Venezuela 159 100' _ _ _ 
British Guiana . . — — — — — 
Surinam . . . . . . . . . 
West Indies . . . 13 85 
Regional total (ex-
cluding countries 
for which no data 
are given) . . . 2 842 9 889 3 343 20 080 8 430 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information and miscellaneous publications. 
" Without regulation of flow. 
" Ths kWh capacity of each storage plant was evaluated on the basis of the sum of the heads 
of all hydraulic power stations further down-stream operating in series. 
° Estimated energy. 
'* 1958: the following are the power stations with an appreciable degree of regulation which are 
taken into account: Nilo Pecanha, Pontes, Cubatao, Itupararanga, Peixoto, Bugres, Canastra, 
• Salto Grande, Americana and Itutinga. When the Tres Marías power station and reservoir 
(River San Francisco) enter operation, the capacity added will be 520 mW and the energy 
capacity stored will increase by 4000 million kWh, including the head of the Paulo Alfonso 
Power Station. 
" The useful storage capacity of the Abanico Power Station was in process of expansion. 
' Hydroelectric plants belonging to the Miguel Alemán System, the Temascal (Papaloapan) Power 
Station, the Necaxa System, Lerma and La Boquilla. 
" Excluding the Panama Canal Company's power station for want of production data. 
" Power stations connected with the natural reservoirs in the upper basin of the Sía. Eulalia. 
(Part of the discharge utilized is run-of-river, from the River Rimac.) 
' The figures are for 1958 because production in 1959 was seriously affected by floods. 
The 150 mW installed at Macagua (Caroní) had no load. 
turbines (where these exist). The intermediate section— 
reduced to a minimum by the operation of the types of 
plant enumerated—is allocated to the thermal plants with 
lower yields. In every case, of course, there are many 
factors that must be considered in this regard. For exam-
ple, the other uses to which the water is simultaneously 
put (irrigation, navigation, etc.) may make it necessary 
to manage the reservoirs on lines different from those 
dictated by energy considerations alone. Again, run-of-
river hydro plants with little regulation are common, and 
should be operated so as to distribute their capacity be-
tween base-load and peak-load, etc. 
Today it can be asserted that all the plants of any 
importance now being constructed, projected and pro-
grammed in Latin America include regulation works. 
As far as can be judged from the available data, reser-
voir capacity throughout the region (in 1959) amounted 
to approximately 28 per cent of the energy produced by 
the hydro power plants and about 42 per cent of that 
produced by hydro storage plants.^® 
Brazil (Sao Paulo-Cubato, Rio de Janeiro-Fontes and 
Nilo Peganha-Peixoto Systems), Mexico (Miguel Alemán, 
Temaxcal, Necaxa, Lerma and La Boquilla Systems), 
Uruguay (Rio Negro), Argentina (Córdoba and Mendoza 
Systems) and Chile (Abanico and Cipreses Systems) are 
the countries whose storage capacity is proportionally big-
gest in relation to the energy produced (1959 figures) by 
the power plants concerned. 
Utilization of public service installations in 1959 can 
be studied, by countries, in table 18 (second column). In 
countries where the share of hydro-electricity in total 
installed capacity is large, combined utilization figures of 
See table 17, note 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: DEVELOPMENT OF INSTALLED HYDRO-ELECTRIC CAPACITY FOR 









1965 1970 Annual rate of increases 
Capacity Capacity of capacity 
(thousands (thousands 
of kW) of kW) 1959-65 1959-70 
Argentina 290 2 207 728 2 578 16.6 22.0 
70 3 857 130 ... 10.9 . . é 
Brazil 3 097 5 447 , 5 792 11.0 • • • 
Chile 482 4 477 985 1489 12.6 10.8 
458 4 640 1141 1799 16.3 13.2 
Costa Rica . . . . 73 4 514 135 , , , 10.8 
Cuba 3 3 500 
Dominican Republic — ... 
Ecuador 31 4355 101 21.7 
El Salvador . . . . 56 4 054 96 9.4 
Guatemala . . . . 28 3 786 98 23.2 
Haiti 
Honduras 3 4 000 
Mexico 1133 5 037 2 556* 17.7 
Nicaragua . . . . 1 3 000 » . . 
Panama'' 6 3 200 . . » 
— — 4 . . 
Peru 234 3 333 859 1419 24.2 17.8 
Uruguay 128 5 938' 233 933 10.5 19.8 
Venezuela 159 3 943" 350 4350 14.1 35.0 
British Guiana . . — — • • • 
Surinam 16" 
West Indies . . . . 'Í3 6 6Í5 
Regional total (ex-
cluding countries 
for which no data 
are given) . . . 6185 4 800 13 220 12 568 12.5 19.6 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of direct information and miscellaneous publications. 
• Up to 1964. Compañía Federal de Electricidad (C.F.E.) programme. 
•• Excluding the Panama Canal Company's power stations, for want of production data. 
' The figure given represents the maximum capacity freely available for the public service at 
the 150 mw power station which is being constructed by the Surinam Aluminium Company 
(SURALCO) under an agreement with the Queen of the Netherlands represented by the 
Government of Surinam. 
" The figure is for 1958 because the Macagua (Caroní) plant had no load in 1959. 
See table 17, note 
more than 5,000 hours are found, and the annual average 
for Latin America exceeds 4,800 hours. The region's most 
important electricity systems (but for a few exceptions, 
outstanding among which are Buenos Aires, Caracas, 
Havana, Guayaquil and Asunción) operate with hydro 
base power plants whose installed capacity is generally 
characterized by a high degree of hydrologic reliability. 
In smaller systems the base load is often served by run-
of-river hydro plants, diesel groups being available to 
cover the increase in demand at peak load hours and to 
meet emergencies. 
The low utilization of Argentina's hydro power plants 
is partly attributable to the peak role assigned to some of 
the hydro storage plants, and partly reflects the lack 
of supplementary works at specific power plants in the 
provinces of Mendoza and Córdoba.'® 
The information available is insu£&cient for an analysis 
of plants in service or under construction in respect of 
degree or type of regulation (daily, weekly, seasonal, 
annual etc), head, age of installations, etc. 
The foregoing remarks relate solely to hydro power 
For "Los Molinos I", which has an average of only 2,600 
hours of utilization, the construction of the Anizácate dyke is under 
study. Similarly, a compesating reservoir would seem to be needed 
at the San Roque dyke power plant. 
plants for the public service. In the case of self-generation 
or, in other words, private supply services, thermal power 
plants generally predominate (petroleum, sugar, manu-
facturing and miscellaneous industries, etc), although 
there are countries where substantial use is made of 
hydraulic plants in the mining of metals (Peru, Bolivia). 
The proportion of total self-generation represented by 
hydro-electric production is approximately 35 per cent. 
6 . DEVELOMENTS PROJECTED 
Several countries have official programmes for the expan-
sion of the public service systems; in others, the leading 
enterprises have drawn up their own development pro-
grammes. In both cases there are some divergencies be-
tween the goals established and the progress actually 
achieved in the various works projected for different 
dates. The relevant data, unadjusted, constituted the basis 
for the last four columns of table 18, which presents pro-
jections of hydro-electric capacity for the public service 
for the years 1965 and 1970, together with the correspon-
ing annual rates of cumulative growth for the periods 
1959-65 and 1959-70. 
The 13 countries for which data up to 1965 are avail-
able will probably install, in the aggregate, 7.0 million 
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hydro-electric kW during the period 1959-65, which gives 
a cumulative annual rate of 12.5 per cent. Similarly, the 
programmes of the six countries for which data up to 
1970 are to hand represent, in the aggregate, the installa-
tion of 10.8 million kW during the period 1959-70. This 
implies a cumulative annual growth rate of 19.4 per cent. 
Both estimates clearly reveal the importance of hydro-
electric development in the region during the next few 
years. Up to 1965, the largest absolute increments would 
seem to be those planned by Brazil and Mexico,®^ (2.70 
and 1.48 million kW respectively), Colombia, Peru, Chile 
and Argentina following with 0.68, 0.63, 0.50 and 0.44 
million kW respectively. Up to 1970, Venezuela and Ar-
gentina, which are projecting 4.2 and 2.3 million kW, are 
outstanding among the countries with known programmes. 
C. F. E. programmes only. 
The highest rates of growth registered in the period 
1959-65, which easily exceed the regional average, are 
those recorded by Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala and Ecua-
dor (24.2, 23.2 and 21.7 per cent respectively). Also very 
significant are the corresponding figures for Mexico,®^ 
Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela (17.7, 16.6, 16.3, and 
14.1 per cent respectively). 
For the period 1959-70, the most striking rates are those 
of 35.0 and 22.0 per cent estimated for Venezuela and 
Argentina. 
Generally speaking, larger increments are contemplated 
for hydraulic capacity than for thermal capacity in almost 
all the Latin American countr ies/ ' 
Ibid. 
ECLA, The electric power industry in Latin America Present 
status and recent development op. cit. 
III. ANALYSIS OF WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
i n view of the fundamental importance of the various uses 
of water for the life and development of nations, it seems 
worth while to recall once more the vital significance at-
iaching to research on water resources as a prerequisite 
for achieving, through their use, the greater welfare of the 
community. 
It is common knowledge that an essential requisite for 
the study of any hydraulic project and for the designing 
of the constructions involved is the availability of the 
relevant hydrological information, which must fulfil two 
basic conditions; the data must be characterized firstly 
by accuracy and secondly by continuity over a sufficiently 
lengthy period. 
Prevention of flood catastrophes and avoidance of the 
over-designing of structures which raises construction 
costs, as well as the more efficient operation of all hy-
draulic works, constitute the rewards that more than 
compensate for the proper collection, processing and analy-
* sis of hydrological and hydrometeorological statistics. 
Moreover, such work represents only a small fraction of 
the investment—usually substantial—required for hy-
" draulic constructions. 
Although the production of energy is not the primary 
purpose for which water is used, the magnitude of Latin 
America's hydro-electric resources—which can be divined 
from the statistics presented earlier—in conjunction with 
the outstanding contribution they already make to the 
supply of electricity in many countries, would alone suffice 
to justify a detailed analysis of the medium available for 
ascertaining the distribution and characteristics of water 
sources throughout the region, as a preliminary to any 
attempt at the integrated evaluation of such resources and 
the programming of their development. 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council, in 
a resolution adopted on 24 August 1954, had recom-
mended that Governments and the appropriate specialized 
agencies should "give particular attention to the assembly 
of hydrological data",'^ an activity which was undertaken 
by the United Nations Energy and Water Resources Pro-
gramme. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Official Records: 
Eighteenth Session. Resolutions (E/2654), resolution 533 (XVIIl) 
(International co-operation with respect to water resource develop-
ment). 
ECLA, at its sixth session, in resolution 99 (VI) , re-
commended to the secretariat that it should evaluate such 
data with the aim of determining potential and optimum 
development of resources, and at the Commission's eighth 
session, in resolution 166 (VII I ) , this recommendation 
was endorsed and reaffirmed. A joint ECLA/BTAO/ 
WMO working group is making detailed country studies 
of water resources and their development. 
Given the limitations inherent in such a study, the 
magnitude of the problem, which involves investigation 
of the quantity and quality of hydrological data in Latin 
America (number of stations and length of time covered 
by the records), is too great for anything but a general 
panoramic view of it to be obtained. Nevertheless, the 
following points may be brought out: 
(a) In several countries a basis exists for making—or 
at least beginning to make—an evaluation of theoretical 
potentials (discussed in section I of this article), in order 
to obtain more reliable data on the region's hydro-electric 
resources and their geographical distribution; 
(b) Although various local shades of difference can 
be recognized within each country and from one country 
to another, the over-all picture of the media for research 
on water resources is not very satisfactory; 
(c) The importance of hydrological data for the pro-
jecting and operation of hydraulic works has not been 
fully grasped by the appropriate authorities, who ap-
parently do not always give adequate support to the in-
stitutions responsible for such measurements; 
(d) The fact that the shortage of data is greater in 
the case of river stages and flows than in that of rainfall 
suggests that for the moment evaluations must be pri-
marily based on precipitation data. It also indicates that 
in the expansion of networks of hydrological and hydro-
meteorological stations priority should be given to those 
of the former which offer possibilities of correlation, 
within a few years' time, with the precipitation stations 
already in operation, whose records of ovservations are 
continuous and cover a long period. 
In the following paragraphs the situation in Latin 
America will be rapidly reviewed, although with the pro-
viso that the lack of basic information in certain countries 
and the availability of only partial data in others may have 
resulted in the accidental inclusion of some figures which 
are not strictly in line with the facts. The numerical data 
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Table 23 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : N U M B E R O F R A I N G A U G E S , F L O W M E T E R S A N D E V A P O R I M E T E R S I N S E R V I C E 


















Argentina (1959) 2 778 412 7 3 613 769 537' 5174 110 
Bolivia (1959) 1098 581 3 200" 5 493 67 16 397 1 
Brazil (1959) 8 513 844 7 2 577 3 304 1287° 6 615 
Chile (1959) 741 767 10 479 1549 260 2 853 19 
Colombia (1959) 1138 355 12 510" 2 232 197"* 5 778 8 
Costa Rica . . . . (1958) 50 900 21 128 398 15 3 393 4 
Cuba (1958) 114 524 56 188' 609 26" 4405 
Dominican 
Republic . . . . (1958) 48 734 57 208" 234 10" 4 873 
Ecuador (1958) 263 206 15 86' 3 061 18» 14 623 
El Salvador . . . . (1959) 20000 122 95" 211 41" 488 "8" 
Guatemala (1958) 108 889 33 149" 731 8° 13 611 7 
Haiti (1958) 27 750 123 100' 278 29» 957 2 
Honduras (1958) 112 088 16 62" 1808 40" 2 802 
Mexico (1958) 1 969 269 16 2 035' 1064 965' 2 041 535 
Nicaragua (1958) 148 000 9 60' 2 467 16' 9 250 7 
Panama (including 
the Canal Zone). (1959) 75 902 14 112" 678 47" 1615 6 
Paraguay 406 752 4 . . . . . < ... 
Peru (1959) 1 285 215 8 127 10 100' 90 14 3ÓÓ 35 
Uruguay (1959) 186 926 14 547" 342 . . . 
Venezuela (1959) 912 050 7 1016° 898 248° 3 678 143 
British Guiana. . . 214 971 2 . . « . . . ... 
Surinam (1959) 142 822 2 60° 2 380 — — — 
West Indies . . . . 16 552 146 ... ... 
SOURCES: ECLA, on the basis of direct official information (in the shape of replies to the relevant questionnaire) and miscellaneous 
publications (see notes on individual countries). 
NOTE: The sources of information acknowledged in connexion with this first table on the present subject, as well as the years (shown 
in parenthesis) up to which data have been taken into account, are valid for the remaining tables. The areas adopted are those given 
in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1959. 
• National Department of Port Facilities and Navigable Waterways (Dirección Nacional de Construcciones Portuarias y Vías Navega-
bles), Agua y Energía Eléctrica (1959) and Anuario Hidrográfico 1948-50. 
" R. Schriieder, Sugerencias para la organización de un servicio meteorológico e hidrológico adecuado para las necesidades de Bolivia 
(1960), a joint ECLA/TAO/WMO study in course of preparation. 
" Belonging mainly to the Water Deparment of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Direct information supplemented with the data provided by the Pan American Institute of Geography and History of the Organiza-
tion of American States, Estudios sobre Recursos Naturales en las Americas, Mexico 1953, Vol. II, Project 29. 
" Ibid. 
' R. Schroeder, Study of water resources in Ecuador, Present state of hydrometeorology (1959), a joint ECLA/TAO/WMO study in 
draft form. (Four stations in the Galápagos Islands are not included.) 
® Charles G. Hawes, Report on water resources in Ecuador, a joint ECLA/TAO/WMO study in draft form (1959). 
Atilio Garcia Prieto, La investigación de recursos hidráulicos en El Salvador (CCE/SC.5/I/DT.12) ,1959. 
' Pan American Institute of Geography and History, op. cit.. Vol. IV; Water Resources Department, Lerma-Chapala-Santiago Study 
Commission, Boletín Hidrológico No 1: Ingeniería Hidráulica en México, February 1956; and Federal Electricity Commission, Bole-
tín Hidrológico No. 2: Cuenca Río Balsas. 
' Pan American Institute of Geography and History, op. cit.. Vol. I; National Energy Commission, Plan de Electrificación Nacional e 
Investigación de los Recursos Hidráulicos (CCE/SC.5/I/DT.1). 
" Pan American Institute of Geography and History, op. cit.. Vol. I; Inter-American Co-operative Economic Development Service (Ser-
vicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Fomento Económico—SCIFE), Proyecto de Recursos Hidráulicos y Electrificación, 1960. 
' The average figure for eight southern departaments is 4 486 km^ per rain gauge (see data quoted from a report by Robert Grace in 
Study of water resources in Venezuela, op. cit.). 
"State Electricity, Gas and Telephones (Usinas y Teléfonos del Estado—UTE) Memoria Descriptiva General del Rio Negro y de las 
Obras Hidroeléctricas construidas, 1959. 
° Ministry of Public Works, Resumen de Datos Hidrométricos 1940-59, and data supplied by the National Institute of Sanitary En-
gineering (Instituto Nacional de Obras Sanitarias—INOS) 
Bokopondo Bureau, Appraisal Survey of Hydro-electric Power in Surinam. 
given below should therefore be regarded merely as a first 
approximation to the analysis of the problem at regional 
level. 
2 . NUMBER OF RAIN GAUGES, FLOW METERS AND 
EVAPORIMETERS, BY COUNTRIES 
Of all the observations recorded in the field of hydrology, 
those relating to the measurement of precipitation are 
(together with volume of flow measurements) the most 
fundamentally important and, at the same time, the most 
widespread. The establishment of precipitation/run-ofF 
relationships makes it possible, when information on 
stream flow variations in a watercourse is inadequate, to 
estimate these on the basis of precipitation data, which, 
except in a very few cases, constitute the longest statistical 
series available in hydrometry. 
Several factors affect a country's ideal minimum density 
requirements in respect of rain gauges, the most important 
being the irregularity of the surface distribution of rain-
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fall, topographical characteristics and the purpose which 
the observations are intended to serve. 
Consequently, the area that a rain gauge can represen-
tatively cover varies widely; however, figures ranging 
from 100 to 1,000 km^ per rain gauge may be considered, 
on an average, to reflect satisfactory station densities for 
many purposes in various parts of the world^^® The highest 
densities correspond to mountainous districts where rain-
fall is more unevenly distributed than in the plains. 
As regards stream flow gauging stations, it may be 
considered desirable for there to be one at the confluence 
of every important tributary with the main water course, 
as well as at tappings feeding existing works and at eites 
where the construction of new plant is contemplated. De-
spite the foregoing suggestion that the ideal number of 
stream flow meters for a given basin is a function of the 
number of confluences of major water courses, by analogy 
with precipitation stations (although their significance is 
not the same) comparisons are often established on the 
basis of the average territorial area corresponding to each 
station^ ®® 
Notwithstanding the importance that is attributed to the 
- determination of evaporation by experiment in order to 
establish water balances in a basin or area, the simple 
methods in use (such as the tank or Piche evaporimeters 
^ and the Livingstone atmometer) do not exactly measure 
the natural process of evaporation, and are therefore re-
garded as only relative indicators of the phenomenon they 
attempt to assess. Consequently, rules for determining the 
optimum number of evaporimeters for a specific territorial 
area have not yet been laid down. 
Table 19 shows the total number of rain gauges, flow 
meters and evaporimeters in service in each of the Latin 
American countries. In the case of rain gauges and flow 
meters, the average area of mainland territory per in-
strument is also given. The figures for rain gauges include 
snow gauges, which are few in number and, according to 
the data available, are to be found only in a few localities 
high up in the Andean massif and, as a rule, far from 
the equator (the countries possessing the largest number 
' are Argentina, which has 88, and Chile, which has 24). 
Only in ten countries does the over-all average figure for 
the area per rain gauge fall below 1,000 km^. El Salvador, 
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay and Costa Rica 
show the most satisfactory averages (210,234, 280,340 
and 400 km^ per rain gauge, respectively). Cuba, Pana-
ma, Guatemala, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico are the 
other countries with better averages than those indicated. 
It may be noted that the countries of relatively small size 
which have a high population density and whose eco-
nomies are heavily dependent upon tropical crops (coffee, 
cacao, sugar-cane, etc.) are among the best equipped for 
these observations, Conversely, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil 
are those registering the largest average area per rain 
gauge (10,100, 5,500 and 3,300 km^, respectively) 
See ECAFE, Proceedings of the third regional technical con-
ference on water resources development in Asia and the Far East: 
Flood Control Series No. 13, United Nations Publications, Sales 
No.: 59.ri.F.2, Bangkok, 1958. 
See W. B. Langheim and W. G. Hoyt, Water Facts for the 
Nation's Future, New York, 1959, p. 63, for an account of varia-
tions in the United States from 6,500 km° per station in arid 
and sparsely populated States like Nevada to 1,700 km® per station 
in the more densely populated Eastern States, with their damper 
climate. 
" In Europe the average area per meteorological station is 192 
km® and in the United States 1,536 km®. See Rudolf Schroeder, 
Chile and Ecuador have each signed (1960) agreements 
with the United Nations Special Fund with a view to the 
expansion and improvement of their meteorological and 
hydrological networks on the basis of the studies carried 
out by the ECLA/BTAO/WMO Water Resources Survey 
Group in these two countries. The relevant programmes 
are already being put into effect. 
The data available are not sufficiently complete to allow 
of a detailed analysis of the proportion of rain recorders 
in the corresponding precipitation stations. According to 
the information to hand, the highest relationships would 
seem to be found in Panama, Colombia, El Salvador, Costa 
Rica and Brazil (42, 23, 20, 10 and 7 per cent respec-
tively). The additional data supplied by the automatic 
recording devices (continuous time-precipitation relation-
ships) and their greater reliability, together with the fact 
that rain recorders do not require constant supervision 
(and are therefore highly suitable for sites which are 
difficult of access or are cut off altogether at certain times 
of year) are so many more reasons for the use of an in-
creasing proportion of these instruments in Latin America, 
despite their heavier cost. 
As regards flow meters (see table 19), EI Salvador, 
Haiti, Panama, Mexico, Honduras and Chile are the best-
equipped countries, the respective areas per unit being 
490, 960, 1,620, 2,040, 2,800, and 2,850 km^ Costa Rica, 
Venezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Argentina 
follow with between with 3,390 and 5,170 km^ per flow 
meter. The available data indicate that the largest areas 
per stream flow gauging station are found in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Guatemala, where 16,400, 14,620, 
14,300 and 13,610 km^ per unit are registered.'® 
The information to hand is insufficient for a precise 
analysis, by countries, of those hydrological stations which 
measure only river stages, with no possibility of the data 
obtained being converted into terms of stream flows 
through discharge curves already or about to be es-
tablished. However, the statistics presented above relate 
only to stations designed for flow measurement purposes, 
except in the case of Argentina, where they include data 
referring to 200 stations operated by the National Depart-
ment of Port Facilities and Navigable Waterways (Direc-
Study of water resources in Venezuela. Present state of hydro-
meteorology (a joint ECLA/TAO/WMO study in draft form), 
which alludes to a quotation, in a report by Robert Grace, from 
H. Landsberg, Physical Climatology, Pennsylvania State College, 
1941. 
Further light is shed on the subject by a comparison with 
the similar situation prevailing in some of the countries of Asia 
and the Far East in 1955, as indicated in the following table: 
Total Number of Number of 
Country area in kM^ per km''per 
per km" sauge flow meter 
Burma 677 950 29 3 660 
Ceylon 65 610 131 137 224 
India 3 288 375 116 934 6 450 
Japan 369 813 241 83 138 
Republic of Korea . 93 634 230 2 340 1610 
Laos 237 000 6 59 300 47 500 
Federation of 
Malaya 131287 46 129 501 
Pakistan 944 824 87 1630 4180 
Philippines . . . . 299 404 74 1 450 1 310 
Thailand 514 000 39 1 280 2 940 
SOURCE: ECAFE, Proceedings of the third regional technical con-
ference on water resources development in Asia and the Far East, 
op. cit. 
97 
ción Nacional de Construcciones Portuarias y Vías Nave-
gables) solely for the registration of river stages for 
navigation purposes. The great majority of the flow meters 
consist of firm cross-stream sections (weirs, bridge cor-
ners, gauging frames and structures, aqueducts of re-
inforced concrete or masonry, etc.) fitted with simple 
scales (limnimeters) for reading the level of the water. 
The flows in question are computed by means of empirical 
formulae established on the basis of direct gauging, or 
specific relationship in hydraulic models. The number of 
cases in which scales are being replaced by automatic 
recorders (limnigraphs), which have advantages similar 
to those already pointed out in the case of rain recorders, 
is increasing in the various countries, but the relative 
share of these instruments in the total is still not very 
high. Thus, it was possible to establish that in the countries 
listed they accounted for the following percentages: Costa 
Rica, 100; Colombia, 25; El Salvador, 17; Argentina, 
13; and Ecuador, 6. In other countries, either data are 
lacking or the figures given are so low as to be of dubious 
value. 
Where evaporation stations in operation are concerned, 
Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina are quite outstanding, 
with 535,143, and 110 respectively. The corresponding 
figures for Peru, Chile and Colombia are, respectively, 
35, 19 and 8. Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti and Nicaragua also record observations of this type. 
Although in some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico, sediment transportation is 
measured in certain watercourses, the information ob-
tained was not sufficient for inclusion in the present study. 
3 . NUMBER OF RAIN GAUGES AND FLOW METERS, BY 
SELECTED BASINS AND SUB-BASINS 
In each individual country, of course, rain gauges and 
flow meters are very unevenly distributed, as can be seen 
from a comparison of table 19 with table 20. The latter 
Table 20 
LAI'IN AMERICA: EXISTING EQUIPMENT IN SOME OF THE BASINS AND SUB-BASINS 
WHERE RESEARCH IS MOST SATISFACTORY, BY COUNTRIES 
Rain gauges Flow meters 
Country, 














Córdoba System* . . 


















Desaguadero . . . . 
Brazil 
River Doce . . . . 
River Paranaiba . . 
Rio Grande . . . . 
River Uruguay . . . 
River San Francisco 





































River Maipo . . . . 












River Cauca (as iar 
as Manizales) . . . 
River Magdalena (as 












River Grande de Tér-
coles 












River Hanabanilla . 200 
Dominican Republic 
River Yaque del Nor-
te 7000 7 1000 
Ecuador 
River Guaillabamba 
(inter - Andean 
zone) . . . . . . 












River Lempa (as far 
as "5 de Noviem-
bre" power station) 6 540 40 164 21 311 
(Continued) 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Rain gauges Flow meters 
Country, 














Michatoga . . . . 







1 2 700 
Haiti 
Honduras 
River Ulúa . . . . 


























Lake Nicaragua and 
River San Juan . 29 000 27 1074 7 4143 
Panama 
River Chiriqui . . . 













River Rimac . . . 
River Mantaro (as far 
as Chinchihuasi 












69175 ... ... 12 5765 
Venezuela 
River Tuy 














SOURCE: See table 19. 
" Including Rivers Primero, Segundo, Tercero, Cuarto and Carcaraña. 
" Consisting of the upper basins (in Argentine territory) of the following rivers: Bermejo, as 
far as Elordi; Salado, as far as Suncho-Corral; and Dulce, as far as Santiago del Estero. 
' Belonging mainly to the water Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
shows the situation in some of the basins and sub-basins 
which are most thoroughly studied in each country, with 
respect to the average area covered by each rain gauge 
and flow meter in operation. 
As regards rainfall measurements, for example, the 
position of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil is worth noting. 
Although for their territories as a whole the largest aver-
age areas per station are indicated, the figures for speci-
fic basins are a good deal more favourable. In the basin 
of the Rimac River in Peru, 908 and 3,066 km^ per rain 
gauge are registered. The Titicaca-Desaguadero River 
basin, in Bolivia, shows 1,356 km^ per rain gauge, and 
for the basins of the Rio Grande and the Tieté River in 
Brazil, the corresponding figures are 891 and 947 km®, 
respectively. Similar observations apply to the other 
countries in respect of both precipitation and stream flow 
measurement. The other highly enlightening aspect of 
table 20 is that relating to the experience afforded by the 
Latin American countries—as to the area—in terms of 
broad averages for which a rain gauge or flow meter 
seems sufliciently representative, in basins where hydraulic 
works are in operation, under construction or projected. 
In most of the basins studied the equipment ascertained 
to exist implies an area of less than 1,000 km^ per rain 
gauge, and in the Cordillera and other mountainous dis-
tricts (see Chile, Colombia and Ecuador) this figure is 
reduced to some 500 km^ per rain gauge. As regards 
stream flow gauging (due allowance being made for the 
comparatively negligible significance attaching, as already 
pointed out, to indications of the area for which, on an 
average, one flow meter is considered adequate), between 
500 and 2,000 km® per station might be mentioned as 
common. ITiese statistics testify to the inadequacy of the 
media available for the collection of hydrological and 
hydrometeorological data in Latin America as a whole. 
4 . LENGTH OF RECORDS 
The flow of water in a river may vary a great deal year 
by year, from onn season of the year to another, and even 
at difl"erent times of day. Consequently, it is of the greatest 
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Table 21 
LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF STATIONS BY LENGTH OF RECORDS (NUMBER OF YEARS COVERED) 
Throughout the country In some of the basins where research is most satisfactory 
Country, 
basins or sub-basins 
Less than 
5 years 
6 to 15 
years 






6 to 15 
years 




Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre; 
Year dpi- Flow dpi- Flow dpi- Flow dpi- Flow 
tation tation tation tation 
Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre-
cipi- Flow cipi- Flow cipi- Flow cipi- Flow 
tation tation tation tation 
37 28 39 5 26 16 
— 1 85 5 91 16 61 7 
— — 115 59 121 15 84 5 
— — 6 1 12 3 14 — 
1 4 12 25 42 85 2 
11 11 32 4 14 
2 2 3 22 81 141 — 1 
33 19 7 23 13 76 — 
15 12 27 42 56 105 5 19 
1 — 14 16 16 21 — — 
8 2 14 5 12 5 12 3 
4 9 6 1 8 6 13 3 
10 15 27 22 7 1 3 
74 40 24 16 28 12 1 1 
10 3 7 1 4 1 




2 1 1 1 
1 1 2 
Argentina 
Rio Negro 
Córdoba System . . 
Northern zone" . . . 
Bolivia 
Lake T i t i c a c a-River 
Desaguadero . . . . 
Brazil 
River Doce . . . . 
River Paranaiba . . 
Rio Grande . . . . 
River Uruguay . . . 
River San Francisco 
River Tieté . . . . 
Chile 
River Maipo . . . . 
River BÍ0-BÍ0 . . . 
Colombia 
River Cauca (as far 
as Manizales . . . 
River Magdalena (as 
far as Honda) . . 
Costa Rica 
River Grande de Tár-
coles . . . . . . 
River Reventazón . . 
Cuba 
River Hanabanilla . 
Dominican Republic 




(inter - Andean 
zone) 
River Ambi . . . . 
(1959) — 1 1327* 271* 1330" 77 956 188 
(1959) 18 30 53 27 73* 10 56* -
(1959) 110 120 836» 360 
(1958) 
( 1 9 5 8 ) 53* 
737 1223" 70 
(1959) 61 72 230* 110" 92 68 96 10 
(1959) 282 132 122 49 79 14 27 1 





5 — 1 — 
El Salvador 
River Lempa (as fat 
as "5 de Noviem-
bre" Power station 
Guatemala 
Lake Amatitlán-River 
Michatoga . . . 
Lake Atitlán . . . 
Haití 
(1959 ) 34 40° 24 1 15 — 22 
Honduras 




Santiago. . . 
River Balsas . . 
Nicaragua 
Lake Nicaragua and 
River San Juan 
Panama 
River Chiriquí . . 
River Santa María 
Paraguay 
Peru 
River Rímac . . 
River Mantaro . 
Uruguay 
Río Negro . . . 
Venezuela 
River Tuy . . . 




(1958) _ _ 40 8 103 — 
(1958) 18 40 38 - 5 -
(1958) 25 14 — 21 — 
6 — 
1 — 
(1959) 170° 90° 754 451 520 359 407 
(1959) 37 36 28 4 18 — 29 
(1959 ) 22 32 84 23' 20 19 1 
(1959 . . . - . . . 5 . . . 1 


























9 — — — 











SOURCES: See table 19. 
NOTE: In the case of those countries for wich the only data available were supplied by the Pan American Institute of Geography and History of the Organization of American 
States, Estudios sobre recursos naturales en las Americas, op. cit., Vol. 11, is was estimated that the precipitation and stream gauging stations existing in 1953 and appearing 
in that publication were operating regularly in 1959. 
° Including estimates. 
" Consisting of the upper basins (in Argentine territory) of the following rivers: Bermejo, as far as Elordi; Salado, as far as Suncho-Corral; and Dulce, as far as Santiago 
del Estero. 
importance that continuous records of the flow be avail-
able, and that they should cover a long period, so that 
the mean monthly, seasonal or annual discharges that 
may be counted upon for a project can be ascertained 
with the requisite degree of accuracy. Moreover, the peak 
and minimum discharges corresponding to periods of 
flood and of drought may constitute the decisive condi-
tions for a project. For example, exceptionaly high dis-
charge figures, with frequencies as distant as 1 in 1,000 
or 1 in 2,000 years, are sometimes used to determine 
spillway dimensions for certain dams. As the high and 
low extremes occur too irregularly for these peak and 
minimum discharges to be established by extrapolation, 
the loss of one such opportunity of recording them can 
seriously a£Fect research work since it may mean that 
many years will pass before a similar situation recurs. 
It is for all these reasons that hydrological observations 
should be initiated long before the construction of works 
is begun. 
Serious catastrophes arising from dam failures have 
had their origin in the under-estimating of maximum flood 
discharges through lack of continuity in hydrologic re-
cords or unduly short statistical series. Again, substantial 
losses are caused by over-designing of works and inef-
ficient operation of projects, attributable to the same 
cause—inadequate hydrologic data whose chief deficiency 
is that the time covered by the record is too short. Latin 
America affords several examples of hydro-electric power 
stations constructed for over-estimated flows and therefore 
operating with low plant factors, while it must not be 
overlooked that the opposite situation also exists, and 
that the source is sometimes under-utilized because of 
lack of knowledge of the available flow. 
In various countries of the region hydrological stations 
can be found which were formerly installed as part of the 
permanent measurement network but have been closed 
down or dismantled before the completion of a hydrologi-
cal period that can be regarded as representative or en-
ables valid correlations to be established with other and 
longer series of rainfall or stresim flow records, so that 
the initial effort and work have been wasted. Such situa-
tions are often due to lack of funds for these activities, 
because their importance has not been fully grasped. 
When the data for this study were being collected, 
there were instances in which information was obtainable 
only up to the early 1950's.®® For the sake of uniformity 
with the majority of countries, for which data were avail-
able up to December 1959, the period of years covered 
by the records of the former group was prolonged on the 
hypothesis that the observations had been uninterrupted. 
This procedure meant that countries for which indirect 
and rather out-of-date information had been obtained, 
and which had installed rain gauges and flow meters two 
or three years prior to 1959, were probably credited with 
fewer sets of equipment than they actually possessed, but 
were not much affected as regards the length of their 
records. 
Table 21 presents a break-down of stations by the 
number of years their records cover, for each country as 
a whole and for selected examples of the better-known 
" This was principally true of the Central American countries 
and the West Indies, in whose case the want of direct information 
was supplied mainly by recourse to the report of the Pan American 
Institute of Geography and History of the Organization of Amer-
ican States, Estudios sobre Recursos Naturales en las Americas, 
Vol. N, Project 29, Mexico, 1953. 
basins. The table includes many estimates and must be 
regarded as highly provisional. Data on existing stocks 
and sites of rain gauges and flow meters were actually 
more complete than those relating to periods of operation 
and length of records. To round off the over-all picture 
and calculate the coverage coefilcient, estimates were 
made when these data were lacking, as far as possible on 
the basis of considerations relating to the creation of the 
institution owning the equipment or to the date of initia-
tion of its activities (railway stations, airports, etc.), and 
in the remaining instances by the arbitrary assignment of 
lengths of series in relation to those known of in the same 
country.*® 
The length of rainfall records is often considerable (or 
relatively so), owing to the fact that many instruments 
were installed by private institutions at the time of their 
foundation for purposes closely linked to their main acti-
vities (railway companies when their construction works 
were begun, crop and stock farming enterprises, airlines, 
etc.). 
TTie high proportion of precipitation stations with re-
cords covering many years in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, 
Bolivia and Chile, for example, is worth noting, and so,„ 
on the other hand, is the extensive but more recent action 
taken by certain oflicial agencies in countries like Colom-
bia and Venezuela. 
As regards stream gauging, Argentina, Brazil and Me-
xico can be seen to have begun recording observations on 
a large scale at an earlier date than the other countries 
of the region for which such data are available. Chile 
next, and then Colombia, afford evidence of more recently 
systematized activities on the part of the official bodies 
responsible for this work, and the same is true of the 
Central American countries. 
A similar analysis in respect of certain selected basins 
confirms the disparities in levels of research as between 
one such basin and another within the same country, and 
even among different rivers in the same basin or from 
one reach of a river to another, according to their distance 
and accessibility from the main population centres. 
5 . COVERAGE COEFFICIENT 
In order to assess the level of development of hydrtflogical 
research in a given basin or territory, the coverage index 
for rainfall measurements and stream gauging simul-
taneously takes into account the density of observation 
stations and the age of the pertinent records, since these 
two elements play independent roles. 
The index in question is determined by the product 
of two factors: the number of observation stations per 
10,000 km^ of the territory under study,^^ and the average 
age, in years, of the corresponding records. 
Table 22 enumerates these coefiicients by countries, for 
both precipitation and stream flow gauging stations. 
The countries in whose case this coefficient reflects the 
most thorough knowledge of precipitation conditions in 
" The classification into groups was based on the view that for 
the purposes of executing a final project of average importance 
records incorporating less than 5 years observations are in-
adequate. Records covering from 6 to 15 years might be used in 
certain special instances, but with reservations. Those in the 16-30 
years group may be taken as satisfactory in most cases, and those 
of over 30 years, highly satisfactory. 
In the present study it was felt preferable to consider the 
number of stations per 10,000 km", instead of per 1,000 km" as in 
the ECAFE report referred to above, since the station density 
figure was too low in some countries. 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMEMCA: COVERAGE COEFFICIENTS 
Precipitation records Stream gauging records 
Average Number of Average Number of 
Coimtry length stations Coeffi- length stations Coeffi-
of per 10000 cient of per 10000 cient 
records km' wy.(ii) records km» (iii)X(iv) 
W (ii) (Hi)'' (iv) 
Argentina 24.1 13.0 313.3 23.9 1.9 45.4 
Bolivia 19.8 1.9 37.6 7.0 0.7 4.9 
Brazü 26.6 3.0 79.8 17.9 1.5 26.9 
Chile 19.0 6.5 123.5 10.8 4.2 45.4 
Colombia 9.8 6.0 58.8 6.5 1.9 12.4 
Costa Rica . . . . 10.1 26.5 267.7 3.8 2.9 11.0 
Cuba 24.0 16.4 393.6 
Dominican Republic 20.8 42.7 888.2 2.1 
Ecuador 7.6 3.3 25.1 2.3 0.7 1.6 
El Salvador . . . . 16.1 47.5 764.8 2.6 20.5 53.3 
Guatemala . . . . 19.0 13.7 260.3 9.0 0.7 6.3 
Haiti 36.0 . . 10.5 
Honduras 8.6 5.5 47.3 2.7 3.6 9.7 
Mexico 26.0 11.5 299.0 10.4 9.3 96.7 
Nicaragua 26.0 4.1 106.6 13.0 1.1 14.3 
Panama'' 19.7 14.8 291.6 7.2 6.2 44.6 
Paraguay . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Peru 9.7 1.0 9.7 15.8 0.7 11.1 
Uruguay" • • • • • • • • • 31.0 0.7 21.7 
Venezuela 11.0 11.1 122.1 6.0 2.7 16.2 
British Guiana . . • • • ... • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Surinam « • • ... • . • « . 4 • > • • • • 
Trinidad and Tobago ... ... ... ... ... 
SOURCES: See table 19. 
NOTE: In calculating coverage coefficients, stations that had been closed down were taken into 
account along with those in existence, when the information available permitted. 
* In the case of stations for which no data on length of records were available, an estimated 
length was arbitrarily assigned on the basis oí the average lor other stations in the same 
coimtry. 
^ Including the Canal Zone. 
° The data available were confined exclusively to the stream gaugin stations on the Rio Negro. 
their territory are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
, Cuba, Argentina, Mexico and Panama, the respective 
figures being as follows: 888, 765, 393.6, 313, 299 and 
292, followed by Costa Rica and Guatemala. Chile, Vene-
zuela and Nicaragua would seem to occupy an inter-
mediate position, with coefficients of 124, 122 and 107 
respectively, while Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, 
Colombia and Brazil present the lowest coefficients. Atten-
tion should be drawn, in connexion with the coefficient 
under study, to the importance acquired in some cases by 
rain gauge density and in others by the average age of 
the records; Argentina, Cuba and Mexico register an 
intermediate rain-gauge density and a high age of re-
cords, whereas El Salvador and Costa Rica show a high 
rain-gauge density and intermediate age of records, while 
for Nicaragua, Brazil and Bolivia the station density is 
low and the number of years covered by the records high. 
Coverage coefficients for research on stream flows and 
river stages mark out Mexico, El Salvador, Argentina, 
Chile and Panama as the countries with the best know-
ledge of their territory in this respect, the relevant figures 
being 97 and 53, respectively, for the first two, and 45 
for the three last-named. In Argentina's case, if only 
those stream gauging stations which are operated for 
purpose of flow measurement are taken into account, the 
coefficient drops to 16. Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Nica-
ragua and Colombia appear in an intermediate position 
with 27, 22, 16, 14 and 12. The lowest coefficients are 
registered for Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Costa Rica and Peru, 
It should be noted that El Salvador shows the highest 
station density alongside, on the average, one of the 
shortest series of records; and, conversely, Argentina 
presents a low station density together with the greatest 
average length of records. 
Maps of Latin America showing, in broad outline, the 
precipitation and stream flow gauging coverage coefficients 
for selected areas are presented below (see maps II-l (a) 
and II-2 (b) ) . 
In studying these maps certain special circumstances 
must be borne in mind. 
There are arid zones in the continent where the low 
density of precipitation and stream gauging stations is 
justified. This applies to vast tracts such as the high 
plateaux of Mexico and the Chihuahua desert, the pen-
insula of Baja California (especially in its extreme north-
east), the arid belt along the coasts of Peru and northern 
Chile, the south-west of Bolivia and the north-west and 
south-east of Argentina. There are also smaller arid zones 
to the south of the Caribbean in Venezuela, Puerto Rico 
and Mexico (north-east Yucatán, besides Tehuantepee and 
the middle reaches of the River Balsas-Mexcala). A rather 
different state of affairs prevails in the "Polígono das Se-
cas" (in north-eastern Brazil), where the rainfall is 
characterized not only by a relatively low mean volume, 
but also, in the main, by great irregularity. Consequently, 
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Map II-l (a) 
APPROXIMATE REGIONAL VALUES OF THE PLUVIOMETRIC COVERAGE COEFFICIENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
1958-59 
(See text for definition) 
m > 5 0 0 
m 2 5 0 - 5 0 0 
100 - 250 
™ 5 0 - 100 
W 2 5 - 50 
k W S I < 2 5 
— ^ 
2/ 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
* Data unavailable. 
Map II-I (b) 
APPROXIMATE REGIONAL VALUES OF THE PLUVIOMETRIC COVERAGE COEFFICIENT 
IN SOUTH AMERICA 
1958-59 
fSee text for definition) 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. 
" Data unavailable. 
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Map II-2 (a) 
APPROXIMATE REGIONAL VALUES OF THE FLUVIOMETRIC COVERAGE COEFFICIENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
1958-59 
(See text for definition) 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map de not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
• Data unavailable. 
Map II-2 (b) 
APPROXIMATE REGIONAL VALUES OF THE FLUVIOMETRIC COVERAGE COEFTICIENT 
IN SOUTH AMERICA 
(See text for definition) 
•• >200 
N ® 100-200 
5 0 - 100 
MW 2 0 - 50 
« Í 10- 20 
< 10 
1 1 2/ 
NOTE: The boundaries shown on this map de not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. 
° Data unavailable 
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precipitation and stream gauging research is of great 
importance here for regulatory purposes, with a view to 
irrigation works. 
In the Amazonian jungle, vast unexplored areas and 
others that are scarcely inhabited show very low average 
population densities and therefore lack precipitation and 
stream gauging stations (States and districts of Rio Bran-
co, Amazonas, Pará, Mato Grosso, Acre and Guapré in 
Brazil, and the llanos of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Bolivia). 
Lastly, in the study of stream gauging programmes, 
the importance of linking them up with those relating 
to precipitation measurement should not be forgotten, 
since flow statistics can as a rule be greatly improved 
upon by means of satisfactory correlations with rainfall 
data. The central zones of Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Argentina and El Salvador, and the north-east of Brazil, 
are examples of other areas where more comprehensive 
flow data than might be supposed from the corresponding 
coverage coefficients could be obtained for specific studies, 
on the basis of the available precipitation data. 
A comparison with countries in other regions on the 
basis of coverage indices shows that as a whole the Latin 
American countries are ill-informed as to their water re-
sources. For example, in the group of more developed 
countries for which complete data are available, Japan 
has coverage coefficients 5 and 4 times greater than the 
highest country figures registered in Latin America for 
precipitation measurement and stream gauging, respecti-
vely (El Salvador and Mexico).''^ 
6 . AVAILABILITY OF CONTOUR MAPS 
It was not possible to establish, by countries, the avail-
ability of contour maps drawn to scales which would 
enable evaluation studies of integrated theoretical poten-
tials to be carried out.''^ 
Geographical institutes attached to the armed forces of 
various countries prepare maps and charts both by aero-
photogrammatic methods and by direct measurement, on 
scales which as a rule allow room for enough planimetrical 
and altimetrical detail (1:200,000; 1:250,000; 1:500,000; 
1:100,000,000, etc.) to serve the purposes mentioned above. 
Possibly, therefore, large areas in different countries 
already have at their disposal a sound cartographical 
To facilitate further comparisons, a table with the pertinent 
coverage coefficients for selected countries in Asia and the Far East 
is inserted here. 
Precipi- Stream gauging 
tation r Flow 
measure- , measure-
ment ment only 
Burma 77 . . . 
Ceylon 2 840 400 820 
India 535 32 18 
Japan 3 900 . . . 380 
Republic of Korea . . . 77 81 27 
Laos 1 8 
Federation of Malaya . 1550 240 57 
Pakistan 368 288 
Philippines 104 38 37 
Thailand 202 51 5 
SODRCE: ECAFE, Proceedings of the third regional technical con-
ference on water resources development in Asia and the Far East, 
op. cit. 
" 1:500,000 and above. Every country has maps on a reduced 
scale with level curves such as, for instance, those used for aerial 
navigation which are on a scale of 1: 1,000,000. 
basis on which at least to begin an integrated evaluation 
of their hydro-electric resources. 
7 . INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HYDROLOGICAL 
MEASUREMENTS 
In almost all countries there exists a series of fiscal in-
stitutions, public corporations and private agencies con-
cerned with hydrological (including hydrometeorological) 
observations and, in some cases, with the corresponding 
research. 
The public institutions which finance and carry out 
activities of this type include, besides the national me-
teorological services, all those relating to agriculture, 
navigation and waterways, drinking-water and sewage and 
aviation, as well as electricity companies, railways, the 
armed forces, universities, etc.; while the private institu-
tions comprise mainly electricity companies, those of an 
agricultural-industrial nature (coiFee, banana, sugar com-
panies, etc.), airlines and some mining enterprises. 
Unfortunately, the advantage taken of the activities to 
which numerous institutions contribute is proportionally 
only very small, owing to the lack of uniformity, co-ordina- ^  
tion and centralization of the observations recorded. A 
great many data benefit solely the company or institution 
taking the observations, and that only to a limited extent, 
while but a meagre proportion of them is published so " 
as to place them within the reach of the various interested 
persons or institutions. 
Co-ordination among the many institutions responsible 
in each country for hydrological observations is of par-
ticular importance for the following purposes: 
(a) Satisfactory planning and distribution of stations 
so as to obviate duplication in some places and 
gaps in others; 
(b) Standardization of instruments and methods so as 
to reduce costs and facilitate the comparison of 
findings; and 
(c) Processing and publication of the observation re-
corded. 
Thus, for the relatively small additional costs which 
such co-ordination would imply, the present yield from 
scattered and partly unrecognized activities could be 
greatly multiplied in many countries. 
It has been suggested in several countries that a Nation-
al-Co-ordinating Committee should be set up with juris-
diction over all hydrological and meteorological activities. 
This Committeee, in its turn, would form part of another 
national body empowered to co-ordinate all activities con-
nected with the development of hydraulic resources.^^ 
Table 23 lists the main institutions in each country that 
are active in one way or another in the field of hydrology. 
More undoubtedly exist (particularly of a private nature) 
than the number given in the table. 
There is some co-ordination of functions in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, 
but it varies in scope and degree. Ecuador has set up a 
Department of Meteorology and Hydrology (Dirección 
General de Meteorolo^ e Hidrología) with jurisdiction 
over the whole republic.^' 
Most countries have meteorological publications which 
" Los recursos hidráulicos de Chile, op. cit., and Study of water 
resources in Ecuador (Information document submitted at the 
eighth session of ECLA). 
March 1960. This institution complies with the general re-
commendations made by the ECLA/TAO/WMO Water Resources 
Survey Group, which undertook a mission in Ecuador in 1959. 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR RAINFALL AND/OR FLOW MEASUREMENTS 













National Department of 
Facilities and Navigable 
Waterways. Water and 
Electric Energy. 
Department of Meteoro-




Department of State Rail-
ways. Lloyd Aéreo Boli-
viano. Universidad Ma-
yor de San Andrés. De-
partment of Irrigation. 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
National Department of 




Rio Grande do Sul Elec-
tric Power Commission. 
Vale do San Francisco 
commission. 
Department of water and 
Electricity of SSo Paulo 
and Paraná. 




Chilean Air Force. 
Department of Irrigation. 











Institute of Water Utili-
zation and Electricity 
Development. 
Bogotá water and Sewage 
Company. 
State anterprises of Me-
delHn Colombian Air-
port Company. 




Costa Rican Electricity 
Institute (ICE). 
Inter-American Technical 
Service for Agricultural 
Co-operation. 
Panama. 
Bolivian Power Company, 
Ltd. 
Braden Copper Company. 
Panagra. 
The National Meteorolo-
gical Service records ob-
servations made, by all 
the officially-recognized 
rain gauges installed in 
the country administered 
by that Service, the Rail-
ways, and national pro-
vincial and private agen-
cies. 
Department of Irrigation 





None. Information is, how-
ever, exchanged among 
a number of institutions. 
Bogotá E l e c t r i c Power 
Company. 
National Federation of 
Coffee-Growers. Geophy-
sical Institute of the Co-
lombia Andes. 
The National Meteorolog-
ical and Hydrological 
Committee co-ordinates 
activities throughout the 
country. 
National Light and Power 
Company. Inter-Ame-
rican Institute of Agro-
nomics. Costa Rican Ba-
nana Company. Costa 
Rican Coal Company. 
Northern Railway C o m -
pany. 
Panagra. 
The Costa Rican Electri-




drológicos de Agua y 
Energía Eléctrica. 
Anuarios Hidrológicos de 
Construcciones Portua-
rias y Vías Navegables. 
Estadísticas Climatológicas 
of the National Meteo-




viométricos and Forgas 
Hidráulicas del Ministe-
rio da Agricultura. 
None. 
Partial centralization. 
Publications: Boletín del 
Instituto de Aprovecha-
miento de Aguas. 
Miscellaneous reviews. 








Table 20 (continued) 





















Section of Hydrology and 
Irrigation Planning (De-
partment of Public 
Works and Irrigation). 
Santiago Town Council 
Department of Meteorolo-gy-
Department of Civil Avia-
tion. 
Ecuadorian Army and Air 
Force. 
Observatory. 
Executive Committee on 
Communications in the 













Tropical Institute of Sci-
entific Research (Na-
tional University) De-






Ministry of Agricutlure. 
Department of Public 
Works. 
Ministry of Public Works. 









National Electric Power 
Commission. 
Inter-American Co-opera-
tive Service for Eco-
nomic Development 
(SCIFE). 
Cuban Aviation Company; 









El Salvadorian Railways. 
Santa Ana Electric Power 
Company. 




United Fruit Company. 
Mfeteorological Observa-
tory of San Marcial Se-
minary. 
Tela Railroad Company. None. 
Panama Canal Company 
(Section of Meteorol-
ogy and Hidrology). 
The Casa Blanca National 
Observatory has pro-
duced some publications. 
Department of Meteorolo-
gy and Hydrology (creat-
ed in March 1960). 
No centralization. Publica-
tions: Boletín Meteoro-
lógico de la Dirección 
General de Meteorolo-
gía. Boletín Meteoroló-
gico de la Armada. 
Publications by the Ob-
servatory. 
No centralization. Publica-
tions: Anales del Obser-
vatorio Nacional Meteo-
rológico. Boletín Meteo-
rológico of the Universi-
ty of El Salvador. 
Revista de la Asociación 
de Cafeteros. 
Information is exchanged 
and there is some co-
ordination among the 
principal institutions. 
Information is exchanged 




cal questions are publi-
shed by the Federal 
Electricity Commission, 
the Department of Hy-
draulic Resources and 
the National Irrigation 
Commission. 
Publications by the Pana-
ma Canal Company and 
by the Department of 
Statistics and Censuses 
of the Republic of Pa-
(Continued) 
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Table 20 (continued) 























Water and Irrigation De-
partment (Ministry of 
Development). 
Department of Irrigation 
(Ministry of Agricul-
ture). 
Peruana del Santa Cor-
poration. 
Meteorological Service. 
Department of State Pow-
er Plants and Tele-
phones (UTE). 
Ministry of Public Works. 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock. 
Venezuelan Development 
Corporation (Caroni) . 
Ministry of Defence. Na-




tive Company. Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation. 
Shell. 
Mene Grande Socony Va-
cuum Creole. 
Venezuelan Railways. 
Iron Mine Company of 
Venezuela. 
The Department of Me-
teorology administers 
and co-ordinates the ob-
servations throughout 
the country. 
With respect to flow meas-
urements, it co-ordinates 
its activities with those 
of the Ministry of De-
velopment and Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
The Department of Me-
teorology centralizes all 
meteorological informa-
tion, and publishes the 




A publication on hydrolo-
gical questions. 
A daily bulletin with ge-
neral information. 
None, Information is, how-
ever, exchanged among 
a few institutions. 
The Meteorological Ser-
vice centralizes informa-
tion and publishes a Bo-
letín and a Revista Me-
teorológica. 
The Meteorological servi-
ce centralizes a certain 
amount of information 
and publishes fortnightly 
bulletins and a yearbook. 
also cover hydrometeorological observations to a certain 
extent. In the field of fluviology, however, only Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Mexico issue publica-
tions. 
8 . STAFF AND LEVEL OF TRAINING 
Governmental and semi-governmental hydrological ser-
vices have developed at very varying rates in the different 
countries, and even within the same country notable 
disparities are to be observed among the organizations 
that take rainfall and flow measurements. The effective 
implementation of their activities is most frequently im-
peded by two factors whose influence is direct and im-
mediate: shortage of personnel and shortage of funds. 
With few exceptions, the people who work in this field 
are still paid at low rates in Latin America, although 
specialists in hydrology and hydrometeorology are hard 
to find there. 
At the lower, non-university, level of the observers, it is 
customary in a number of countries to employ people 
who have other activities as well, and who make the 
observations and fill in the forms sent to them by the 
head offices simply to earn more money (although they 
do occasionally work free of charge). 
The element of routine in the work of observation, the 
fact that it requires no special training, and the inadequate 
supervision exercised from above, sometimes lead to the 
gradual introduction of operational deficiencies and even 
to defects in the instruments which may pass unperceived 
for a long time in the data-processing offices with the 
inevitable consequences. 
Solely in the case of three countries could fairly complete 
and reliable information be obtained on the personnel 
engaged in hydrological and hydrometeorological activi-
ties, according to level of training, in the principal institu-
tions (see table 24) . 
The sample shows that, in relative terms, the greatest 
shortage of specialized personnel is at the intermediate 
level, and of non-specialized persons at the level of those 
who have completed their secondary school studies. 
Table 24 
PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HYDROLOGICAL AND HYDRO-
METEOROLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND STUDIES, 




Higher Intermediate Secondary Primary studies studies 
Argentina" . . . . 16 7 30 397 
Chile" . . . . . , 9 26 52 286 
Colombia' . . . . 16 16 17 598 
Water and Electric Energy in hydrological studies only. 
Department of Irrigation, ENDESA and the Chilean Air Force, 
in hydrological and hydrometeorological studies. 
The Bogotá Water and Sewage Company, the Valle del Cauca 
Corporation, MedelHn State entreprises and the Institute of 
Water Utilization, in hydrological and hydrometeorological stu-
dies. 
I l l 
A N N E X 
1. EVALUATION OF THE CROSS RUN-OFF POTENTIAL ON THE BASIS 
OF RAINFALL DATA CHECKED BY A STREAM-CAUCINC STATION 
Reference is made in point 4 of section I to the determination 
of the gross run-off potential of a region or a country; this is 
done by dividing the area into small sub-basins and using the 
hydrologic data provided by a stream-gauging station at the 
lowest point of each sub-basin. However, if this division involves 
areas greater than 400-500 square kilometres (a common situation 
in Latin America because of the lack of stream-gauging data) it 
is advisable to adopt the method indicated below, which involves 
a further sub-division into micro-areas by standard squaring (see 
figure I-A).^ Let A be the area in square kilometres of such a 
sub-basin, F the stream-gauging station, and t the length in kilo-
metres of the side of a single square. The average elevation H 
of each square above sea level can be calculated from a map at a 
suitable scale (1:500,000 to 1:250,000) showing contour lines. 
On the basis of extensive' rainfall data in the form of isohyetal 
lines it is possible to obtain the hydraulic contribution of each 
^ This method was proposed by the ECE Committee on Electric 
Power: see United Nations, Hydro-electric Potential in Europe and 
its Gross, Technical and Economic Limits (E/ECIVEP/lSl). 
' Ideally covering a period of 30 years. 
Figure I-A 
EVALUATION OF GROSS SURFACE POTENTIAL BASED ON 
FLUVIOMETRIC AND PLUVIOMETRIC INFORMATION 
A: Sea level 
H: Elevation above sea level (m) 
p: Mean annual depth of rainfall 
e: Mean annual evapo-transpiration loss 
F: River gauge station 
t: Side of each square 
Figure I-B 
BASIC DIAGRAM OF LINEAR GROSS POTENTIAL 
a) Longitudinal profile b) Diagram of potential 
HA and HB: Elevations at points A and B (m) 
Km A and Km B: Horizontal projection (km) 
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square to the total run-off Qm of the sub-basin, either by cal-
culating the average annual loss by evapo-transpiration for the 
whole area A," or by calculating this loss for each square (t') 
by one of the available empirical formulas (Vermeule, Khosla, 
Justin, etc.) on the basis of such veiriables as elevation above sea 
level, average temperature, rainfall, etc. In the second case a final 
correction is required, in the form of a proportional modification 
of the contribution of each square so that the run-off measured at 
F shall be equal to the sum of the contribution of each square. 
When the flow has been finally estimated as the contribution of 
each square to the flow Qm, V and the potential Ps can be de-
termined for each of the squares, and by addition for the whole 
basin. 
2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE CROSS RIVER POTENTIAL 
Point 4 of section I gave a general outline of the method of 
evaluating the gross river potential. Further details are given 
below, together with the graphic representation. 
Let the stretch of river concerned be AB (see figure I-B). 
The average annual flow should be known at each of these 
points, by direct verification (or direct verification and covariation, 
on the basis indicated for determining the gross run-off potential) 
from a statistical series covering a period of not less than twenty 
years. 
The elevation of the water level above sea level in metres at 
each point. HA, and HB, must also be determined. 
The maximum theoretical potential of the section concerned in 
kW is given by formula (2), which assumes a 100 per cent yield. 
' By one of the following formulas: 
S t=p - 31,536 Qm 
( i) ei = (Height of the water in millimetres), 
A 
where p is the annual precipitation in millimetres for each 
square, and 31,536 X 13 is the number of seconds in the year 
(ii) 62 = P — Qm (mVsec.), where 
S t'p 
P = represents the average annual volume equivalent 
31,536 
to rainfall on area A, expressed in cubic metres per second. 
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and represents the upper limit of the total output of a group of 
hydraulic power plants in series: 
(2)' P L = 9.8 
QA + QB 
( H A - H B ) 
where QA and QB are the values for the average flow immediately 
downstream of A and upstream of B, respectively, expressed in 
cubic metres per second. 
A graphic representation of this potential is given in figure I-B. 
Using rectangular co-ordinates and a given scale, elevations 
HA and HB are drawn as ordinates and flows QA and QB as abscis-
sae. The shaded area P represents the potential Pi, at the ap-
propriate scale. 
Figure I-C is a diagram representing the principal course of a 
river and two tributaries flowing into at points C and E. The 
second tributary has a small tributary of its own. It should be 
noted that a tributary consisting of a single stream is represented 
by a triangle such as BiCB, whereas when a tributary has another 
stream flowing into it, the basic diagrams are superimposed to 
form geometric figures like that at D1GD3HED. Variations in 
shading make it possible to distinguish between the potentials 
of the various components. It should be noted that points of 
equal elevation (at the basis of the diagrams of the tributaries) 
such as B and C (and D and E in the other example) represent 
the same place on the course of the main river, and are given 
' different letters only in order to indicate the river's flow including 
and excluding that of the tributary. 
The potential of a river system between its source and any 
point X on its main stream can be easily determined by measuring 
' on the appropriate diagram the area represented as above a 
* For the first section of the river the formula is reduced to: 
9.8 
P I . = — - Q B ( H A - H B ) 
horizontal line X-X drawn at the level of that point. Generally 
speaking the potential between any two points on a river is given 
by the area included between the horizontal lines drawn on the 
diagram to represent the elevations of the two points. 
Figure I-C 
DIAGRAM OF LINEAL GROSS POTENTIAL 
OF A RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES 
HA, HBO, HDE, HF: Elevations at points A, B, C, D, E, F (M ) 
QB, QO, QD, QE, QF: Flow at points B, C, D, E, F (mVsec) 
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